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
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The Self as Enterprise
Foucault and the Spirit of 21st Century Capitalism
PETER KELLY

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The Self as Enterprise

Foucault and the Spirit of 21st Century Capitalism

PETER KELLY
Edge Hill University , UK

GOWER

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CONTENTS

List of Tables *vii*
Acknowledgements *ix*

Chapter 1 **From Kevin 07 to Kevin 24/7** **1**

Chapter 2 **New Work Ethics and the Self as Enterprise** **7**

Chapter 3 **After (a) Method** **17**

Chapter 4 **Michel Foucault and the Care of a Self** **31**

Chapter 5 **Flexible Capitalism and the Brazilianisation of Work?** **49**

Chapter 6 **The Spirit of Twenty-First Century Capitalism** **71**

Chapter 7 **Better than Sex, and Toil and Drudgery** **95**

Chapter 8 **Stress and the Edge of Chaos** **113**

Chapter 9 **The Body, Mind and Soul of the Self as Enterprise** **137**

Chapter 10 **24/7 and the Problem of Work–Life Balance** **163**

Conclusion: Le laisser-faire, c'est fini *185*
References *199*

Index *213*

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LIST OF TABLES

5.1	Civilian Employment: Males and Females as a Percentage of Labour Force	56
5.2	Labour Force Participation Rates (Percentage of 15 to 64-year-olds in Labour Force)	56
5.3	Percentage of Civilian Employment: Agriculture	57
5.4	Percentage of Civilian Employment: Industry	57
5.5	Percentage of Civilian Employment: Services	58
5.6	Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment	60
5.7	Females as a Percentage of Part-Time Labour Force	60

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I dedicate this book to my daughter Georgia. I wish you all the best in trying to make some sense of a life, and in finding a place in this monstrous cosmos.

Finally I want to thank my parents who like many millions of people around the world struggled to make a living and provide for their family by working in jobs that often gave them a sense of worth and purpose, but, which were, in the end, profoundly damaging to their health and well-being. Thank you.

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CHAPTER 1

FROM KEVIN 07 TO KEVIN 24/7

> Previous generations of the Australian Right have been variously dominated by old-style conservatives or social liberals: Deakin, Menzies, Fraser, Peacock and others. All supported the welfare state as a form of social insurance and an institutional corrective against market fundamentalism. This partly explains why, in the period of Deakinite Liberalism, it was possible for a number of Right–Left alliances to be formed to secure the passage of what can be described (in the context of the times) as progressive legislation. The Harvester Judgement of 1907, which legislated a minimum wage based on Justice Henry Bourne Higgins' determination of a living wage 'for human beings living in a civilised community' – defined not by market forces but rather from an entirely different values-base – is a case in point.
>
> John Howard, though, has always wanted to overturn the Harvester Judgement (as David McKnight has noted, Howard said in 1983 that 'the time has come to turn Mr Justice Higgins on his head'), and he was finally delivered his political dream when, following the 2004 election, his Senate majority enabled him to legislate away a century of hard-won protections for Australian families. But in doing so, Mr Howard is also in the process of unleashing new forces of market fundamentalism against youth workers; families trying to spend sufficient time together; and communities trying to negotiate with single, major employers experimenting with their newfound powers. Breadwinners are now at risk of working less predictable shifts, spread over a seven-day week, not sensitive to weekends and possibly for less take-home pay. The pressures on relationships, parenting and the cost and quality of childcare are without precedent.
>
> Kevin Rudd (2006) *Howard's Brutopia: The Battle of Ideas in Australian Politics*

At the end of 2007 the Australian electorate voted out – after 11 years – the conservative government of John Howard (leader of a Liberal/National Party coalition). They voted to replace this conservative government with the social democratic Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd. Kevin 07 – as his marketing machine dubbed him in the lead up to the election – was seen by many commentators to be a younger, possibly more progressive, but certainly not a radically different version of the then 68-year-old Howard. For these commentators Kevin Rudd, and the government that he would lead, was best characterised as socially progressive (in areas such as the environment, indigenous affairs and education) but, significantly,

economically conservative. I am not a political scientist and this book is not about this election campaign and the change of government (see Brett 2007 for an account of these events/processes). However, there are some aspects of the Labor Party's policies and the work practices, even work ethic, of Kevin Rudd and some of his senior ministers that are of interest in terms of what I want to do in this book. Some of these issues are hinted at in the opening quote to this chapter where Rudd's concerns about the Howard government's industrial relations policies, and their claimed impact on working families and work–life balance issues, are situated against a tradition of conservative support for legislative protection for working people against the harshest excesses of unfettered free markets.

During the 11 years of conservative government from 1996 to 2007 the ways in which the Australian labour market was imagined and regulated were transformed by a series of legislative processes, and, as I will argue throughout this book, by cultural, technological and economic transformations that have changed the nature and meanings of work and the sorts of behaviours and dispositions imagined as being necessary for ongoing participation in paid labour. However, and at the risk of sounding repetitive so early in a book, I am not a human resources or industrial relations expert, and a history of these changes is not my chief concern here. Notwithstanding my claims about what this book is *not* about, a significant element of the Labor Party's election campaign revolved around a prolonged attack on the Howard government's Work Choices industrial relations policy, and a pledge to overturn many of the principles and practices that shaped and emerged from Work Choices. Much of this campaign came to be framed by an oft-repeated reference to Australia's *working families*: a phrase, a signifier, a metaphor that was designed to hail, call out to, even *interpellate*, large numbers of working and middle class, mortgage holding, wage and salary earning family members who might come to recognise themselves, their circumstances, their concerns and anxieties, their aspirations in ways framed by Kevin 07, the Labor Party and their campaign strategists. One of the central concerns of working families, it was suggested, were the demands placed on families by uncaring, even hostile employers who were chiefly interested in extracting as much surplus value from wage and salary earners as possible in the pursuit of performance, productivity and profits. Such employers, it was claimed, were uninterested in family and carer responsibilities; in family members being able to spend time together in the pursuit of a variety of non-employment related activities; in the different demands different family members might have to meet that could clash with the expectations of paid employment. Women, single parents and young people were held to be especially vulnerable in these contexts. Most paid labour markets, it was suggested, still operated with the model of the ideal worker as male and unencumbered by carer/family responsibilities as a consequence of being single or having the support of a *good woman* (wife, mother, housekeeper).

The mythology/symbolism of *working families* played powerfully in the campaign: in concert with a variety of other factors it was a significant element in Labor's victory (Brett 2007).

Fast forward to May 2008. The Labor government has been in office nearly six months and is in the middle of its first significant, prolonged policy dilemma in the context of the Global Financial Crisis, and a sharp rise in petrol prices driven by supply and demand issues and speculative activity in futures and commodities markets. At this time a number of confidential Cabinet documents were leaked to the media: these pointed, apparently, to conflicting advice and dissenting voices in relation to policy responses to these issues. Once again, my claim to a lack of expertise and interest in political science would suggest that my focus on these events lies in a different direction to any possible comment or analysis about the politics (personalities, processes, policy machinations) at play here. Indeed, my interest here – and it is one that attracted much media commentary at the time – is that these leaks allegedly came from disgruntled, even over-worked and stressed, middle ranking and senior public servants who were said to be angry at the apparently uncaring, even hostile demands by their employer to work excessive hours with little regard for their other commitments and responsibilities as members of *working families*: 'From the early weeks of the new Government's tenure, there has been complaints about workload, the demands being made on both ministerial staff and public servants, and whether the relentless pace demanded by the Prime Minister dubbed "Kevin 24/7" is sustainable' (Grattan, 2008).

The front page of the Melbourne based *The Age* newspaper of 31 May 2008 features a large picture (one quarter of the broadsheet sized page) of Kevin Rudd in an unbuttoned blue shirt (*sans* jacket) poring over briefing documents, head resting on his left hand. He sits at a desk/table behind a place card that identifies him as *Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister*. In the top left hand corner of the photo is the headline that accompanies the story: *It's 24/7 if you want to work for Kevin ...* (Grattan, 2008). In the bottom left hand corner is a quote attributed to Rudd (extracted from the story) that says, '*I believe that the Australian community at large expect all of us to work really hard.'* In the article itself these words are preceded by the following quote, which is also attributed to Rudd: '"*One of the criticisms we've got ... which I find remarkable, is that we're working too hard ... We are elected to govern ... and the public service are here to support the Government ... It is hard ...* "'

The article's author, *The Age's* respected political editor Michelle Grattan, begins her story with another quote from Rudd: *'"Frankly I do believe in burning the midnight oil,"* Kevin Rudd declared yesterday, in face of ever-louder groans from weary public servants. The trouble is, he also lights the burner before dawn. As one public service talk back caller told ABC radio yesterday, "*Fair go, if you are on board early in the day, don't expect them to be there late at night too*"*.'*

Grattan – who in this article at least was sceptical of the claimed link between stressed, disgruntled, over-worked public servants and the series of cabinet leaks – nonetheless sketches and reports on an apparently gruelling, round-the-clock work cycle in particular parts of the Prime Minister's office, and related Cabinet and media offices: a schedule that she claims has much to do with a 24/7 media cycle.

Since the time of these stories from the early days of a new government, the political landscape in Australia is much altered. Kevin Rudd was replaced as Prime Minister by a party revolt in June 2010. His replacement, one-time loyal deputy Julia Gillard, took the country to the polls in an election in August 2010, which resulted in the Labor Party forming a minority government with the support of independent and Green members of parliament.

Now it is possible that much of this story is, in truth (a nebulous concept in the 24/7 globalised, (old and new) media environment in which politics is played), a media beat-up. It is possible that the anonymous callers to talk back radio are not, in fact, disgruntled, or stressed, or over-worked, or even public servants. But in the context of the story to be told in this book the truthfulness (or otherwise) of these elements is not my concern (again!). Rather, I am interested in the ways in which Kevin 07, who so passionately and successfully – and in his own words – called out to the concerns and aspirations of working families, could, so quickly and stridently – again in his own words – be re-cast as *Kevin 24/7*. A re-casting that – through his own words – positioned him as a demanding, relentless, uncaring boss who, apparently, is unable to understand that his advisors may have other things to do in their life other than work or be on call 24/7: '*"I understand ... that some public servants are finding the hours a bit much ... I've simply got news for the public service – there'll be more ... The work ethic of this government will not decrease, it will increase"*' (Grattan 2008, 1).

(NEW) WORK ETHICS?

The figure of Kevin 24/7, and the demands that are placed on those who work for such a figure, speaks directly to some of my key concerns about work, the way it is imagined, regulated and performed, and its role in many people's lives at the start of the twenty-first century. This story of the morphing of Kevin 07 into Kevin 24/7 says something about the ways in which the concept, the idea, the symbolism of the work ethic can continue to be invoked to position your government, yourself, in a virtuous space in relation to those who apparently don't share or exhibit this ethic. The idea of the work ethic, it would seem, is not dead. It continues to have some purchase in what might be called the popular imagination.

Such a figure also alludes, a little less directly, a little ambiguously, even ironically, to the ways in which I want to explore the issues that interest me here.

This approach should become clearer as the discussion develops – particularly through the two chapters that immediately follow. My intent is to draw on existing research; on a mix of theoretical and methodological traditions; on metaphors, allusions, figures to be found in, or which shape, a variety of cultural artefacts and conversations about persons, about work, about the self in twentieth and twenty-first century capitalism. These ideas, forms of data, existing artefacts will be examined and analysed in ways that suggest that at the start of the twenty-first century we can identify new work ethics that provide novel *ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of a life* (Weber 2002). That at the start of the twenty-first century, in the globalised, risky labour markets of the over-developed economies, *the cultivation of the self as an enterprise* is the life-long activity that should give meaning, purpose and direction to a life.

From the outset such a bald or bold statement should provoke some caution, even scepticism. Much of what follows will pay heed to that caution and scepticism. Indeed, my main purpose in this book is not so much to present and analyse evidence that would establish, beyond doubt, that the cultivation of the self as enterprise is the one thing that gives meaning and purpose to life at the start of the twenty-first century. What I intend, instead, is to think of what it means to imagine the self as enterprise. How does such a formulation enable us to think about such things as the forms of personhood demanded by globalised, precarious labour markets, and the character and consequences of such things as freedom, choice, responsibility, autonomy and power in these spaces?

At the turn of the twentieth century Max Weber published his provocative and highly influential essay *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism*. At a very general level Weber's purpose was to explore the particular virtues that should be seen as attaching to work, and the particular influence that certain Protestant sects had on articulating these virtues. One hundred years later it may be timely to describe and analyse the particular virtues and ethical injunctions that attach to work in twenty-first century, globalised, flexible capitalism – a context in some ways similar to the one that Weber set out to explore, but one, also, that is markedly different.

In this task I will take as my guide the work of one of the most influential thinkers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Michel Foucault (for example, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1991a). I use the term *guide* with a particular purpose in mind. This purpose will be made clearer in the following chapter. A guide can provide direction, openings, suggestions and provocations without determining, in advance, each step or the point of arrival. The work of Foucault can, in different ways, open possibilities for exploring the limits of thinking about the issues I identify here, for writing about them, for imagining where and how it is that we might look at these issues.

Hence the title of this book. A title that makes reference to the provocations of individuals whose work can be seen as opening up new avenues for thinking about the ways in which we are encouraged, even compelled to imagine ourselves as workers, or as persons who want to work. In these conceptual spaces I will situate what I understand as an ethic of enterprise. This ethic provides frameworks for coming to know and understand how one should act, behave and think in relation to specific ends, and in particular, limited, fields of possibilities. These ethics are culturally and historically located; they are produced and circulated within generalised, and more specific, configurations of time and space – such as families, relationships, schools, offices, factories, communities. These frameworks function as truths in terms of the ways in which they are translatable through time and space; in the ways in which they have, and produce, significant resonances in particular times and spaces.

CHAPTER 2

NEW WORK ETHICS AND THE SELF AS ENTERPRISE

NEW WORK ORDERS?

Much of my interest with what I am calling new work ethics and the self as enterprise will be situated in relation to recent and continuing debates about the nature of work related identities and the consequences of the intensification of the work regimes in which these identities are produced, regulated and performed. These discussions are set against an apparently profound transformation of the world of work in economies such as the US and Canada, the UK, Europe, Australia and New Zealand – which is not to suggest that in an increasingly globalised context these economies are identical in the various forms of regulation that shape participation in paid labour markets. These concerns are made explicit in a number of best selling texts, including Richard Sennett's (1998) *The Corrosion of Character* and (2006) *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Ulrich Beck's (2000) *The Brave New World of Work*, Zygmunt Bauman's (2001) *The Individualized Society* and (2005a) *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*, and Jeremy Rifkin's *The End of Work* (1995). These texts have in common a sense that processes of globalisation, energised and enabled by electronically enabled, microprocessor based technologies, and accompanied by radicalised narratives of competition and performance, have profoundly transformed both the material reality of paid work in many of the industrialised nations, and the ways in which those who want to work should be imagined.

In this literature reference is made to the emergence of widespread anxieties and uncertainties as individuals work away at their own Do-It-Yourself (DIY) biographical projects in increasingly globalised settings (Beck, 1992). Broadly speaking, it is suggested that a globalising risk society has restructured the demand for labour intensive manufacturing and service jobs, and witnessed the emergence of an increased demand for *flexibility*, *casualisation*, *up-skilling*, *multi-skilling*, *life-long learning*, and *core* and *peripheral* workforces. These processes have rendered the world of paid work uncertain and risky for most, if not all, participants and those who wish to participate in various labour markets. What is more, these labour markets are segmented and shaped by age, gender, ethnicity, ability and geography – a structuring that profoundly impacts on individual and

collective experiences of these labour markets. For Ulrich Beck (2000, 3) in the *brave new world of work* 'one future trend is clear. For a majority of people, even in the apparently prosperous middle layers, their basic existence and lifeworld will be marked by endemic insecurity. More and more individuals are encouraged to perform as a "Me & Co.", selling themselves on the marketplace'.

Zygmunt Bauman has been a key, and provocative (therefore controversial), contributor to these sorts of debates. Anthony Elliott (2007, 3–18) argues that Bauman ranks as 'one of the world's most influential social theorists and politically engaged public intellectuals', whose theory of liquid life provides a 'reflective reconfiguration of the institutional and personal domains for the analysis of modern societies'. Bauman's (2000, 2003, 2004, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) prolific, innovative and suggestive cultural sociologies of *liquid life* have opened up a range of possibilities for exploring the globalised social, cultural, economic and political landscapes of the twenty-first century. For Bauman (1997, 119) a cultural sociology of liquid life is informed by a sociological imagination that embraces a 'tolerance and equanimity towards the wayward, the contingent, the not-wholly determined, the not-wholly understood and the not-wholly predictable'.

At this time it is worth sketching some of the central features of Bauman's thesis on liquid life to situate a sense of some of the limits and possibilities, some of the ironies and ambiguities that should attach to, and frame our thinking about processes of individualisation and choice in the liquid lifeworlds (work, family, consumption) of the twenty-first century. For Bauman (2007, 7–8) we inhabit 'an individualized, privatized version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual's shoulders'. In these structured and structuring spaces it is the 'patterns of dependency and interaction whose turn to be liquefied has now come. They are now malleable to an extent unexperienced by, and unimaginable for, past generations'. However, as is the way with liquids, these patterns, relationships and interactions 'do not keep their shape for long. Shaping them is easier than keeping them in shape'. Bauman (2000, 113–114) contrasts his ideas of liquid life with a more *solid*, *heavy* modernity: 'the epoch of weighty and ever more cumbersome machines, of the ever longer factory walls enclosing ever wider factory floors and ingesting ever more populous factory crews, of ponderous rail engines and gigantic ocean liners.' In making these comparisons he suggests that we can sense that: 'Solids are cast once and for all'. However, and in ways that have strong connections to the ideas that I want to explore here: 'Keeping fluids in shape requires a lot of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success of the effort is anything but a foregone conclusion' (Bauman 2000, 7–8). Uncertainties, anxieties and fears accompany, for Bauman (2005b, 2), the flow, the lightness, the exhilaration that can also be the hallmarks of a liquid life: the forms of anxiety that 'haunt such a life are the fears of being caught napping, of failing to catch up with fast-moving events, of being left behind, of over-looking "use by" dates

… of missing the moment that calls for a change of tack before crossing the point of no return'. Liquid life is, in this sense, characterised by a 'succession of new beginnings – yet precisely for that reason it is the swift and painless endings, without which new beginnings would be unthinkable, that tend to be its most challenging moments and most upsetting headaches'. For those of us compelled to live a liquid life, a life of dizzying change, apparent choice and opportunity, as well as open-endedness and uncertainty, we tend to 'focus on things we can, or believe we can, or are assured that we can influence'. In living a liquid life 'we try to calculate and minimize the risk that we personally, or those nearest and dearest to us at that moment, might fall victim to the uncounted and uncountable dangers which the opaque world and its uncertain future are suspected to hold in store for us' (Bauman 2007, 11). In a very general sense, and in ways that open the spaces for thinking about these dilemmas and challenges, the individual, the person who is compelled to live a liquid life, because of the *monstrous cosmos* (Weber 2002) into which they are born, is confronted with a range of challenges, opportunities, uncertainties, choices. And needs to have developed, or have the capacity to develop, a set of behaviours, dispositions and skills that equip them to meet the challenges and make the choices characteristic of a liquid life: 'Among the arts of liquid modern living and the skills needed to practise them, getting rid of things takes precedence over their acquisition' (Bauman 2005b, 2).

I will revisit some of these ideas in what follows to think about the challenges that Bauman's work sets social science, particularly given the critiques that have targeted the supposed 'epochal' character of Bauman's work (see, for example, du Gay 2007).

WILLING SLAVES?

Under these admittedly generalised circumstances I am interested in examining and analysing the ways in which persons are expected to practise their freedom in relation to the world of paid work at the start of the twenty-first century. These relationships are not only located morally, instrumentally and physically in places of work. Indeed, my interest here is in the ways in which certain work ethics – certain ways of being a person who *works* – are also connected to ways of being a parent or partner, being dependent or independent, being young or mature, being professional or unprofessional, being entrepreneurial or not.

The processes I refer to here have transformed the spaces in which work is imagined. So that new narratives of work, of its value, of who participates in it, and how this participation is structured have emerged and been articulated, by employers, unions and governments. Twenty-first century, 24/7, flexible capitalism creates new demands for those who work, and those who want to work, to imagine that their performance at work is determined by their health, fitness, relationships and

work–life balance. Increasingly, all aspects of a worker's life have come to be seen as performance related, and consequently of interest to those who employ them (or fire them).

Madeleine Bunting's (2004, xiii–xvi) *Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture Is Ruling our Lives*, presents and analyses data posted to her *Working Lives* column on *The Guardian* website. Bunting solicited email contributions from readers on the subject of *overwork*. Some of these she followed up in face-to-face interviews. She suggests that the overwhelming response to her call for contributions reveals the 'sheer invasive dominance of work in people's lives, and the price it exacted on their health and happiness'. For Bunting *work–life balance* 'was an inadequate label for the set of issues' that energised the responses she received from contributors. She argues that the UK has 'become a more work-centred society than ever; it demands more of us than ever, and it also purports to fulfil more of our needs than ever'. As one of her contributors – a civil servant – noted: '*I enjoy what I do and I work hard. But ... I feel owned and more so every day. Due to all the mission statements, "values", imposed ways of behaving and having to be always get-at-able (you must be accessible by mobile phone, must give an address when you are on leave, must leave a number when you are at a meeting ...) I feel that I have no privacy left.*' In a similar vein an Australian Council of Trades Unions (ACTU 2001) occupational health and safety (OH&S) campaign Stress @ Work drew on a variety of Australian and overseas studies to highlight 'the health, social and economic costs of the rising incidence … [of] stress at work, resulting from precarious employment, excessive workloads and unreasonable demands being placed on Australian employees'. The campaign argued: 'The more stressful the workplace, the greater the likelihood that employees will suffer from fatigue, anxiety, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, panic attacks, depression, cardiac disorders, backache and other muscular syndromes, with a resultant rise in workplace injuries and absences' (see also Kelly and Colquhoun, 2003, 2005).

Bunting (2004, xv) is keen to emphasise that her book is not 'a diatribe against work'. For the range of damaging consequences I have just touched on here, there is another dimension to the contemporary world of paid work, an ambivalence associated with the identification and analysis of workplace identities at the start of the twenty-first century. Bunting acknowledges a point that will be central to understanding the themes I will explore in this book: namely, that for many of us work is not *drudgery*. For many contributors to Bunting's column paid work is 'stimulating, exciting and rewarding'. Helen Trinca and Catherine Fox (2004, 3) – at the time editor and deputy editor, respectively, of the *Australian Financial Review's* leadership and management magazine *AFR BOSS* – structure a discussion of the roles that paid work plays in the lives of Generation X workers through this very theme. The title of their book says much about the argument they set out to develop: *Better than Sex: How a Whole Generation Got Hooked on Work*. Their discussion examines the tensions generated in new work regimes that demand ever-

increasing levels of commitment and performance, and which promise substantial rewards in terms of a sense of achievement, worth and of self. For many people whom Trinca and Fox interviewed and spoke to work is something that could not compete with sex for 'glamour, excitement and emotion, but it's close'. However, because it takes up so much of so many people's lives – in terms of hours worked, in terms of hours spent thinking/worrying about it, in terms of dreaming about it, or it interrupting sleep/recovery time – work can 'drain people of the energy, time and desire that make sex and intimacy happen. It can push away love, deaden our interest in others and flatten our horizons – and yet still rate as the most important part of our life'. Indeed, on so many levels work, and its place in our lives, can be 'more fulfilling, empowering, constant and controllable than … [our] sex life. Better, in so many ways …'

A point to stress at this stage: as workers in the liberal democracies we are free to choose and to act, but to be employable or successful in the world of flexible capitalism we have to choose to act in certain ways – or suffer the consequences. *Willing*, in this sense, should be understood as both ambiguous and ironic.

The nature of our *willing* participation in the world of paid work – a willingness that can often exact damaging consequences at the same time as it can produce and provide a range of positive, even exhilarating, dimensions to a sense of self – constitutes one aspect of Richard Sennett's (1998, 2003, 2006) sustained, critical engagement with the culture of flexible capitalism. In a recent book – based on a series of lectures he gave at Yale University in 2004 (The Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics and Economics) – he is interested in what he calls the cultural dimensions of the 'new', 'flexible' capitalism. More specifically: 'What values and practices can hold people together as the institutions in which they live fragment?' (Sennett 2006, 3). There is much to agree with in Sennett's attempt to explore and worry about the answers we are currently offered to this question. Indeed, in the following chapters I will return in more detail to Sennett's work to take up and examine some of these concerns. However, there is also much I would argue with in his analysis, and it is these points of difference that can provide a bridge to the sort of work I will put Michel Foucault to – so to speak. But first to a sketch of the points that Sennett develops in order to make these distinctions.

Sennett (2006, 3–5) suggests that only a particular, 'ideal' kind of person can successfully negotiate the 'unstable, fragmentary social conditions' of the flexible capitalism he identifies. For Sennett this ideal self is forced to confront and negotiate three significant challenges. The first of these is a *matter of time* – in the sense that flexible capitalism requires that the self has the capacity to juggle short term relationships, and a sense of self 'while migrating from task to task, job to job, place to place'. This challenge can mean that in the event of a lack of an institutional frame to support a coherent personal narrative then the 'individual may have to improvise his or her life-narrative' (what Beck would call a DIY self).

The second challenge identified by Sennett relates to the need for the working self to continually re-skill, multi-skill and/or display new skills that are in some way marketable – all in a 'meritocratic' environment that celebrates and rewards 'potential ability rather than past achievement'. In other words: *OK, that was yesterday, but what can you do today or tomorrow?* This second challenge leads to a third – a challenge that requires a self that is capable of continually letting go of the past. To illustrate this challenge Sennett refers to a statement from a CEO that 'no one owns their place in her organization, that past service in particular earns no employee a guaranteed place'. For Sennett a rather 'peculiar trait of personality' is needed to live with this particular challenge. In sum, the challenges posed by the new, flexible capitalism require forms of identity that are ambiguous at best, physically and mentally damaging at worst: 'A self oriented to the short term, focused on potential ability, willing to abandon past experience is – to put a kindly face on the matter – an unusual sort of human being.' In Sennett's mind most 'people are not like this, they need a sustaining life narrative, they take pride in being good at something specific, and they value the experiences they've lived through. The cultural ideal required in new institutions thus damages many of the people who inhabit them'.

This is an argument that will be well known to those familiar with Sennett's work over the last decade. It is an argument that is supported through empirical work and analysis that builds on, and extends from a largely qualitative, ethnographic base. And it is at the level of analysis that I take some issue with Sennett's argument. At this point my concerns can be identified as relating to Sennett's critique itself resting on an ideal self. A self identified as 'most people'. And a self that appears to bear the weight of a *human nature* that is at risk of fragmentation; is pressured for continual renewal; is subjected to demands to continually up the *ante* in terms of performance; is not allowed to rest. All of which, as the discussion thus far indicates, I have some sympathy with. But the resort to a human nature, thus framed, leaves little room to account for the *willingness* Bunting identifies, the excitement, thrill, *sexiness* of work for many in Trinca and Fox's discussion – with all the irony and ambiguity that should attach to these terms. And in the end this self appears to be in need of liberation; it needs to be set free in ways promised, but not delivered, by the flexible spaces of production and consumption in the new capitalism – unchained, so to speak, from the '*iron cage*' (*shell as hard as steel* as Baehr and Wells (2002) translate the original) of Weber's characterisation of bureaucratic, industrial capitalism. These concerns, to be given further discussion in later chapters, enable me, at this point, to put Foucault to work.

I see the use of Foucault in largely – but not solely – utilitarian terms. I take seriously a conversation between Foucault and Gilles Deleuze (1977) which makes a strong argument that theories, concepts, ideas constitute an intellectual toolbox. These tools can be useful in some contexts, and not others. You shouldn't, as the saying goes, *use a hammer to crack an egg*. However, a craftsman [sic] can

use tools well/appropriately in a particular context to do a good job (and others can then pass judgement on how well the job is done!). It can also be argued that a knowledge of particular tools can enable the user to see a problem in a particular way, a way that suggests that certain tools are appropriate both to envisage the problem and then to work through/tackle the problem. All of which is a means to say that Foucault's later work on the care of the self, the central part played by an analysis of the relationships between knowledge/power/subjects in this work, the focus on the ways in which forms of management and regulation, and practices of the self interact to shape the ways in which we practise our freedom in neo-liberal spaces, and a refusal to ground this analytic in a theory of the Subject enables me to focus on what I call *an ethic of enterprise*. Foucault's work can, I will argue, allow us to imagine and engage with the ambiguity and irony of the apparent willingness and sexiness associated with new work regimes. Regimes which can at the same time exact a heavy toll on those who are required to practise their freedom in particular ways in these settings.

In an interview shortly before his death in 1984, Foucault sets out his concern with understanding power, freedom and the self in certain ways. A brief account from 'The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom' (2000a, 282–285) gestures towards the ways in which I will explore and develop Foucault's intellectual legacy:

> Foucault: *I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because if it is not treated with precautions and within certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his origin, and reestablish a full and positive relationship with himself. I think this idea should not be accepted without scrutiny …*
>
> *This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation …*
>
> Question: You say that freedom must be practiced ethically …
>
> Foucault: *Yes, for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom?*
>
> Question: In other words, you understand freedom as a reality that is already ethical in itself.
>
> Foucault: *Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection.*

THINKING THE SELF AS ENTERPRISE

It is in the practices of freedom, in the play of power relations, and in the irony and ambiguity of *willing* that I want to identify and locate – via the work and legacy of Max Weber and Michel Foucault among others – a range of incitements, encouragements and injunctions to develop particular ethical dispositions to the conduct of a working life. In a capitalism that has been variously described as post-industrial, information/knowledge based, *flexible*. Taking a lead from Weber, we can imagine, in this sense, that the *essence* of the *spirit of twenty-first century flexible capitalism* is that the cultivation of self as enterprise is *the* calling to which individuals should devote themselves. That is, twenty-first century flexible capitalism is energised by a spirit that sees in the cultivation of the self – as an ongoing, never-ending enterprise – an *ethically slanted maxim for the conduct of a life*. The cultivation, conduct and regulation of the self is a never-ending project shaped by an ethic of enterprise that promises to support, facilitate and energise this project. This spirit is analysable as an institutionally structured, individualised entrepreneurialism; a structured series of incitements to manage the lifecourse as an entrepreneurial DIY project. This is a project that requires us to know and govern ourselves in ways that facilitate the pursuit of this calling.

The self as enterprise is required to think of itself, imagine the work that it should do on itself within a widespread, embracing set of normative terms that seek to position the self as entrepreneurial, active, autonomous, prudential, risk aware, choice making and responsible (Kelly 2006). The self as an enterprise is a self that is capable of both continuing to engage in the enterprise of the self, and in the enterprises of production and consumption. This self is required to develop a certain self-awareness, a particular self-understanding, a type, form and level of reflexivity that equips it to exercise a well regulated autonomy. This form of selfhood should also have the capacity to exercise, on a continual, ongoing basis, practices of freedom that require the exercise of choice, and acceptance of the responsibilities for the consequences of choices made, or not made. Especially in relation to what it means to be a worker in the globalised, risky labour markets of the over-developed economies of the liberal democracies.[1] In this sense, we all, as individual entrepreneurs of our own biographies and portfolios of choice and achievement, carry an increasingly onerous burden. Individualisation processes increasingly locate the self as the space/site in which the tensions, risks, contradictions, paradoxes, ambiguities and ambivalences of globalised, rationalised capitalism are to be resolved and managed – or not (Kelly and Harrison 2009).

1 In the September 2010 issue of *Harper's* magazine, in the 'Findings' section it was reported: 'Psychologists warned against drawing universal conclusions on the basis of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic, or "WEIRD" countries.' The temptation to use this acronym throughout this book is strong. But it is a temptation that I will resist.

In many respects the self as enterprise does not have a gender, or an ethnic background, or a particular age, or a specific geographic location. Though this may not be entirely accurate. It is possibly more accurate to imagine that gender neutrality assumes masculinity. That no ethnic background assumes 'whiteness'. That no age barrier means a productive, enterprising adulthood that runs from the mid 20s to the mid 40s. That having no place in effect means that cosmopolitan, post-industrial urban geography is what makes enterprise understandable, thinkable, possible. The particular character of the self as enterprise can be diverse, can accommodate an array of possibilities. What it means to be entrepreneurial, active, autonomous, prudential, risk aware, choice making and responsible can be relatively open. However, the expectations and norms of the self as enterprise take on particular limits and possibilities in different labour markets. Participation in these labour markets isn't about unlimited possibilities but rather suggestions, incitements, and demands to imagine and practise the self in ways that conform, more or less, to the norms that give shape to these fields. *You want to work here? These are the expectations!*

WHAT FOLLOWS

Chapters 3 and 4 aim to establish a theoretical and methodological frame for the ways in which I want to explore the self as enterprise and the spirit of twenty-first century capitalism. Social science can be done in a variety of ways. I make no claim for identifying the right ways in which such work should be done. Instead, in my quest for a method, and in my initial discussions about the ways in which Foucault understands enlightenment as an *ethos*, and the *untimely thinking* that accompanies such an ethos, I make a claim for troubling the limits and possibilities of what we know as social science. I am less interested in closing down the possibilities for a *social scientific imagination* (Mills 1970) that are promised by the certainties that might come from privileging particular forms of knowledge (as evidence), or in performing a particular ethos that sees critique largely in terms of judgement (Butler 2002). Rather, I am more interested in exploring how it is possible to think if we engage with the work of, for example, Michel Foucault, or Zygmunt Bauman or John Law or Judith Butler. And, in thinking in ways that are made possible from these perspectives, what space is made available for such things as irony, ambiguity and ambivalence in trying to apprehend the limits and possibilities of the self as enterprise.

Following this discussion, Chapters 5 and 6 consider, in the first instance, a number of the significant changes in (the *Brazilianised*?) labour markets of the industrialised, liberal democracies over the past 30 years; and, in the second instance, commence an engagement with a so-called spirit of twenty-first century capitalism in which I suggest that it is in the ongoing, ceaseless requirement to cultivate and to conduct the self as an enterprise that we can discern this spirit.

This first group of chapters are about framing the contexts and conditions in which we live and work in the industrialised, liberal democracies at the start of the twenty-first century; and the forms of selfhood – the self as enterprise – that are offered to many (if not all) of us as the normalised limits and possibilities of what it is to be an active, competent, reliable, employable person at this time. The chapters that follow this grouping are concerned with exploring how many of us experience these limits and possibilities. How we experience or might think about work when it is *toil and drudgery* or *better than sex*. What it might mean to think how, in the workplaces where we seek some sort of always precarious material and emotional salvation, if we *can't stand the heat we should get out of the kitchen*: that, indeed, stress is inevitable at the *edge of chaos*. How it feels to imagine that our *body, mind and soul* is something to be sold, or willingly given to our employers if we are to conduct the self as a successful enterprise. How we experience time when we come to know time in such terms as *24/7* (rationalised clock time consumes all time), *quality time*, *time as a commodity* (time rich, time poor). And how thinking about time and living/spending time in these terms creates concerns about work–life balance.

CHAPTER 3

AFTER (A) METHOD[1]

In another context (Kelly and Harrison 2009, 235) we made reference to Michel Foucault's (1994, xv–xxii) startling Preface to *The Order of Things* where he cited Jorge Luis Borges (*Other Inquisitions*) and his account of a *certain Chinese encyclopaedia*. That (fictional) encyclopaedia classified animals in the following way: '(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.' The *fabulous* character of such a list, argued Foucault, *troubles* the 'ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things'. The *charm* of thinking in such a way, of juxtaposing and creating correspondences between these objects in these ways, is that we are confronted with the limits and possibilities of our own systems of thought. Systems that provoke us to think in particular ways and not others. Systems that provoke the 'stark impossibility of thinking *that*'. When, as Foucault goes on to suggest, we 'establish a considered classification, when we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if they both are tame or embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have just broken the water pitcher, what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification with complete certainty?' Foucault's influential *archaeology of the human sciences* attempts to examine the *conditions of possibility*, the basis on which 'ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed'.

How is it, then, that we can know the self? The self as an enterprise? Twenty-first century capitalism? Part of what I want to do at this time is to think of what it means to cultivate a social scientific imagination (Mills 1970), to do social science, to write social science. And to imagine what might be some strategies for troubling the limits and possibilities of doing social science. I want to make explicit the ways of thinking that shape such questions, that enables them to be imagined in the first instance, and then to be asked in the form that they take.

1 The title pays due reference to John Law's (2004) *After Method*.

At one level it should be self-evident that *knowledge practices* in the social sciences (Law and Mol 2006) provide frameworks in which knowledge is produced, is imagined, is confirmed as being appropriate or legitimate, is understood as being truthful. At least in some respects, for now, or until someone engages with the claims and seeks to challenge, refute or agree with them. As Foucault and others (for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) have demonstrated, historical, though not inevitable, processes have produced a range of institutionalised knowledge practices in the social sciences, and in the diverse disciplines that make up this domain.

For John Law (2004, 28–29, original emphasis) the conduct of the natural and social sciences is, in part, a *literary exercise*, though, '*crucially, science is not just a literary exercise*'. Again, as literature (of varying quality), social science is not fiction. I cannot just write what I want. I cannot disregard the traditions, the rules, the methods, the practices of social science. As Law suggests: 'Natural (and social) science works with statements of a particular provenance. Thus statements do not idly freewheel in mid-air, or drop from heaven. They come from somewhere.' They emerge from particular ways of thinking and doing science in particular contexts, particular communities of practice and knowledge. Law indicates that if '*a statement is to last it needs to draw on – and perhaps contribute to - an appropriate hinterland*'. In his discussions of method, of knowledge practices, Law argues that 'it is the character of this hinterland and its practices that determine what it is to do science, or to practise a specific branch of science'. So, in thinking of how to pose, frame, examine and write about these issues as a social scientist I want to test some of the limits and possibilities of what I can think, say and do, as I keep in mind that, as Law points out, 'we can all dream up wish lists about the character of reality, but without support from other statements or inscriptions of an appropriate provenance they do not go very far'.

KNOWING CAPITALISM

> This is a book about what happened when capitalism began to consider its own practices on a continuous basis. This is a book about what happened when capitalism began to use its fear of uncertainty as a resource. This is a book about what happened when capitalism began to circulate new ideas of the world as if they were its own. This is a book about what happened when capitalism began to intervene in, and make a business out of, thinking the everyday. This is a book about capitalism at (serious) play.
>
> Nigel Thrift (2005, 1) *Knowing Capitalism*

Nigel Thrift (2005, 8–10) poses himself a number of similar challenges in his *Knowing Capitalism*. He introduces his project with an outline of three key aspects of the ground that might be covered in a new political economy, a political economy that would try to come to grips with some of the transformations that have reshaped the character of capitalism in the last 30 years. These aspects include what Thrift identifies as the *discursive power of the cultural circuits of capitalism*, the changing *form of the commodity*, and the ways in which time and space are reconfigured as a *productive grid of resources*. More on these later. At this time I want to take up and examine a number of the methodological and theoretical challenges that Thrift identifies in his knowing of capitalism.

In the first instance Thrift (2005, 3) tries to make explicit his position in relation to what he considers an oftentimes non-reflexive, *automatic response* to the problem of capitalism: 'Surely capitalism is a system of oppression whose only purpose is to grind out mass commodities? And surely its Dionysian side is just one more symptom of its wrong-headedness?' Thrift wants to adopt a more deliberately ambivalent, even pragmatic, position: one that recognises that capitalism can be oppressive, exploitative and 'hard graft' for many. But, it is 'also fun. People get stuff from it – and not just more commodities'. In this view capitalism 'has a kind of crazy vitality. It doesn't just line its pockets. It also appeals to gut feelings. It gets involved in all kinds of extravagant symbioses'. It is productive, it is performative, it 'adds into the world as well as subtracts'.

In some circles, as Thrift indicates (2005, 10–11), this is an unpopular, even *wrong-headed*, position, and one that attracts criticisms for displaying a lack of a political stomach for the difficult task of holding capitalism accountable for an array of consequences, effects and practices that should, rightly, be the object of critique and action. In due course I will develop a position on *critique*, *enlightenment* and *truth* that draws on Foucault's intellectual and political legacy, and which can respond to such criticisms by suggesting that they are framed by a limited, pre-determined sense of what constitutes a political stance, a political programme, political action, and who or what should be the target or object of this critique or action. Which is to suggest that I have some sympathy for the ambivalent, pragmatic position that Thrift (2005, 3) outlines: a position that imagines capitalism as a 'set of networks which, though they may link in many ways, form not a total system but rather a project that is permanently "under construction"'. We could even suggest, following such a claim, that there are more things in the heavens and on earth than capitalism.

As a project that is permanently under construction capitalism is also a project that is continually failing, continually escaping the ordering processes that organisations, managers, consultants, commentators and academics bring to bear in giving shape, meaning and purpose to behaviours and practices, ventures and initiatives. And, as a consequence, it is a project that continually energises the production

of newer, more sophisticated ordering devices and practices. As Thrift (2005, 1–3) argues, capitalism is marked at the same time – all the time – by innovation, inventiveness, routine, repetition, the new, the old, the uncertain, the tried and true. In this framework capitalism is 'only relatively stable and relatively predictable'; is characterised by 'all kinds of gaps and hesitations, excesses and remainders'; 'contains multiple spaces of oppression and lockdown, but it also contains little spaces of joy and generosity which cannot be locked out'; is 'enchanted'; is 'closer to the imaginary of the medieval world of dark superstitions and religious bliss than we fondly choose to believe'. Particularly, as Thrift suggests, if we are to imagine that managers of capitalist organisations are also uncertain, unsure and in the dark about 'what they are doing for quite a lot of the time'. Management as a *dark art*!

In a globalising world capitalism may be the main game in town, but the game isn't over, has no time limits (there appears to be no end to history), and its rules, regulations, outcomes, consequences, tools (equipment) and players continue to evolve in complex, uncertain and only sometimes predictable ways. The global, regional and local economic, political and social consequences of the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis, still echoing and unfolding in dramatic, if uneven, ways, in different contexts, is a powerful manifestation of these uncertainties and contingencies.

From this standpoint Thrift (2005, 2–5) argues that any analysis of this game should be framed by a number of *methodological rules*. These rules, for Thrift, enable capitalism to be made known in particular ways. Knowing, in this sense, would mean adopting a particular disposition towards a history of the present that would seek to acknowledge in our present 'vast numbers of unresolved issues, differences of interpretation and general confusions'. This present is indeed contingent – the past, present, and future are in effect shaped by a cascading series of possibilities, *what ifs*, *if onlys*, and a particular lack of a grand (intelligent) design. These ways of knowing would try to capture a sense of the performative nature of capitalism, a performativity marked by experiment, success, adaptation, complex change and the permanent possibility of failure, and of consequences that are/were not able to be imagined or planned for in any of the frameworks or models that fallible actors (human, machine, virtual) could design, develop and deploy. From this perspective the routine, the mundane, the everyday is as important to the performativity of capitalism as the new, the inventive, the *sexy*.

These methodological dispositions and standpoints – marked as they are by a considered ambivalence and pragmatism, even irony – offer an orientation to an analysis of twenty-first century capitalism that I have some sympathy for, but they do not necessarily resolve the challenges of knowing, ordering, naming.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM: EPOCHALISM?

Paul du Gay has been an influential and, at times, provocative commentator on and analyst of the *fetishisation* of identity within academic and managerialist discourses over the last 30 years or so: a fetishisation profoundly influenced and shaped by various feminist and *post* (colonial, modern, structuralist) discourses. Du Gay's particular contributions to these discussions and debates has been largely genealogical and somewhat sociological. He has been concerned with exploring and analysing identity in organisational and work contexts. In one of his more recent contributions to these discussions he indicates that his interests lie in shifting focus from more general socio-cultural accounts of the self in late or post modernity to a more 'historical and sociological understanding of the specific forms of personhood that individuals come to acquire in distinctive settings' (du Gay 2007, 13).

In du Gay's (2007, 43) account of a genealogical approach to the description and analysis of the 'relations that human beings have been enjoined to establish with themselves as certain sorts of person', he explicitly, and with the aid of the intellectual legacy of the likes of Max Weber, Marcel Mauss, Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose, establishes a distinction from what he, and others, characterise as *epochal*, generalised accounts of the ways in which transformations in the postmodern/post-industrial economy, work organisation and/or family might affect, or are causally related to, changes in identity. In particular he reference's Nikolas Rose's critique of Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman, and their accounts of reflexive and risk modernity and post/liquid-modernity, and the new forms of self that they identify as emerging from these contexts: 'Instead of assuming changes in identity from grand theoretical accounts of social and cultural transformations, Rose suggests that we should instead examine the intellectual and practical instruments and devices enjoined upon human beings to shape and guide their ways of "being human"' (du Gay 2007, 46).

At a later point in his book (Chapter 6, 'The Tyranny of the Epochal: Change, Epochalism and Organizational Casuistry') du Gay (2007, 137) ramps up his critique of what he sees as epochalism in both academic and managerialist discourses: 'I highlight its reliance on a logic of over-dramatic dichotomization that establishes the available terms of the debate and critique in advance, in highly simplified terms either for or against, and offers no escape from its categorical imperatives.' At this point he singles out the work of Scott Lash and John Urry (1994) – cutting them loose from an original group of so-called epochalists comprising Bauman (liquid modernity), Manuel Castells (the network society), Tom Peters (chaos/crazy times) and Charles Leadbetter (Knowledge Economy) – to illustrate his suggestion that whatever theorising/theorist in question (from this group) the analyses presented (in either a *bitterly pessimistic* or *dizzyingly*

optimistic frame) tend to be 'founded upon' and sustain a 'dualism that is also a periodization' (du Gay 2007, 138–139).

Now, in this book I want to, at various times, engage with the sort of generalised, macro level, even grand theorising/thinking that du Gay takes such exception to; and which, indeed, the likes of Nikolas Rose and many other Foucauldian governmentality theorists take aim at with the claim that such approaches may be *too* sociological. In the chapters that follow, the work of Lash and Urry, Giddens, Beck, Bauman and Sennett – some of the big names of Anglo-European-US sociology at the start of the twenty-first century – will be engaged to think about some of the broad characteristics and contours of twenty-first century capitalism and work regimes which are influential in the process that call for(th) the ethic of enterprise that interests me here.

My sense of du Gay's account of this so-called epochalism is that he himself tends to the overly-simplistic, the categorical, the dramatic that he finds fault with in this work. Indeed, his heading for the section in which he takes Lash and Urry to task points to these tendencies: *All or Nothing at All: The Extremism of 'Change'*. My concerns here raise fundamental methodological points for the analysis that I want to develop. It is possible to excavate and recuperate a number of powerful, useful, provocative insights from these *sociologies of our times* without arriving at the position occupied by du Gay or, in some respects, Rose. A useful example of this type of recuperation can be found in the work of Mitchell Dean (1999) who, from a largely genealogical analysis of risk rationalities, develops a notion of *reflexive governmentality* that draws on the reflexive modernization work of Beck, Giddens and Lash.

Any story can be told from a number of different perspectives, different levels and/or layers of analysis; from, or in, a number of different *registers* – as Gareth Morgan (1997, 348–349) indicates in his provocative and influential use of *images of organization* to analyse organisational practices, processes and behaviours:

> Hence the main invitation and challenge of this book: To recognize and cope with the idea that all theories of organization and management are based on implicit images or metaphors that persuade us to see, understand, and imagine situations in partial ways … Think 'structure' and you'll see structure. Think 'culture', and you'll see all kinds of cultural dimensions. Think 'politics' and you'll find politics. Think in terms of system patterns and loops, and you'll find a whole range of them …

The story that is told, or which emerges from these different registers will look different; will emphasise or analyse different subjects/objects; will make use of

different analytical concepts/frames; will deploy different rules of story telling, of what can and cannot be said, spoken or imagined. In thinking in this way I don't imagine that, in the end, I will end up nearer the truth or with a more accurate or complete picture of the things that are of interest to me in telling this story. Rather, what will emerge is a narrative that has some coherence, but which is built from a number of different – not entirely commensurable – registers. Each of these registers bear certain relationships to each other, but these relationships need not be seen or imagined as direct, or as cause-and-effect, or as constitutive. There are many ways in which things can relate to each other: incidentally, accidentally, inconsequentially, profoundly, haphazardly, literally, metaphorically, allegorically. All these words signal some form of relationship, and the character and nature of the relationship can be analysed and considered in a variety of ways to establish the contribution that such a relationship might make to the ways in which we come to know, to understand, to think about, to make sense of … something.

The building of coherence in the telling of the story – even if this coherence emerges from different registers – can have the effect of creating a sense that in subsequent tellings or re-tellings of these stories then the rules and terms of engagement are pre-set, pre-determined: as du Gay would say in relation to his group of epochalists the 'available terms of debate and critique' are determined in advance. Another way to approach this issue is to imagine that rather than determining the terms of debate such narratives serve to frame and to open up new fields of possibility. Indeed, Foucault (1991b), for example, argued that rather than providing a methodology he saw his work as providing a series of openings and beginnings – where these beginnings would lead or end was not something he could, or wanted to predict or control.

IMPOSSIBLE THINGS?

> 'There's no use in trying,' [Alice said]: 'one *can't* believe impossible things.'
>
> 'I daresay you haven't had much practice,' said the Queen. 'When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.'
>
> Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, cited in Law (2004, 1)

Over a number of years John Law (2000, 2004) has made a provocative contribution to ongoing discussions about what he and Annemarie Mol (2006) identify as *knowledge practices* in the social and the hard sciences (see also

Hacking 1999; Haraway 1997). Law's work is most often associated with studies of Science, Technology and Society (STS), actor network theory and a more generalised interest in complexities, heterogeneities and knowledge practices in the natural and social sciences.[2] In his *After Method* Law (2004) makes reference to a wider intellectual debt to the challenges and possibilities posed by feminism and post-structuralism to disciplines such as sociology, but at the same time firmly locates his project in STS. Law stresses that traditional scientific (social, *hard*) knowledge practices craft realities that, in many instances, produce knowledge, outcomes and consequences that have been, are, important – if not necessary. However, if, as Law (2004, 2) suggests, so much of the natural, the social and the cultural is 'vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct', then can the institutionalised, even standardised, rule-bound knowledge practices of the social sciences – quantitative and/or qualitative *methods* such as interviews, surveys, observations; forms of representation such as reports, theses, papers, monographs; practices such as interventions, programmes, reviews, audits – *capture* or *create* understandings that can account for these realities? Or do we need to 'teach ourselves to know some of the realities of the world using methods unusual to or unknown in social science'.

In exploring the limits of standardised method assemblages/knowledge practices Law (2004, 2–4) introduces and develops a number of frames to shape the ways in which the social sciences might think and know differently (a number of these draw on feminist and post-structuralist discourses). For example, he discusses knowing as embodiment where we come to know 'through the hungers, tastes, discomfort, or pains of our bodies'. Knowing as 'emotionality or apprehension' suggests, for Law, exploring 'private emotions' that bring into view the 'worlds of sensibilities, passions, intuitions, fears and betrayals'. Echoing feminist problematisations of discourses of objectivity and generalizability, Law proposes that we need to consider 'how far whatever it is that we know travels and whether it still makes sense in other locations and if so how. This would be knowing as situated inquiry'. In a final suggestion that points to allegory as a key motif in his discussions Law argues that we need to think about and embrace the sense that our ways of knowing – despite our desires to dress them up in pretensions of validity, certainty and rigour – are, indeed, imprecise and that, therefore, we need to 'find ways of knowing the indistinct and the slippery without trying to grasp and hold them tight. Here knowing would become possible through techniques of deliberate imprecision'.

Law's work is not unique, but it does provide – as a consequence of the traditions it emerges from, and the provocations it mounts in terms of how we might imagine the project and the conduct of the behavioural and social sciences – a generative vocabulary for capturing and locating much of what interests me in this space. A

2 See, for example, the resources/papers at http://heterogeneities.net/index.htm

key ordering concept that Law (2004, 144, original emphasis) develops (drawing on Deleuze and Latour) is his idea of *method assemblage*, which he describes as a 'continuing process of *crafting and enacting necessary boundaries between manifest absence and Otherness*'. Law uses this concept of method assemblage to make apparent what he calls the 'enactment of *presence*, *manifest absence*, and *absence as Otherness*'. Any method/methodology/assemblage 'makes something present by making absence'. Method assemblage, in playing with the relations between presence, manifest absence and absence as Otherness, tries to make explicit and imagine the consequences of the 'crafting, bundling, or gathering of relations' between these elements – between what Law identifies as 'in-here or *present* (for instance a representation or an object)'; between what is 'absent but also *manifest* (it can be seen, is described, is manifestly relevant to presence)', and, finally, between what is 'absent but is *Other* because, while necessary to presence, it is also hidden, repressed or uninteresting'. That which is Other, suggests Law (2004, 42):

> might range from things that everyone in question knows (how to do chromatography), through mundanities that no one notices until they stop happening (the supply of electricity), to matters or processes that are actively suppressed in order to produce the representations that are taken to report directly on realities (these would include the active character of authorship or the trail of continuities between statements and the realities that they describe).

My interests in the limits and possibilities of these knowledge practices that shape contemporary social scientific research and critique lead me to consider the roles that such things as irony, metaphor and allegory may have in troubling the governmentalised knowledge practices that shape the limits and possibilities of a social scientific imagination (Kelly 2011). In later parts of this book, for example, I question whether labour markets in the over-developed economies are becoming *Brazilianised*; I talk about different forms of work as being *toil and drudgery*, or *better than sex*; I try to imagine what it means to sell your *body*, *mind* and *soul* to secure ongoing work; I invoke the idea of an *edge of chaos* to think about stress and individual responsibility for managing stress. None of these terms, ideas, metaphors should be taken too literally. There is, at the least, some gentle irony attached to these allegorical terms. Sometimes the irony is more bitter. As irony, as metaphor, as allegory these titles or terms open up a space in which we can think in ways that might trouble the limits and possibilities of the conventions of social science.

Allegory, suggests Law (2004, 88–90) is the 'art of meaning something other and more than what is being said'. Meaning something *more* requires that allegory

also invokes the 'art of decoding that meaning, reading between the literal lines to understand what is actually being said'. Allegory, in part because of its often close affinity with metaphor and irony, can be powerful in gesturing to what might not be apparent at first glance, but which can strike us as profoundly truthful as its possible meanings emerge or materialise under a particular gaze. Allegory 'uses what is present as a resource to mess about with absence. It makes manifest what is otherwise invisible. It extends the fields of visibility, and crafts new realities out-there'. Often, also, it has the capacity to do 'something that is even more artful. This is because it makes space for ambivalence and ambiguity. In allegory, the realities made manifest do not necessarily have to fit together'. Allegory is, in many ways, a lost art-form when so much of the representational logics and practices of Anglo-European settings are dominated by particular, and limited, ideas about description, analysis, prescription and generalisation. The social sciences, media commentary and policy pronouncements gain weight and credence when they are imagined as being objective, transparent, rational and evidence based: 'Descriptions describe directly. This is the goal, and seemingly the achievement, of many or most of the dominant forms of representation in Euro-America.' But this achievement is not necessary: it is, indeed, an achievement within particular social, economic, political and technological configurations. It is an achievement that relies on a number of relationships, a number of presences and absences, including the following: the appearance of evidence based, scientific representations denies space to other forms of apparently less rigorous, less clear, less practical representations (including metaphor, irony and allegory). All representation is, at some levels, allegorical because all representation is, at some level, mediating/mediated: direct, evidence based representation is, in this sense, 'allegory that denies its character as allegory'.

Social science emerges from institutionalised spaces that demand particular approaches to knowledge production. These demands are not necessarily *bad*, as Foucault (1983) might say, but they do place limits on the ways, the methods that are considered appropriate for producing knowledge that is understood as useful. In these domains some can speak and others can't. Some things can be said and done and others can't. Certain ideas, stories, ways of producing knowledge are just impossible to imagine as being useful, appropriate, truthful, evidence based. And where useful signals something that is readily translatable, transferable, able to be operationalised by various agencies, departments, organisations in settings, processes and practices that maybe remote and abstracted from the times/spaces/places where knowledge is produced. The tensions and dilemmas I see here relate to what those things that are absent, Othered, impossible might contribute to our understanding if they could be imagined as possible. Because, as Law (2004, 92) argues, in our everyday, sense-making existence we are all – expert and non-expert, scientist and artist – 'allegorists'. We 'read between the lines and manifest realities that are not being spoken about in as many words'. We unsettle, interfere with the 'boundaries between that which is Othered and that which is manifest'. In this way

we can imagine allegory as a 'mode of discovery – so long as we understand that in a world of enactment, allegory is also crafting what it is discovering'. In addition, as allegorists we, much of the time, 'are crafting and manifesting realities that are non-coherent. That are difficult to fit together into a single smooth reality' (Kelly 2011).

It is in this context that the recent work of Zygmunt Bauman makes a provocative contribution to what might be called the *re-enchantment* of a social scientific imagination. Bauman (2007, 24) is explicit about the provisional, inconclusive and provocative dimensions of his work over much of the past two decades: 'I am fully aware of the "messiness" (complexity, multisidedness, heterogeneity) of reality that our common experience makes available to us.' However, given this messiness, 'I am also aware that models "adequate at the level of meaning", as Max Weber would say, are indispensable for any understanding, and indeed for the very awareness of the similarities and difference, connections and discontinuities that hide behind the confusing variety of experience.' His deliberate inconclusiveness, provocations and references to texts, ideas and sources outside of what might be called mainstream sociology is framed by Keith Tester (2007) in terms of irony, and in a re-reading and re-invigoration of what C Wright Mills identified as the *sociological imagination*. For Tester (2007, 90) Bauman's work sits – comfortably for some, less so for others – in a sociological tradition 'that is ironic about the status of sociology, which sees no reason to avoid certain books simply because they are found in different parts of the library, and which is concerned to recover the ambiguity of the human adventure from any trap into which it might fall or be pushed'.

It is readily apparent, suggests Tester (2007, 83), that Bauman's sociologies of postmodernity and liquid life are 'inspired to a considerable degree by literature'. For Bauman: 'understanding human dilemmas and torments is not the sociologists' privilege. Learning sociological methods may guarantee a job, but not wisdom and insight … I personally learned more about the society we live in from Balzac, Zola, Kafka, Musil, Frisch, Perec, Kundera, Beckett … than, say, from Parsons' (cited in Tester 2007, 83). Moreover, Tester (2007, 85) claims that 'Bauman's commitment to literature as a tool of irony, and therefore of the unsettling of the determinations of common sense', is illustrative of his conviction that 'the sociological imagination is quite independent of the discipline of sociology. One can be a paragon of the discipline and possess no sociological imagination whatsoever'. It is in this sense that Tester (2007, 82) locates Bauman's work in a European literary tradition which is fundamentally concerned with an 'exploration of how the meaning of the world has been transformed, from the place of wide open adventure into which Don Quixote rode, to the place of petty yet life-threatening officialdom and administrative opacity in which Kafka's unheroic heroes are consigned to dwell'. The question then is: 'How has it been that the transformation of a man into a

beetle, which for Don Quixote would have been a call to arms … has become just one more family embarrassment?'

Conceptually there are a number of key ideas that Bauman has developed in the last decade or so that are useful for thinking sociologically about the limits and possibilities of the self as enterprise, and the globalising social, cultural, economic and political conditions – material and discursive – of the last 30 or so years that makes the idea and the practice of the self as enterprise so compelling in the shaping of individual biographies. For example, in his *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor* Bauman (2005a) identifies and traces the ways in which work has been transformed in the economies of the liberal democracies; the relations of these transformations to changes in global spaces and flows which witness the *incorporation* of more of the world's population into rationalised, globalised and increasingly precarious paid labour markets (often as low paid, unskilled, expendable units of production); the related emergence and rise to dominance of an aesthetic of consumption over an older work ethic. There is much that might be discussed and developed here, particularly in terms of how these ideas also connect to a number of other frames of thought that Bauman has worked with in this period, including the liquid nature of what he calls life-politics, and the movement, in terms of the forms of personhood demanded by these circumstances, from *homo faber* to *homo consumens* with the triumph of a consumption culture.

However, the real value of Bauman's work has less to do with the empirical veracity or truthfulness of these and other concepts, and more to do with how, after reading Bauman, after struggling with what it is that he is suggesting, then our thinking, our sense of the limits and possibilities of our knowing, of what we can imagine has been pushed into different spaces.

In his *The Social Thought of Zygmunt Bauman* Tester (2004, 6) outlines the traits, the qualities of what he calls Bauman's 'sociological mission', but which can just as readily be seen as Bauman's *sociological imagination*. For Bauman the possibility is that sociology can show 'that things could be different to this; that where we perceive only necessity there is the chance of possibility'. This so-called *mission* is shaped by and shapes an array of *analytical problems* for the work that Bauman undertakes. Bauman, Tester argues, is interested in the ways in which individual biographies and histories are structured by social forces, and 'in particular how men and women are brought face to face with contradictions in their own lives that are utterly beyond personal and biographical resolution'. Tester uses as an example here the ways in which Bauman's own story was fundamentally shaped by the ways in which the Communist party/apparatus in Poland 'made it nigh-on impossible for one to be Jewish *and* a builder of the purported new world'. Related to this mission and these problems is the sort of *political action* that is informed by a sociological imagination that takes this form. In many important ways this action is suggestive rather than prescriptive, is marked both by ambivalence and

a commitment to recognise and work with this ambivalence rather than impose an order on it. As Tester suggests, Bauman's work has most often taken a course that seeks to unsettle the many intellectual, business and governmental projects which assume or presume that the 'world is clear to the understanding (or can be made clear as soon as the "correct" method is discovered or as soon as the obstacles to clarity are got out of the way)'. In unsettling these presumptions of an ordered world Bauman insists that the 'human condition is instead marked by all the possibilities and problems of ambivalence'. Bauman's embrace of ambivalence, and recognition of the all-too-human tendency to seek to impose order on this ambivalence, provokes what Tester identifies as his *ethical commitment* to 'attend to those who are made to suffer most sharply from the ambivalence of the human condition'. It is in *rubbing up* against, encountering, troubling, and being troubled by, these limits and possibilities that Bauman suggests that we can 'try to transcend them; and it is precisely in that rubbing against and attempt to transcend that we become fully human'. As a consequence Bauman 'does not write in order to find answers. To the contrary, his writing is concerned to develop better ways of asking questions' (Tester 2004, 10).

For me, and for my purposes here, Bauman's thinking, his writing, his social scientific imagination opens up spaces in which it is possible to think differently. Not necessarily with any more clarity or clear-headedness. Rather, it troubles what I think I know, what others know, the limits of our knowing. It unsettles certainties and allows me to try to think in different ways.

These various formulations provide a series of provocations for understanding the messiness of the world, and the worlds that emerge from the array of stories told about the world by the social sciences:

> The world as a 'generative flux' that *produces* realities? What does this mean? I can only tackle this question bit by bit, and any answer will be incomplete. Nevertheless, in this way of thinking the world is not a structure, something we can map with our social science charts. We might think of it, instead, as a maelstrom or a tide-rip. Imagine that it is filled with currents, eddies, flows, vortices, unpredictable changes, storms, and with moments of lull and calm. Sometimes and in some locations we can indeed make a chart of what is happening round about us. Sometimes our charting helps to produce momentary stability. Certainly there are moments when a chart is useful, when it works, when it helps to make something worthwhile … But a great deal of the time this is close to impossible, at least if we stick to the conventions of social science mapping.
>
> John Law (2004, 7) *After Method*

So, my claim is that in mapping or charting dimensions of twenty-first century capitalism, and work related forms of personhood, it is sometimes useful to draw on the existing maps and charts provided by the likes of Bauman, Beck, Giddens, Lash and Urry, Sennett. But these maps and charts don't determine either the directions or destinations of the narrative to be developed. At some times the scale of the map, and the features that emerge at that scale, may be more or less useful in charting a course. In all likelihood at other times other technologies and tools of mapping may need to be deployed. This is when I imagine that the genealogical, governmentality work that is indebted to the legacy of Foucault is useful in taking up the challenges of knowing personhood and the work contexts characteristic of twenty-first century capitalism. Again, it should not then be supposed that these technologies provide a means to capture the truth of the matter, or provide a more complete picture; at the scale these charts operate at it may be that other features and characteristics of Law's maelstrom – the messiness of the world – fade from view or are not apparent.

In this sense there are two key registers that will give shape to this discussion of the spirit of twenty-first century capitalism and the demands, the expectations that we need to develop particular forms of personhood to succeed in the new work orders: one is a sociological story to be told at a larger scale about how to understand work in twenty-first century capitalism; the other is a genealogical one to be told at the level of the ways in which personhood – of the type necessary to find and keep work – is defined and enacted and made up. Each of these registers have, as I have already suggested, certain relationships to each other, but these need not be seen as direct, cause-and-effect, transparent, constitutive.

A principal purpose in working in these registers, in shifting between these registers, of working with irony, ambivalence and ambiguity is to open up spaces for thinking, for exploring the limits and possibilities of twenty-first century capitalism and the self as enterprise. Openings and beginnings, including the ones produced by the works of others that I draw on and play with, are, possibly, more generative and useful outcomes than answers, conclusions, findings.

CHAPTER 4

MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE CARE OF A SELF

UNTIMELY THOUGHT

At the end of 2009 a special issue of *Theory, Culture & Society* presented a number of commentaries that were framed by the twenty-fifth anniversary of Michel Foucault's death in 1984, and by a new wave of scholarship related to Foucault's work as a consequence of the publication in English of his lecture courses at the College de France.[1] Paul Rabinow (2009), a colleague and collaborator with Foucault at UC Berkeley (with Hubert Dreyfus) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was a contributor to the special issue.

In a *Prelude* in his essay Rabinow (2009, 27–28) touches on Friedrich Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* [*Unzeitgemäss Betrachtungen*] as a means to introduce a discussion of the 'problem of what *mode* is appropriate for giving form to thinking'. Part of the way that Rabinow frames this discussion is by suggesting that the *intent* and the *affect* of the English and French translations of *Unzeitgemäss Betrachtungen* is captured best by the French term *l'intempestif*. For Rabinow the 'semantic range' of the term covers not only 'untimely', but 'ill-timed', 'unreasonable', or 'inopportune'. In this sense the term 'captures a striving to bring something forth, something that could be actual but does not yet exist'. Importantly for the ways in which Rabinow wants to position his later discussion of the struggles that he claims characterised Foucault's mode of thinking, such a reading 'does not mean that there is something waiting around to come to fruition but only that, taken up in a distinctive way, the things of the actual and existing world can be made into something appropriate as well as inopportune'. The *inopportune*, as a mode of thinking, 'operates adjacently [to a somewhat straightforward historical contextualisation], in a space of becoming where the old and the new are available if one approaches them in a mode of vigorous contemplation of the about-to-be-factual'.

Rabinow (2009, 28–29) argues that Foucault 'took up and experimented with the challenge of critical thought' in a variety of ways throughout his intellectual life.

1 These included *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978–79); *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981–82); *The Government of Self and Others* (1982–83).

Indeed, for Rabinow the majority of Foucault's work can be understood as 'an inopportune and vigorous contemplation' – a Nietzschean *untimely meditation* – 'a critical contestation perpetually in search of new forms of criticism and invention'. Rabinow suggests that, like Nietzsche, Foucault 'almost always in an uneasy and restless fashion … strove to invent and practice a form of asceticism'. For Foucault this asceticism took the form of 'an active attention to work on the self, on those he worked with and the material he was considering'. In addition, this understanding of asceticism invoked a sense that there was a 'price to be paid for forging a different mode of relationship among and between elements'.

A central element of the discussion that Rabinow develops relates to the ways in which this asceticism did not take the form of a renunciation, but of a positive engagement with the limits and possibilities of thinking, of the forms that thinking could take, where thinking could take place, the uses to which thinking could be put. Rabinow (2009, 31–32) illustrates these claims through a reference to a conversation from 1981 between Foucault and Didier Eribon, in which they address the concerns of the then newly elected French Socialist government that French intellectuals should publically support the government's *reform* programmes.[2] The extract, and the one that follows, is important in so much as Foucault makes a case for the space that should be given to thinking about thinking, and of thinking in its *untimely* mode:

> To begin from the outset by accepting the question of what reforms I will introduce is not, I believe, the objective that an intellectual should entertain. His role, since he works in the register of thought, is to see just how far thought can be freed so as to make certain transformations seem urgent enough so that others will attempt to bring their own into effect, and difficult enough so that if they are brought about they will be deeply inscribed in the real.

What is more:

> We must free ourselves (*s'affranchir*) from the sacralization of the social as the unique instance of the real and stop diminishing that essential aspect of human life and human relations, thinking. Thought exists well beyond the systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always animates ordinary human action. There is always some pinch of thought in the stupidest of institutions. There is always some thought in the most silent of habits.

2 From 'Est-il donc important de penser? (entretien avec D. Eribon)', first published in *Libération* (no. 15, 30–31 May 1981), then Foucault, Michel (1994b) *Dits et écrits*, vol. IV. Paris: Gallimard.

Rabinow (2009, 39–41) discusses the concept of a 'struggle' that is central to Foucault's work on the care of the self, and to his ideas about 'salvation'. In the Hellenic texts that constituted a large part of Foucault's working space towards the end of his life *struggle* signified a 'mode of lifelong practice and exercise, a form of perpetual vigilance and training'. The *function* of such a struggle involved, in part, 'focusing attention on and unlearning the myriad bad habits and dispositions that one had accumulated and continued to accumulate'. Rabinow argues that these Hellenic meanings of struggle and salvation did not, for Foucault, translate directly and/or literally into the present, but they could be given some contemporary character and purchase. *Struggle*, in the direction or pursuit of salvation, was an 'activity of self-transformation' which might consist of 'the subject's constant action on himself … the vigilant, continuous, and completed form of the relationship to self … The self is the agent, object, instrument, and end of salvation'. In this sense salvation 'ensures an access to the self that is inseparable from the work one carries out on oneself within the time of one's life and in life itself' (Foucault 2005, 184–5, cited in Rabinow 2009, 40–41).

Rabinow is explicit, as others have been, in his rejection of any individualism that might be read into these remarks. Their location in a body of work fundamentally concerned with problematising the government of oneself and of others should put paid to any such suggestions, as would Foucault's political activity, his self-styled *hyper and pessimistic activism* (Foucault 1983).

My interests in these opening comments are manifold. These ideas, these openings, serve to situate Foucault's legacy as, fundamentally, a political one. But in the case of those whose work is intellectually based this politics is principally to be found in the realms of thought. Thinking that is untimely is thinking that finds, tests and possibly troubles the conditions and possibilities in which thinking occurs, and those who engage these limits and possibilities. Untimely thinking is an activity that can change the object of thought. Understandings – of medicine, of punishment, of sexuality, of the self, for example – are rendered problematic by thought that is untimely. Inopportune thinking can also transform those who do the thinking and those they conduct relations with. The sense of self-transformation as a struggle points, also, to the active, political and troubling potential of a self. Such a view of the self is fundamental to Foucault's late work on the care of the self, and the choices, the ethics that are associated with the many ways in which it is possible for a self to practise freedom – even if the spaces, the fields of possibility in which a self is located are necessarily constrained and limited.

These opening comments also serve to situate the work that I will undertake in this chapter. Part of this work is related to developing further the idea – which Foucault explored in his essay 'What is Enlightenment?' (2007b), as well as in a number of related essays such as 'What is Critique?' (2007c) – that enlightenment can be understood as an *ethos*, a certain disposition towards the conduct of intellectual

work, to thinking. If we understand enlightenment in this way we are introduced, via Foucault's own work and the scholarship that has emerged in relation to his work, to a set of tools that are useful for exploring the limits and possibilities of the self as enterprise. Of principal concern here is Foucault's concept of *governmentality*, and the ways in which this concept is grounded in, and leads to, particular ways of thinking about power, freedom and the conduct of relations with oneself and with others.

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?

In their commentary a number of writers, including Judith Butler (2002), John Rajchman (2007) and Paul Rabinow (2009), provide a context for the ways in which Foucault returned, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, to the questions of enlightenment and critique and to Immanuel Kant's essay as a point of reference in this endeavour. Rajchman (2007, 9–11), for example, in his Introduction to a collection of Foucault's essays (*The Politics of Truth*) situates Foucault's interest in the 'enlightenment question' in the debates in different schools of Continental philosophy during the 1970s and 1980s, the emerging and ongoing arguments about such things as modernity and postmodernity, the possibilities that could be imagined in relation to political interventions and engagement by intellectuals, and the mode and possibilities of critique.

Judith Butler (2002) also examines the ways in which Foucault's essays on critique and enlightenment provoke different ways of thinking about what it is that we do when, as part of our intellectual practice, we engage in critique. Butler (2002, 218) argues that Foucault's account(ing) of/for enlightenment is 'one that no "Enlightenment" thinker would accept'. But this refusal does not, she argues, 'invalidate' the sort of characterisation that Foucault develops. As Butler suggests it is 'precisely what remains "unthought"' within the terms of enlightenment that Foucault tries to identify and describe: 'In his view, critique begins with questioning the demand for absolute obedience and subjecting every governmental obligation imposed on subjects to a rational and reflective evaluation.' The key claim that Butler makes and explores is that Foucault's provocations open up a space in which it is possible to think of critique as being less about judgement, and more about a process of de-subjugation in which we, the subjects who do critique, refuse, by degree, to be governed in such and such a way, in relation to such and such ends. In this space critique is suggestive of something more akin to virtue.

In *What is Enlightenment?* Foucault (2007b, 104) stresses the need not to place too great an emphasis on Kant's original essay in terms of its place in Kant's body of work, and in relation to ongoing philosophical and historical investigations of the Enlightenment. In doing so he does, nevertheless, suggest that the essay opens spaces in which to think differently about our present and our engagements with

the challenges it presents. Foucault (2007b, 99) reads Kant's original essay in a way that foregrounds a concern with the present. Kant, suggests Foucault, is not 'seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement. He is looking for difference: What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?' Foucault (2007, 104) suggests that: 'Kant in fact describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority'. As Foucault argues it is 'precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped'.

Addressing the idea of modernity as an epoch, an idea that also invokes and is accompanied by periodisations such as an 'archaic premodernity' and an 'enigmatic and troubling' postmodernity, Foucault (2007b, 105) offers the suggestion that modernity might better be understood as an *attitude*: 'I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving'.[3] In this discussion Foucault (2007b, 106–109) takes as another point of departure Baudelaire's characterisation of modernity as the *ephemeral*, the *fleeting*, the *contingent*, and a necessarily *ironic* and *problematising* attitude towards the real, the present, the self ('modernity does not "liberate man in his own being"; it compels him to face the task of producing himself'). These preliminary, and brief, engagements lay the ground for Foucault's (2007b, 118) suggestion that enlightenment can be considered as an *ethos*, the character of which he summarises at the end of his essay:

> The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating: it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

This ethos would refuse what Foucault (2007b, 109–110) calls the 'blackmail' of the Enlightenment, the idea that one must necessarily be for or against the Enlightenment. This is a point that directly addresses the debates during the 1970s and 1980s, often involving Foucault, in Anglo-European philosophy, social theory,

3 Which is not to say that at certain times periodisation, even epochalisation, is not a useful ordering technology. Foucault's own work – on madness, medicine, punishment – often rests on distinctions between an *ancien régime* in France and what follows its demise at the hands of the French Revolution.

history and feminism about the modern, the postmodern and the legacy (positive and/or negative) of the Enlightenment. For Foucault refusal here would mean that we 'try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment', but in doing so we would seek to examine the 'contemporary limits of the necessary'. How does our present condition the limits, the manner of our knowing? How might we trouble those limits?

Locating ourselves at some moment or place on the limits of understanding, thinking and acting is a central concern for Foucault, and for my own sense of what I might be doing here. As Foucault (2007b, 113 original emphasis) imagines it this ethos can be understood as a 'limit attitude'. In doing critique: 'We are not talking about a question of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative, we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of *analyzing and reflecting upon limits*'. In Butler's (2002, 212–213) essay on Foucault's mode of critique (as virtue, rather than judgement), which was originally presented as the Raymond Williams Lecture at Cambridge University (May, 2000), she makes reference to a concern expressed by Williams that the notion of 'criticism has been unduly restricted to the notion of "fault-finding"'. Williams argued for the development of a vocabulary of critique which did 'not assume the habit (or right or duty) of judgment'. Butler suggests that what Williams called for was a more limited, specific form of critique that did not 'generalize too quickly: "what always needs to be understood," he wrote, "is the specificity of the response, which is not a judgement, but a practice"'. For Butler this explicit use of a vocabulary that incorporates concerns with practice, specificity and judgement opens up or maps out similar spaces to Foucault. There is a positive dimension to critique as Foucault (2007b, 113) imagines it: 'The point … is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.' More specifically, critique seeks to imagine 'in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?' The focus on the contingent, the arbitrary, the singular is characteristic of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical analyses of madness, medicine, punishment and sexuality.

For Foucault (2007b, 114–115), this ethos 'must also be an experimental one'. By this he means 'that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality'. This test, so to speak, is necessary in order to 'grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take'. In this sense, in a way that has often provoked criticism from some feminists and from (neo) Marxists, Foucault refuses 'all projects that claim to be global or radical'. 'I prefer,' he argues, 'the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes.'

Indeed, 'I prefer even these partial transformations that have been made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the 20th century.'

This ethos, as I have indicated, has been the subject of often scathing criticism from those who suggest that Foucault fails to offer normative political goals or such things as a theory of the State or the Subject, or a vision beyond the limited horizons of the partial, the local.[4] In *What is Enlightenment?* Foucault (2007b, 115) offers two responses to such objections. In his first he contends that we 'have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits'. In his second response he suggests that the 'theoretical and practical experience we have of our limits and of the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and determined'. From this perspective, and with a sense that there is no end to history, 'we are always in the position of beginning again'.

GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER, FREEDOM, KNOWLEDGES AND SUBJECTS

> I am saying that 'governmentality' implies the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of 'governmentality' to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. Those who try to control, determine, and limit the freedom of others are themselves free individuals who have at their disposal certain instruments they can use to govern others. Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, the relationship of the self to itself and the relationship to the other.
>
> Michel Foucault (2000a, 300) '*The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom*'

At this time I want to turn to a discussion of Foucault's concept of *governmentality*, and the ways in which this concept can enable us to both imagine the self as enterprise, and to think of this form of personhood in ways that acknowledge the irony, the ambiguity, of such things as freedom, choice, autonomy and responsibility. The concept of governmentality provides a broad analytical frame in which to situate my concern with the sorts of injunctions, incitements, directions that both aim to govern our lives, and provide the frameworks and techniques by which we should

4 See, for example, the commentary on this sort of critique in the contributions to *Feminism and the Final Foucault* (Taylor and Vintges 2004).

know and govern ourselves as workers. From this perspective we can imagine that as subjects we practise our freedom in more or less open fields of possibilities. These fields, though, are not completely open in any unconstrained way. The world of paid work, and the behaviours and dispositions seen as necessary for ongoing participation in this world, is a field of possibilities constructed, shaped and bounded by multiple, complementary, sometimes contradictory, *ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of life*.

Governmentality has been a generative and powerful analytic in many of the social sciences over the past two decades. As Rose (1999a, 3) indicates, the work undertaken in this space has concerned itself with identifying and analysing myriad 'endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others, whether these be the crew of a ship, the members of a household, the employees of a boss', or footballers in a professional competition (see Kelly and Hickey 2010). Moreover, these analyses are further concerned with the ways in which 'one might be urged and educated to bridle one's own passions, to control one's own instincts, to govern oneself'.[5]

The art of governing, argued Foucault (1991a, 87–92), refers to the multiple practices and rationalities that shape the management and regulations of, among other things: 'a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, a family'. This concern with the practices and rationalities of government in a variety of settings and in relation to a diversity of ends/outcomes, is characteristic of the emergence in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe of an array of texts, of rationalities, that had as their purpose a re-thinking of what it meant to govern: 'How to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor.' Foucault argued that this early modern literature on the arts of government was formulated in relation to 'three fundamental types of government, each of which relates to a particular science or discipline'. There was the 'art of self-government', which was concerned with 'morality'. The 'art of properly governing a family' signalled a concern of economy, where economy is, largely, about the practice of 'managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family'. The 'art of governing the state' was, and remains, a question of politics, of 'defining the particular form of governing which can be applied to the state as a whole'. Government consists of the variety of knowledges and practices considered necessary to/for the arts of guiding, regulating, managing oneself and others. In this framework Foucault was concerned with understanding government as the *conduct of conduct*. Central to this way of thinking about government is Foucault's play on the ambiguous

5 My discussion here draws on work done over a number of years thinking about the government of young people and young workers in particular (Kelly 2003, 2006, 2007). See also Barry et al. 1996; Binkley and Capetillo 2009; Bratich 2003; Burchell et al. 1991; Cole et al. 2004; Dean 2010; Dean and Hindess 1998; Inda 2010; Peters et al. 2009; Rose 1990; Rose and Miller 2008.

meanings of *conduct*. For Foucault (1983, 220–221 original emphasis) the 'equivocal nature of the term *conduct* is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations'. Conduct, in this ambiguous use, points both to the action of leading others, and to a 'way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities'. So, an analysis of the arts of government, of the conduct of conduct, provides a way of understanding the ongoing regulation of the behaviours and dispositions of individuals, groups, teams, populations across a variety of domains, and at various levels of practice.

The concept of governmentality is framed by a particular characterisation of power. In ways that are often misread Foucault (1991a, 102) preserves a distinction between three forms of power. For Foucault each of these forms is distinct from the other, at the same time as they are intimately connected through their concern with populations. Foucault suggested that:

> we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty–discipline–government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.

In his analyses of liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities Foucault (1991a, 101–102) did not see the emergence of these *mentalities* as signalling the disappearance of sovereign and disciplinary forms of power. Foucault argued that the problem of regulating the behaviours and dispositions of persons who are imagined as choice making, responsible subjects capable of living lives characterised, and given order, by a well regulated autonomy, 'renders more acute the problem of the foundation of sovereignty … and all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline'. A number of the characteristics, distinctions and relations between sovereignty, discipline and government will be revisited throughout this book.

It is from this position that Foucault (1983, 212) argued that his concern was with that form of power which 'applies itself to immediate everyday life', a form of power which 'categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity'; and which, further, 'imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him'. This understanding of power is centrally concerned with identifying the relations of power which make 'individuals subjects'. Subject, in one sense, to 'someone else by control and dependence'; in another sense, subject to and tied to 'his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge'. This is a quite specific characterisation of power in its pastoral form: a characterisation which marks pastoral power off

from power as domination, or from a relationship of violence. For Foucault (1983, 220), this form of power relation is defined, not as a 'mode of action' which acts 'directly and immediately on others', as in a relationship of violence which 'forces', 'bends', 'destroys' and/or 'closes the door on all possibilities'. Rather, a power relation is characterised by 'action upon action', on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future. This understanding of power rests on a seemingly paradoxical relation with freedom. Foucault (1983, 220) argues that in a power relation, the other, 'over whom power is exercised', must be 'recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts'. In addition, in this sort of relation a 'whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions may open up'.

Importantly, for my further discussion and analysis of the self as enterprise, Foucault (1983, 221) argues that government can be understood as a series of practices and rationalities that structure the 'possible field of action of others'. In these fields, in the array of relations and processes that give form to our lives, the behaviours and dispositions of individuals might well be different to that envisaged by the programmes, the strategies that are developed and deployed to manage and regulate conduct. In turn, the more or less open character of these possibilities can provoke a variety of measures or responses which seek to regulate possible future actions: 'Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.' Freedom, in this context, indicates that individuals, groups, a crew, a team, a population, as the subjects of power, are situated in a 'field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realised'. Thinking about power in this manner avoids some of the problems associated with seeing power and freedom as *oppositions*, as being 'mutually exclusive (freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised)'. Foucault (1983, 221) sees the 'interplay' between power and freedom in the 'shepherd game' as being far more complicated: 'In this game freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination)'.

Power is productive of what we imagine as freedom. The possibility and reality of freedom or autonomy is shaped by power relations. Power and freedom exist in shifting relations rather than as absolutes, or as presences and/or absences in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other (see Rose 1992, 1999a).

Nikolas Rose has been a significant contributor to the English language literature and thinking that has emerged in the spaces opened by Foucault. In his inaugural professorial lecture at Goldsmiths College in London in 1992 Rose called for the development of critical sociologies of freedom. For Rose (1992, 3) such sociologies would understand freedom as a *formula* of regulation, would seek to imagine what

it meant to situate 'freedom as it has been articulated into norms and principles for organizing our experience of our world and ourselves; freedom as it is realised in certain ways of exercising power over others; freedom as it has been articulated into certain rationales for practising in relation to ourselves'. Critical or genealogical analyses of freedom would identify and analyse the diverse ways in which freedom has informed, and informs, the liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities that have given structure to individual and collective lives in Anglo-European democracies since the eighteenth century. As Rose (1992, 3–4) argues, these 'investigations would not be critical *of* freedom. They would not try to reveal freedom as a sham, or to decry the freedom we *think* we have in the name of a truer freedom to come'. Rather, these analyses would examine the ways in which we 'have come to define and act towards ourselves in terms of a certain notion of freedom'. Rose suggests that contemporary *neo-liberal,* or *advanced liberal* governmentalities are framed by particular understandings of choice and freedom that are embedded in certain, *technical*, understandings of the person, and of the behaviours and dispositions that the person should possess and be capable of exercising in order to practise their freedom in the various ways that are appropriate to particular contexts and relations. In these mentalities of government we are imagined as persons who are *economic* (prudent, entrepreneurial, choice making) in the conduct of our lives; we are imagined as not only capable but *desiring* of being able to exercise our freedom through an array of choices in all realms of our existence; and we are imagined as persons who are *aspirational* in terms of our capacities for betterment, advancement and the creation of a particular *lifestyle*. None of these are a *sham*. Indeed, they should be read in ways that allow space for the irony and ambiguity that they provoke – especially at those times, such as a Monday morning, when we might have to drag ourselves out of bed to start work. Such ideas about the person, about the self as enterprise emerge from, and give shape to the fields of possibilities in which we contrive to fashion a life – and they should be critiqued to explore their limitations and possibilities (Kelly and Harrison 2009).

It is this understanding of government, conduct, power relations and freedom that leads to Foucault's later work on ethics and on the care of the self. The development of these concerns through the second and third volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, and in accompanying lectures and interviews during the last years of his life, were largely attached to analyses of the ways in which ancient Greek and Roman citizens (free men) were encouraged to know themselves, and the ways in which they ought to conduct themselves and their relations with others – women, boys, slaves – in relation to domains such as marriage, food, and sexual practices and behaviours. In this work Foucault (2000a, 283–285) argued that freedom was 'the ontological condition of ethics', insofar as 'ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection'. Foucault suggested that among the ancient Greeks and Romans 'concern with self and care of the self were required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself … as well as to form oneself, to surpass oneself, to master

the appetites that threaten to overwhelm one'. Here, suggested Foucault, 'Taking care of oneself requires knowing … oneself.' *Care of the self*, understood in these terms, is not just *knowledge of the self* but 'knowledge of a number of rules of acceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths and prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip oneself with these truths: this is where ethics is linked to the game of truth'.

Ethics, then, consist of the array of directions, suggestions, encouragements for how it is that we should, rightly, with due regard to the truth of things, think and act in relation to particular ends. Given these incitements and directives, how do we choose to conduct ourselves and our relations with others? From these analyses of the care of the self appropriate for guiding the conduct of free men in ancient Greece and Rome Foucault (2000a, 283) argued that his more particular concerns during the 1970s and 1980s was with 'practices of freedom' rather than 'processes of liberation':

> This is precisely the problem I encountered with regard to sexuality: does it make any sense to say, 'Let's liberate our sexuality'? Isn't the problem rather that of defining the practices of freedom by which one could define what is sexual pleasure and erotic, amorous and passionate relationships with others? This ethical problem of the definition of practices of freedom … is much more important than the rather repetitive affirmation that sexuality or desire must be liberated.

Foucault's concerns, in what would be his final works, were not so much driven by an intent to describe the history of the past (in order to return to it), but rather with producing histories of the present (genealogies), so that we might be able to recognise the contingencies, possibilities and limits of ourselves, and our present: always with the purpose and possibility of imagining and acting otherwise (Foucault 2000c).[6] For many commentators this emphasis in the 'final Foucault' is troubling, particularly in relation to the early and mid Foucault. In *Foucault 2.0* Eric Paras (2006) presents a detailed analysis of 12 of the 13 annual lecture series/courses that Foucault taught during his tenure at the College de France. For Paras (2006, 3) this immersion in the archive of Foucault's courses raises a fundamental question, one that he explores throughout the course of his book: *How and why does Foucault go from being a philosopher of the disappearance of the subject to one wholly preoccupied with the subject*? This is not a question that I want to directly

6 Foucault's 'classical' work, his untimely meditations on the care of the self in ancient Greece and Rome, has been the object of stinging critiques by various classicists and philosophers – see Timothy O'Leary's (2002) *Foucault and the Art of Ethics* and Alexander Nehamas' (2000) *The Art of Living* for overviews of the analyses and critiques.

engage, and I am not so much interested in the success or otherwise of Paras' examination of his question. What is of interest is that the question can actually be asked in the first place. Because in asking such a question Paras indicates the ambivalence, uncertainty and ambiguity that is often associated with Foucault's work, and his positions on a variety of subjects (including THE *Subject*). Which Foucault are you talking about, using, critiquing? The early Foucault? The middle Foucault? The later Foucault? Who or what is Foucault (the Author?). Paras (2006, 12–13) argues that a detailed analysis of Foucault's 1979 course (*The Birth of Politics*) and 1980 course (*The Government of the Living*) revealed a Foucault who for the 'first time' spoke of 'individuals as independent loci of experience – and as subjects able to *act upon themselves* in the pursuit of certain goals. In these courses, argues Paras, 'Autonomy and reflexivity emerged as the characteristics of a subject that could no longer be seen as a mere relay of power.'

Does this mean that we should imagine that Foucault got it wrong in *The Order of Things*, *Madness and Civilization*, *Discipline and Punish*? Whatever *it* may be. A number of commentaries provide a different way to imagine these claimed differences between the Foucaults. Gary Cutting (1994, 2) in his introduction to the *Cambridge Companion to Foucault* argues, 'Foucault's work *is* at root ad hoc, fragmentary and incomplete. Each of his books is determined by concerns and approaches specific to it and should not be understood as developing a theory or method that is a general instrument of intellectual progress.' In an examination of a trenchant, deeply personal, posthumous judgement of Foucault's work in French intellectual circles Paras (2006, 152) argues against what he sees as attempts to 'flatten down' Foucault's thought into a single coherent project'.[7] Instead, suggests Paras, it is more appropriate to see not a 'consistent advocacy of a pointed philosophical message (as for instance, the dissolution of the subject), but rather a succession of near-independent probings into questions that, for the moment, had captured the philosopher's imagination'. Indeed, Paras (2006, 13) cites a 1984 interview in *Les nouvelles littéraires* in which Foucault, some might say, renounces the direction, the object, the practice that characterised his early work:

> In admitting – and I admit it! – that I practiced in *The Order of Things*, *Madness and Civilization*, even in *Discipline and Punish*, a philosophical study essentially founded upon a certain usage of the philosophical vocabulary, rules and experience, and that I gave myself over to this whole hog, it's certain that, now, I am trying to detach myself from that form of philosophy.

7 Paras cites here the neo-liberal stream he claims is represented by the likes of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut's (1985) *La pensée 68: Essai sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain* (Gallimard) and (2000) *Qu'est-ce que l'homme?* (Odile-Jacob).

The issue here is that it is relatively easy to see in such sentiments *renunciation*, to see some sort of acknowledgment of the error of Foucault's ways. Yet, it is just as apparent, if one's purpose is not solely judgemental, to see reflexivity, to see the practice of the very *historical ontology of ourselves* that Foucault imagines as being central to an enlightenment *ethos*, the practice of critique, the arts of existence which have no end. How is it that we have become what we are? How is it possible to identify and transcend the limits of what we have become?

So, Timothy O'Leary (2002, 170) argues in his examination of Foucault's philosophical and historical analyses that the aim of Foucault's ethics 'can be characterized as an *art* of freedom: the task of giving form to one's liberty, of moulding and giving a style to one's life and one's relations with others is a task, like that of the artist, which knows no completion'. In this sense, as Paras (2006, 157) argues, the active, choice making, autonomous and reflexive self assumes a central place in Foucault's work on the care of the self:

> Experience was the province of an active, autonomous, reflective subject. It was that which allowed the Iranian subject to examine his own condition and then act. It was that which permitted the free citizen to craft his selfhood according to the principles of art. Experience was certainly historically dependent, but it is incorrect to imagine that, for the Foucault of the early 1980s, it was constructed by practices; it was, rather, that which made practice possible.

A self acts, feels, thinks, develops understandings, has doubts, explores limits and possibilities, is more or less enterprising (among a whole range of possibilities). A self emerges in and from a range of relations, encounters, practices throughout a life – all of which are shaped by norms, limits and possibilities, in ways that are subject to the incitements, imperatives and directions of diverse others. It is this means for understanding and thinking about power relations, the ways in which our conduct is managed and regulated by others in various contexts, and the ways in which we might choose, *willingly*, to act, to think, to conduct ourselves and our relations with others, that is so generative for identifying the ethics that seek to shape the ways in which the self can/should conduct itself as an enterprise. This framework is suggestive of a particular way of understanding the self – a way that is less interested in the essence of the self, the truths of the self (whether these truths are biological, psychological, sociological, philosophical), than in the production of truths about the self in relation to differing and particular problematisations of what it is to be a person in work related settings and relationships.

In this vein Mitchell Dean (1995, 563–564), drawing on the work of Foucault and the literature on governmentality, imagines the self as a 'particular space that is

the locus of conduct and capacities'. Dean argues for a *thin* understanding of the self: an understanding that sees the self as 'human material that is composed of forces and endowed with capacities, and as such is a space of conduct or action'. Here Dean suggests that identity and processes of self-formation should not be understood in philosophical, psychological or socio-cultural terms, but in terms of the 'forms of self-relation, self-specification and self shaping that are thrown into question and made possible and sometimes necessary by particular practices, techniques and exercises'. If the self is imagined in these ways then, for Dean (1995, 566) the concern is not so much with the 'empirically given behaviours or patterns of existing social relations but the "problematisations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the practices on the basis of which these problematisations are formed" (Foucault 1985: 11)'. Indeed, what is at 'stake is not the social or psychological construct of the human subject, but the forms in which human being is problematized, interrogated and invested with meaning, within the frame of governmental and ethical practices' (see also Kelly and Colquhoun 2003, 2005).

If we are free to choose, even compelled to choose, if the cultural, social, economic and political spaces that shape the West at the start of the twenty-first century are largely structured by discourses of choice, and we are positioned as selves that must imagine and conduct the self as an enterprise, then the practice of freedom, the ways in which we will imagine this and conduct ourselves in relations to these *ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of a life*, are dilemmas that we are confronted with on a daily basis. And these dilemmas are shaped and unfold in fields of possibilities that confront us with shifting limits and possibilities.

CRITIQUE: THE SELF AND THE REFUSAL OF GOVERNMENTALISATION

I want to close with an accounting for a number of the relationships and possibilities that are suggested by my concerns with Foucault's inopportune thinking about enlightenment, governmentality and the care of the self.

The ethos sketched here, as an attitude, a set of dispositions, is more productive than a, potentially, dogmatic adherence to a particular approach or method (archaeological or genealogical or sociological or feminist or Marxist). Archaeology and genealogy are no less prone to *hardening of the categories* than other forms of thinking, especially if in the *doing* of these approaches the limit attitude that Foucault articulates becomes less than apparent. In the end a slavish, even dogmatic, adherence to any approach is itself necessarily limiting. The *troubling* part of Foucault's (2007b, 114) ethos is captured in the ways in which he imagines what would make critique genealogical. Critique, in this form, 'will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and know'

However, it 'will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think'. In the end critique is 'not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom'.

These themes are evident in an essay that preceded 'What is Enlightenment?' In 'What is Critique?' Foucault (2007c, 44) suggests, as a brief, initial, provocative definition, that *critique* can be understood as being the 'art of not being governed quite so much'. Or, with a bit more specificity that is related to his characterisation of the emergence of modern arts of government, with concerns about how one can govern, 'we identify a perpetual question which would be: "how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them"'. This particular form that a so-called critical attitude takes is different, claims Foucault, to a refusal to be governed at all: 'we do not want to be governed and we do not want to be governed at all.' From this perspective critique takes a particular character with the emergence of early modern mentalities of rule that do, indeed, recognise the diverse capacities of those who are governed to exercise their freedom in a variety of, always limited, ways. In this mode critique can be imagined as an unwillingness to be governed like that, a refusal to be managed, regulated like that, a questioning of the demands, expectations and encouragements to know, understand and govern the self *like that*.

Foucault (2007bc 47) is explicit about a number of objections that might easily arise in relation to such a formulation, but this way of thinking does open up a number of possibilities for imagining the relations between the conduct of ourselves and of others:

> And if governmentalisation is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well then! I will say, that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. Well then!: critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially ensure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.

Foucault (2007b, 117) also identifies the three axes, and the relations between them that he considers should frame the sorts of analyses that he proposes. In this characterisation of an orientation to the conduct of intellectual work we are continually confronted with new beginnings, with restless problematisations that explore an 'open series of questions': 'How are we constituted as subjects of our

own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?'

Critique understood in this way would make problematic both the ways in which we imagine and conduct ourselves in relation to the practice of such things as the identification and analysis of forms of personhood demanded by globalised labour markets, and how we imagine personhood, its formation, its practice. As Butler (2002, 220–221) argues, the purchase of Foucault's position, the ways of thinking that it enables and opens up becomes apparent when we ask questions such as: 'What counts as a person? What counts as a coherent gender? What qualifies as a citizen? Whose world is legitimated as real?' In a more individual, subjective dimension these types of inquiry can translate into such questions as: 'Who can I become in such a world where the meanings and limits of the subject are set out in advance for me? By what means am I constrained as I begin to ask what I may become?' In asking and thinking and acting upon such questions 'what happens when I begin to become that for which there is no place in the given regime of truth?'.

It is in these conceptual spaces that I locate my concern with analysing the self as enterprise. The spirit of twenty-first century flexible capitalism – in which the self as an enterprise is the end to which much productive activity ought be directed – is shaped, energised and given concrete form and meaning in a variety of settings through the functioning and effects of a number of related *ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of a life*. I understand these new work ethics as providing frameworks for coming to know and understand how one should act, behave and think in relation to specific ends, and in a particular, limited, field of possibilities. These ethics are culturally and historically located; they are produced and circulated within generalised, and more specific, configurations of time and space – such as families, relationships, schools, offices, factories, communities. These frameworks function as truths in terms of the ways in which they are translatable through time and space; in the ways in which they have, and produce, significant resonances in particular times and spaces.

The work to be done, then, is not about defining in advance what the ends of critique will be, what a refusal to be governed might look like, but to explore the possibilities that appear at the limits, on the boundaries, of those injunctions to imagine the self as an enterprise and to conduct oneself, and relations with others, in the mode, the manner of the enterprising self.

So, my intent in this discussion has been not so much to outline a method, an approach to identifying the limits and possibilities of the self as enterprise – though that is a part of the work that I have done here. Rather, my main purpose has been to outline an ethos, an orientation towards the conduct of this work. This is an ethos that is interested in both the limits and the possibilities of the self as

enterprise, and the limits and possibilities of thinking about the self as enterprise. An important element of this ethos is the idea that critique can open up spaces for *untimely*, *inopportune* thought, can enable us to engage with irony, ambivalence and ambiguity, and not seek the certainty and clarity that is often promised by the practice of judgement.

CHAPTER 5

FLEXIBLE CAPITALISM AND THE BRAZILIANISATION OF WORK?

… IT IS NOT YOUR FATHER'S WORLD …

A billion (or so) Chinese knock at (pound on) our door. A foreign-owned factory is opened in China every … 26 minutes! A foreign-owned R&D laboratory is opened in China every … 43 hours! The Chinese are making baseball hats … and luxury yachts … and discovering the new drugs that will save our lives … while also, certainly, making this the Opening Gong of the 'Asian Century.' Keep moving West.

Some 70 companies have achieved the highest quality certification in software design, according to the gold-standard measure provided by the Carnegie Mellon Software Institute. Thirty-five of those companies come from … India!

Those of us who are not Indian or Chinese—and, to be sure, the Indians and Chinese themselves—are scrambling. Trying … almost desperately … to find New Bases for Adding Value, separating oneself from the herd-horde. And more's to come …

Tom Peters (2005b, 9) 'The "PSF" Is Everything! (or: Making the Professional Service Firm a "Lovemark" in an Age of "Managed Asset Reflation")'

Since the 1970s, this has all changed radically. Large firms became far more competitive, global and innovative. Something I call supercapitalism was born. In this transformation, we in our capacities as consumers and investors have done significantly better. In our capacities as citizens seeking the common good, however, we have lost ground. The shift began when technologies developed by government to fight the Cold War were incorporated into new products and services. This created new competitors, beginning in transportation, communications, manufacturing, and finance. These cracked open the stable production system and, starting in the late 1970s and escalating thereafter, forced all companies to compete more intensively for customers and investors …

Robert Reich (2008, 7) *Supercapitalism: The Battle for Democracy in an Age of Big Business*

… we are eye-witnesses – as subjects and objects – of a break within modernity, which is freeing itself from the contours of the classical industrial society and forging a new form – the (industrial) 'risk society' … Today, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, in the developed Western world, modernization has consumed and lost its other and now undermines its own premises as an industrial society along with its functional principles … In the nineteenth century, privileges of rank and religious world views were being demystified: today the same is happening to the understanding of science and technology … as well as to the modes of existence in work, leisure, the family and sexuality …

Ulrich Beck (1992, 9–10) *The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*

One of those who saw an opportunity in the floodwaters of New Orleans was Milton Friedman, grand guru of the movement for unfettered capitalism and the man credited with writing the rulebook for the contemporary, hypermobile global economy. Ninety-three years old and in failing health, 'Uncle Miltie', as he was known to his followers, nonetheless found the strength to write an op-ed for the *Wall Street Journal* three months after the levees broke. 'Most New Orleans schools are in ruins,' Friedman observed, 'as are the homes of the children who attended them. The children are scattered all over the country. This is a tragedy. It is also an opportunity to radically reform the educational system' …

In one of his most influential essays, Friedman articulated contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as the shock doctrine. He observed that 'only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable' …

I call these orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities, 'disaster capitalism' …

Naomi Klein (2007, 4–6) *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*

Ours is, as a result, an individualized, privatized version of modernity, with the burden of pattern-weaving and the responsibility for failure falling primarily on the individual's shoulders. It is the patterns of dependency and interaction whose turn to be liquefied has now come. They are now malleable to an extent unexperienced by, and unimaginable for, past generations; but like all fluids they do not keep their shape for long. Shaping them is easier than keeping them in shape. Solids are cast once and for all. Keeping fluids in shape requires a lot of attention, constant vigilance and perpetual effort – and even then the success of the effort is anything but a foregone conclusion …

Zygmunt Bauman (2000, 7–8) *Liquid Modernity*

At this time I want to address the dilemmas associated with naming the thing that to this point I have identified as twenty-first century flexible capitalism. The dilemma is a significant one, and one that can be understood as being important because of my conviction that the story that I want to develop here is not the definitive story, and that it can be, indeed should be, told in a number of different registers. As the above citations appear to suggest there are any number of ways in which our present can be named. This problem of naming has over the past 20 or 30 years provoked seemingly endless, sometimes less than useful, debate about whether we, the denizens of the industrialised, developed liberal democracies, are witness to the demise of, the movement to, or the emergence of any/all of the following – *reflexive modernity*, *postmodernity*, the *risk society*, *late capitalism*, the *post-industrial society*, the *knowledge economy*, *supercapitalism*, *disorganised capitalism*, *disaster capitalism*, *casino capitalism*, *soft capitalism*, *flexible capitalism*.

As Foucault (1994) would argue, the ordering of things matters, but can there be an end, a final solution to this ordering? This discussion will take a particular point of view in my account of the characteristics and conditions of twenty-first century capitalism, and the ways in which these characteristics shape the nature of paid work, the ways in which paid work is imagined and regulated, and the forms of identity or selfhood that these work regimes demand. However, my purpose is not to extensively review the debates and arguments about whether the late twentieth, early twenty-first century can be most accurately understood through any of these classifications, orderings, processes of naming. It can be argued that each of these signifiers – *metaphors* – do describe something, and do describe something in ways that are useful at different times and places and for different purposes. It seems to me to be a less than useful exercise to pick a winner, so to speak. Or to try and make a name for oneself and coin a phrase that has some currency in the oftentimes cacophonous bazaar that seems to characterise what Nigel Thrift (2005) has called the *cultural circuits* of capitalism.

So, in the first instance I will briefly sketch some of the key labour market changes of the last 30 years. My aim here is to provide an introductory overview of key transformations in the nature, the character and opportunities, possibilities and limits of/for paid work in the industrialised democracies. Building on this overview I want to then introduce and discuss more fully the ways in which Richard Sennett (1998, 2006) characterises flexible capitalism. This metaphor of flexibility is useful at a number of levels, including: the ways in which various developments in a globalising capitalism transform practices, ideas, cultures and values in work organisations; in thinking about how persons should know and act on themselves in organisations that are conceived as being more reflexive, more precarious, more flexible. These themes of risk, reflexivity and precariousness have framed sociological understandings of more globalised labour markets, more flexible work orders. It is these understandings of the ideas, technologies, actors

and material conditions that give a particular form to the *conditions of possibility* in which the self should be imagined as an enterprise.

NEW WORK ORDERS?

> Australia's job market is getting curiouser and curiouser, as Alice would say if she ever wandered through the wonderland of the weekend employment pages.
>
> Interested in work as an Enforcement Technician, Database Spatial Analyst or Accounts Receivable Collections Officer? How about as a Manager Procurement Agent or Quality Advice Consultant? (Excuse the surplus of capital letters but a paintball approach to punctuation is one of the defining characteristics of the genre.) …
>
> Times have certainly changed since school when choosing a profession was a simple business. Kiddies either wanted to be an astronaut, a zoo-keeper or – in my case – one of the campy dancers from the Hot Gossip groove troupe on *The Kenny Everett Video Show* …
>
> I certainly don't remember anyone standing up in careers class and saying, 'when I grow up I want to be a PD/H/PE Co-ordinator or an APS Level 5 (Administrative) Assistant Site Manager or a PeopleSoft 8.8 Analyst/Consultant'. Yet these exceedingly odd-sounding jobs now make up the bulk of vocations vacant ads on offer to CV-slinging job seekers.
>
> So what's changed? The work or the wanky way in which the work is described? The answer is a little of both …
>
> Depressingly enough, employment pages in the noughties contain very few ads asking for astronauts or zoo-keepers – though there is a large number of openings for exotic dancers. I'm not sure what a Hot Gossip wannabe would have to do to acquire the requisite hostessing skills and peep experience. And who knows whether a recent dancer ad reference to limited positions refers to the number of jobs available or something far more physical?
>
> But given that none of these things sound anywhere near as painful as strategic procurement, it's worth sending off a resume before such positions are rebranded as Thonged Pole Authorities, Holistic Lap Aides or Clothing Resistant Movement Consultants.
>
> Emma Tom (2007) 'Finding a job in jargon is nice work if you can decode it,' *The Australian,* 31 January 2007, 11

At the time that this piece was published Emma Tom was a regular columnist in Australia's only national daily newspaper – the News Corporation/Rupert Murdoch owned *The Australian*. Her weekly column was called *The Wry Side*, and according to Emma Tom.com.au she 'has an opinion on just about anything

but is particularly interested in ethics, feminism, sex, religion, democracy, gender, Socrates, postmodernism, human nature, East Asian politics, terrorism, television vampires and the delightful disgustingness of dogs'.[1] Tom asks a question that, in a wry manner, points to some of the key issues I want to explore in this book: '*So what's changed? The work or the wanky way in which work is described?'* She suggests: *The answer is a little bit of both*.

Many of the jobs that 'kiddies' in previous generations aspired to no longer exist – for example, *campy dancer from the Hot Gossip groove troupe on the Kenny Everett Video Show*. Of course for many kiddies of prior generations aspirations were significantly limited by time/space/place as successive generations of males followed each other down the mines, into the steel mills and car plants, or into the police forces and company offices of industrial (Fordist) capitalism. Girls too had aspirations, but these were often thwarted or subjugated to the demands, expectations or *fates* of being and becoming a wife and a mother. Aspirations and choices looked pretty different in what Ulrich Beck (1992) has called *industrial modernity*. However, in what Beck has identified as the emergence of a reflexive, *risk society*, processes of individualisation have transformed the co-ordinates that give shape to our working and non-working lives. Social class, gender, ethnicity and the like still matter in shaping life chances and choices, but become less important in considerations of what an individual lifecourse looks like. More and more we are compelled to choose – about such things as education, career, work, family/relationship arrangements – and we are increasingly imagined, and held responsible, as the managers of our own DIY project of the self (for competing analyses of some of these changes see Beck-Gernsheim 2002, Beck and Beck-Gernshiem 1995, Giddens 1993, Smart 2007). Aspirations and choice take on different meanings and consequences in a risk society – *Database Spatial Analyst, Manager Procurement Agent!* And future generations will have different aspirations and choices as many of the jobs, and the kind of work that might be available to them, have yet to be invented – *Holistic Lap Aide!*

If, from this somewhat wry opening, I was to claim that at the start of the twenty-first century the nature and meaning of work has changed, I would likely provoke some argument – and some agreement. In many respects workers in the OECD economies, for example, remain as participants in a classic capitalist exchange relation in which they sell their labour (physical, mental, creative) in variously regulated labour markets. Those individuals and organisations that purchase labour then have some claims – often negotiated, contested, arbitrated – over what individuals are expected to do in terms of work processes and practices; when and where they are expected to do work; and the manner in which they should think,

1 As of the beginning of October 2010 Emma Tom is now known as Emma Jane and can be found at http://emmajane.info/, where there is a link for anyone interested in knowing the reasons for her name change (which, incidentally, don't involve marriage).

act and feel in relation to these paid work tasks and duties. Not much has changed, then, since the likes of Marx and Engels, and later Weber, were formulating frameworks for understanding capitalism and work. Yet, in many other ways work, work opportunities, work identities, the meaning of work, the place of work in our lives, the times and spaces and places in which work occurs have been, and continue to be, transformed.

The challenge, in many respects, particularly in spaces like this, is how to think about change, *newness*, novelty, reproduction. Peter Nolan (2007) in his Foreword to Baldry et al's (2007) *The Meaning of Work in the New Economy* sketches an outline of an ESRC (UK) funded national research programme titled The Future of Work, which is firmly located in academic and policy debates about various claims made for the emergence of a 'new economy', and of a raft of associated transformations in organisations, 'employment patterns and work spaces'. A claim that is given a somewhat ironic form by Nolan (2007, ix): *'Why work for a firm, office or bank when you can work for yourself from home with a laptop? According to some commentators the advancing army of e-lancers is challenging, root and branch, established business structures, social relations and individual ways of working'*. Baldry et al. (2007, 223–225) take up this point and suggest that in debates (even celebrations) about the *new economy*: 'Policy makers in both Government and the economy seemed more willing to pay attention to dramatic blue-sky scenarios produced by consultancies and think tanks than the more measured and grounded observations of social scientists.' In the context of this debate the authors claim to 'generally favour an approach which is inclusive of continuity'. On the basis of the various data, findings and analysis that they present as emerging from their empirical work in the call centre and IT software development and supply industries in Scotland, they suggest that a good reason for being cautious about, even rejecting, claims that the knowledge economy represents a 'new evolutionary stage' in the development of capitalism – a rejection that also targets 'associated "post-" models and Castells' claims for a "new mode of development"' – is 'that there is no evidence that capitalism has yet evolved into a new socio-economic form; indeed capitalism has seldom been so unreluctant to speak its own name'. In these spaces the Future of Work programme aims to conduct what it claims is vigorous empirical work and develop rigorous theoretical frameworks because, 'Poor theory thrives on sensational vignettes and limited data' (Nolan 2007, ix). The programme has generated a number of publications and presents a valuable contribution to the ways in which we can think about the contemporary and future character of work in a liberal democracy such as the UK (see, for example, Brannen et al. 2004; White et al. 2004).

As I have indicated, and will discuss at a number of points in what follows, these claims and contributions echo much of the debate about the nature of work and the character of capitalism at the start of the twenty-first century (for further discussion/debate about 'new capitalism' see, for example, Boltanski and Chiapello 2009,

Doogan 2009). A large part of my concern with some of the arguments framed by this work is the faith apparently invested in *data*. Doogan (2009, 4–6), for example, suggests that empirical work – of the kind that C W Mills (1970) might characterise as *abstracted empiricism* – makes problematic the claims or theses of the likes of Beck or Bauman: 'Thus the labour force survey data from North America and Europe discussed here shows that job stability *has not declined* and that long term employment *has increased* in many sectors of the advanced economies.' However, what this sort of work often assumes is that the sort of empiricism practised in this research encounters a world ready/ripe for, amenable to, calculation. I have already discussed some of the limits and the possibilities of this approach to knowledge practices and production, but these limits should be revisited here. For example, confronted with ambiguity, ambivalence and apparent contradictions in the ways in which men and women in their study thought about and talked about their work, its limits and possibilities, their relationships with colleagues and managers, the ways in which hours of paid work bled out into hours notionally understood as non-work, the impact and influence of work on family relations and life, and other activities and practices located outside of, away from work, Baldry et al. (2007, 236) suggest that 'any discussion of the meaning of work has to included the additional dimension that its meaning is not only a reflection of what is but also what we might hope for, of the world as it could be'. So, what is calculable relies for its meanings on what is not as readily calculable. The experience of time, of uncertainty, of precariousness, for example, is not just measurable through the use of a number of existing scales, surveys, or the conduct of interviews. I, along with thousands, even millions of others, may feel insecure in my job. I may experience a sense of time pressure even if some forms of data don't support this feeling/experience. In the sense discussed by Weber this is a feeling, experience which is *enchanted* rather than *disenchanted* (through the practice of social science in its intellectualised/rationalised form). Which is not to say the feeling is wrong or that the processes of intellectualisation are mistaken. They just may be incommensurable. If they are, then it does not follow that a particular set of interviews, or survey data disproves or proves anything. Its contribution to debates such as this should be framed in far more modest terms.

Given these debates, and the limits and possibilities of the knowledge practices that give shape to them, we can still suggest that at a fundamental level paid work in many of the OECD economies, for example, is no longer primarily a male pursuit (although, of course, to suggest that at one time it was is to think of paid work from a middle class perspective: large numbers of women from the working classes had to participate in the paid labour market to secure household livelihoods). In many of these economies women now make up at least 40 per cent of the labour force (see Table 5.1), and in many economies at least 60 per cent of women of working age (15 to 64) are active participants in the labour force (see Table 5.2). This so-called *feminisation* of the workforce has attracted significant commentary – most of which has been related to issues such as the possibility of developing balance between work

and family; childcare availability and rights; wage parity and career opportunities; and diversity issues related to the apparent introduction of so-called feminine values and dispositions into traditionally masculine environments (Thrift 2005, Probert and Wilson 1993, Edgar 2005, Hochschild 2001, 2003, McKenna 1997).

Table 5.1 Civilian Employment: Males and Females as a Percentage of Labour Force

Country	Males 1982	Males 2005	Females 1982	Females 2005
Australia	63.3	55.1	36.7	44.9
Canada	58.8	53.2	41.2	46.8
Greece	69.3	61.8	30.7	38.2
Ireland	69.5	57.4	30.5	42.6
Japan	61.0	58.6	39.0	41.4
New Zealand	65.8	54.0	34.2	46.0
United Kingdom	59.0	53.3	41.0	46.7
United States	56.5	53.6	43.5	46.4

Source: OECD (2006) *Labour Force Statistics 1985–2005*, data extracted from larger tables on pp. 22–25

Table 5.2 Labour Force Participation Rates (Percentage of 15 to 64-year-olds in Labour Force)

Country	Males 1985	Males 2005	Females 1985	Females 2005
Australia	85.9	85.0	54.8	69.6
Canada	75.2	76.5	56.2	68.0
Greece	77.7	75.4 (2003)	41.8	51.0 (2003)
Ireland	84.6	82.0	40.3	60.9
Japan	87.6	87.6	57.1	62.5
New Zealand	83.6	86.8	47.6	72.3
United Kingdom	86.7	80.7	61.4	68.5
United States	85.2	76.3	64.1	66.2

Source: OECD (2006) *Labour Force Statistics 1985–2005*, data extracted from larger/separate tables on pp. 54–343

At another level paid work requires fewer and fewer of the workforce to manufacture a physical object; fewer and fewer to plant, sow, harvest or otherwise engage in the production of foodstuffs or agricultural products; fewer and fewer to dig or mine

minerals, ores and fuels above or below ground. As Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 indicate the percentage of the labour force engaged in mining and primary production in selected OECD economies declined significantly from 1982 to 2005, as did the numbers involved in industry; while greater numbers of those who participate in labour markets are engaged in the provision of a vast variety of services.[2]

Table 5.3 Percentage of Civilian Employment: Agriculture

Country	1982	2005
Australia	6.4	3.6
Canada	5.1	2.7
Greece	28.9	12.4
Ireland	17.0	5.9
Japan	9.7	4.4
New Zealand	11.4	7.1
United Kingdom	2.7	1.4
United States	3.6	1.6

Table 5.4 Percentage of Civilian Employment: Industry

Country	1982	2005
Australia	29.4	21.0
Canada	26.6	22.0
Greece	29.2	22.4
Ireland	31.3	27.9
Japan	34.9	27.9
New Zealand	32.7	22.0
United Kingdom	34.6	22.1
United States	28.4	19.8

2 The classifications used by the OECD – **Agriculture, Industry, Services** – are based on the United Nations' International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC 3rd Revision). **Agriculture (Classification A-B)** includes (A) Agriculture, hunting and forestry and (B) Fishing; **Industry (C-F)** includes (C) Mining and quarrying, (D) Manufacturing, (E) Electricity, gas and water supply, (F) Construction; **Services (G-Q)** includes (G) Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, (H) Hotels and restaurants, (I) Transport, storage and communication, (J) Financial intermediation, (K) Real estate, renting and business activities, (L) Public administration and defence, compulsory social security, (M) Education, (N) Health and Social Work, (O) Other community, social and personal service activities, (P) Private households with employed persons, (Q) Extra territorial organisations and bodies.

Table 5.5 Percentage of Civilian Employment: Services

Country	1982	2005
Australia	63.7	75.3
Canada	68.3	75.3
Greece	42.0	65.2
Ireland	51.6	66.2
Japan	56.4	67.6
New Zealand	55.9	70.8
United Kingdom	62.8	76.5
United States	68.0	78.6

Source: OECD (2006) *Labour Force Statistics 1985–2005*, data extracted from larger tables on pp. 32–35

In addition the microprocessor based, information and communications technology revolution of the last three decades has, on the back of long run historical tendencies to develop and deploy labour replacing technologies in many work environments (the agricultural, mining, manufacturing sectors in particular, and, most recently, various administration activities and jobs across sectors), transformed work tasks, practices, outcomes and products:

> What did you do at work today?
> *I was in a planning meeting all day for the marketing campaign meeting on Thursday.*
>
> What did you do at work today?
> *I was working on my (PowerPoint) presentation for Friday's meeting/lecture.*

For Daniel Bell (1976, 46, see also 2001) (and the post-industrial theorists) these changes in the nature of work – let alone the way work is imagined, managed, regulated – signal the emergence of post-industrial society, a society in which the:

> sources of innovation … are derived increasingly from the codification of theoretical knowledge, rather than from 'random' inventions. Every society in human history has been dependent upon knowledge, but it is only in recent years that the accumulation and distribution of theoretical knowledge has come to the fore as a directive force of innovation and change.

In some respects these formulations have been superseded by the arguments about the emergence of a so-called knowledge economy. These positions outline transformations which point to a capitalism in which knowledge (of certain types) becomes a valued currency, and knowledge workers become the ideal type (Lyotard 1984). Still others suggest that creative energies and intelligences provide the motive forces of economic productivity in the twenty-first century, and that, more problematically, we are witnessing the emergence a creative class of workers. For Richard Florida (2002) the start of the twenty-first century is the time of the 'creative class':

> This young man and his lifestyle proclivities represent a profound new force in the economy and life of America. He is a member of what I call the creative class: a fast-growing, highly educated, and well-paid segment of the workforce on whose efforts corporate profits and economic growth increasingly depend. Members of the creative class do a wide variety of work in a wide variety of industries – from technology to entertainment, journalism to finance, high-end manufacturing to the arts. They do not consciously think of themselves as a class. Yet they share a common ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference, and merit.

These changes in technology, economy, culture and politics arguably impact on the organisation of work, and the nature of work – signalling, in many, but not all contexts, a shift from Taylorist scientific management, mass production technologies, and bureaucratic, hierarchical organisational structures to flatter, *work team* orientated, more flexible organisational structures (more on this later in this chapter). And as the twenty-first century unfolds these processes increasingly play out on a globalised scale with economies such as China and India adding to the global *economies of signs and spaces* in which new work orders might be identified (Lash and Urry 1994).

In this context there has been discussion about the emergence of core and peripheral labour markets in which the core workforce trades excessively long hours of work for a measure of security and access to a range of non salary benefits. The so-called peripheral workforce has been characterised as low/minimum wage, casualised and part time, denied access to employment conditions such as sick leave, pension and health care entitlements, and a general lack of security in an employment context. In many of the OECD economies the labour force has become characterised by increased levels of casualised and part-time work (Table 5.6), and the over-representation of particular populations – females (Table 5.7) and young people – in part-time and casual employment (Campbell 2004).[3]

3 Part-time employment in the OECD figures is defined in terms of persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week in their main job. Furlong and Kelly (2005) and Campbell

Table 5.6 Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment

Country	1983	2005
Australia	19.0	27.3
Canada	16.8	18.3
Greece	7.2	6.1
Ireland	8.0	18.6
Japan	16.1	25.8
New Zealand	16.6 (1986)	21.7
United Kingdom	18.4	23.6
United States	15.6	12.8

Table 5.7 Females as a Percentage of Part-Time Labour Force

Country	1983	2005
Australia	69.9	68.3
Canada	69.6	68.6
Greece	58.4	69.6
Ireland	69.8	79.1
Japan	72.9	67.7
New Zealand	80.0	74.8
United Kingdom	89.3	77.3
United States	68.1	68.4

Source: OECD (2006) *Labour Force Statistics 1985–2005*, data extracted from larger tables on pp. 36–37

Elsewhere (Furlong and Kelly 2005) we argued that processes of casualisation, and of the increase in part-time work do not unfold in uniform ways. There we suggested that these processes have the greatest impact on the most vulnerable labour market participants. For example, part-time employment and casualisation affects young women more than young men. These forms of employment are also concentrated in the lowest skilled occupations, and in particular sections of a service labour market. In this sense we argued that people may not be so much choosing *flexible* forms of employment as part of lifestyle aspirations and choices related to concerns about work–life balance. Rather, these more marginal

(2004) discuss the problems associated with definitions of casual and part-time work, and how these difficulties impact on comparative analyses.

and precarious positions in the labour market are made even more uncertain as a consequence of various policy and regulatory processes that facilitate increases in part-time and casual forms of employment. The notion of choice in these circumstances is particularly ambiguous and ironic.

So, how is it that we can know twenty-first century capitalism in ways that can account for at least some of these changes in the world of work?

FLEXIBLE CAPITALISM?

> Although we have been interested both in continuities with the past and emergent trends for the future, the timing of our study proved to be significant as during the research period many of the predictions of the knowledge economy were themselves undermined by the puncturing of the dot.com bubble. This reinforces the point … that working life today is characterized by more uncertainty and impermanence, even in the daily organization of work, than has been the case for half a century.
>
> Baldry et al.(2007, 235)

In *The Culture of the New Capitalism* Richard Sennett (2006) identifies three key, unfolding, processes shaping the emergence of what he calls *flexible capitalism*. It is worth stressing that the changes Sennett describes are complex; they unfold unevenly and with a variety of consequences (intended and unintended); they may look different and impact differently in different configurations of time/space/place – such as in different organizations (large/small, start-up/established), or in different towns, cities, regions, nations, free trade communities. However, this framework enables me to discuss changes in twenty-first century work regimes that foreground the powerful demands for flexibility, both at the level of the organisation, and at the level of the self.

The first of the processes Sennett (2006, 37–47) identifies is the 'shift from managerial to share holder power' in many, mostly larger, organizations. Sennett locates the energising moment for this shift in the 1970 breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, and the subsequent freeing of vast amounts of capital to find optimal returns anywhere around the globe. Takeovers, mergers, acquisitions and buyouts became the playthings of increasingly mobile capital. All enabled by the frenzied activity of wealth holders seeking wealth creation; and facilitated by the demands, not always successful, for the interests of fluid, mobile, digitised capital to be accorded more currency/value that those of more *territorially fixed players* such as nation states and *flesh and blood* workers (Beck 2000). For Sennett

this explosion in the volume and circulation of capital, and the emergence of sophisticated investment instruments/practices, means that managers and executive officers in many large organisations are confronted by investors who have become *active judges*: 'a turning point in such participation occurred when pension funds, controlling vast quantities of capital, began actively pressuring management. The increasing sophistication of financial instruments like the leveraged buyout meant that the investors could make or break corporations while its management stood by helplessly'.

This globalised circulation/flow of often predatory capital, always on the lookout for bigger, better, faster returns on its risk activity, ushered in the second process that Sennett identifies as energising the flexibilisation of capitalism. Citing Bennett Harrison's notion of *impatient capital*, Sennett (2006, 39–40) argues that 'empowered investors' in greatly enhanced, globalised circuits of capital demanded short term rather than long term results: 'whereas in 1965 American pension funds held stocks on an average for 46 months, by 2000 much in the portfolios of these institutional investors turned over on an average of 3.8 months.' In these emerging investment markets share/stock prices, rather than dividends or earnings ratios, became the favoured measures/indicators of return or potential return. As Sennett indicates there is little new in money chasing money. However, organisations have had to transform their institutional processes, practices and structures to satisfy the fetishisation of the short term by impatient, globalised, digitised capital: 'Enormous pressure was put on companies to look beautiful in the eyes of the passing voyeur; institutional beauty consisted in demonstrating signs of internal change and flexibility, appearing to be a dynamic company, even if the once-stable company had worked perfectly well' (Sennett 2006, 40–41). In Sennett's understanding of flexible capitalism this is a profound change, and a continuing driver of change: the re-engineering, reworking, re-invention of the organisation – and I would add, of the self – that accompanies the myriad, complex demands for flexibility, nimbleness and innovation signals a highly consequential break from the *steel hard shell*/*iron cage* of the Weberian bureaucracy. And the possibility of thinking or acting otherwise in twenty-first century capitalism is indeed limited: what might be the possibilities for, and the consequences of, risking the indifference or wrath of impatient, globalised capital? As Weber (2002, 13, original emphasis) himself argued in *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism*:

> *Today's* capitalist economic order is a monstrous cosmos, into which the individual is born and which in practice is for him, at least as an individual, simply a given, an immutable shell … , in which he is obliged to live. It forces on the individual, to the extent that he is caught up in the relationships of the 'market', the norms of its economic activity. The manufacturer who consistently defies these norms will just as surely be forced out of business as the worker who cannot or will not conform will be thrown out of work.

What was *truthful* in relation to turn of the twentieth century capitalism is *truthful* in the beginning of the twenty-first century, where the norms that govern economic relations/activity are powerfully captured in the metaphor of *flexibility*.

The third driver of this post-bureaucratic, flexible capitalism is, for Sennett, the information, communication and transportation revolutions of the last three decades that have transformed the nature of all productive activities – service based, manufacturing, agricultural and mining. Under the unfolding, sometimes uneven, influence of the global development and deployment of these technologies twenty-first century work looks different, is imagined and regulated in different ways. It can be undertaken by microprocessor governed machines and hardware that displace humans on a massive scale. It can be organised within organisational architecture that, ideally, looks less like a *pyramid*, is *flatter* with fewer layers; and which constantly strives for *real time* rather than *lag time* in processes of command and control, but also of innovation and development. The promise of these technologies is forms of flexibility, nimbleness, responsiveness and creativity that appeal – for however short a term – to impatient capital. These forces are not just felt at the organisational level, at the level of being an attractive object of mobile, digital, impatient capital. They are highly consequential for the individual, the self, that constantly encounters these *norms* of economic activity, and must make choices, fashion a self, practice his/her freedom in the spaces structured by these demands and expectations: *How flexible are you? How flexible are you prepared to be/become?*

Importantly, these post-bureaucracy demands for flexibility are not only active and powerful drivers of organisational change in the private sector. In many of the OECD economies these logics and rationalities have been translated – alongside, and with the aid of, discourses of choice and customer rights, and efficiency and effectiveness – into the public sector. Public service development and delivery are increasingly imagined within this frame of flexibility/choice and this has had significant impacts on public sector work practices and processes as these services are rationalised, modernised, flexibilised (see, for example, Ahmad and Broussine 2003, Bach 2002, Franco et al. 2002, McLaughlin et al. 2002).

As I indicated earlier there is much to agree with in Sennett's analysis. Others, however, would find much to argue with. Nigel Thrift (2005, 5), for example, argues against placing too great an emphasis on a number of emergent possibilities and processes that are often identified as being significant in energising the so-called *new economy*. In the first place he argues we should not place too much emphasis on 'money and finance'. Writing about the role played by the financialisation of capitalism in the wake of the dot.com boom and bust Thrift (2005, 5) suggests:

> Though an event like the 'new economy' was in large part an asset price bubble, driven by the demands of new and extreme kinds of financial 'discipline' … aided by the advent of new kinds of financial instrument, fuelled by the spread of pension funds, mutual funds, and middle class financial literacy, and buttressed by all-too-familiar forms of greed and avarice, it constituted … not a new development but rather a more extreme version of past developments.

In the second instance he suggests that the developments in information technologies (IT) should not be understood deterministically, as having profound effects in uniform ways. IT should 'be seen as a having differential effects on numerous circuits of practice, rather than as having a uniquely determining effect on its own'. Finally, he cautions against overstating the influence of new forms of regulation and ownership in terms of such things as intellectual property rights associated with the commodification of, for example, bio-genetic research and its products. Again, Thrift doesn't deny the emergence and influence and possibilities of these processes. But he is unconvinced that this 'process has been more than an incremental evolution of past practice, impressive though that evolution undoubtedly is' (Thrift 2005, 5).

For me, these sorts of qualification often raise questions along the lines of: *What is the difference between something new and something that is novel*? In some sense Thrift is arguing about degrees, about relative amounts of weight that should be attached to processes that are apparent to most, if not all observers and commentators. This caution might be pedantic in some contexts. My concerns here are somewhat instrumental, even pragmatic, and are related more to particular purposes and uses, than to an over-arching desire to nail down the truth of twenty-first century capitalism. Instrumental in the realm of thought is, for me, about what a particular formulation allows in terms of proposition, of possibility, of a social scientific imagination. *How is it that we might think if we think in these terms*?

So, at one level Sennett's metaphor of flexible capitalism provides a useful frame for understanding a number of emerging characteristics of twenty-first century capitalism. His emphasis on the cultural processes that shape this fetishisation of flexibility, and the consequences of this fetishisation, are important for my identification and analysis of an ethic of enterprise. Indeed, in *The Corrosion of Character* Sennett (1998, 10) explores the impact of flexible capitalism on the *character* of those who toil in these emerging spaces. His concern is with an understanding of character as 'the ethical value we place on our own desires and on our relations to others'. For Sennett this view of character also has a focus on the enduring facets of 'our emotional experience' – a focus that is expressed, positively, through ideas of 'loyalty and mutual commitment, or through the pursuit of long-term goals, or by the practice of delayed gratification for the

sake of a future end'. Sennett argues that flexible capitalism poses a number of dilemmas for *character* that is understood in this way. These include: *How do we decide what is of lasting value in ourselves in a society which is impatient, which focuses on the immediate moment? How can long-term goals be pursued in an economy devoted to the short term? How can mutual loyalties and commitments be sustained in institutions which are constantly breaking apart or continually being redesigned?* (see also Kelly et al. 2007).

These are only one set of concerns that could be explored in this sort of discussion. Sennett (1998, 99–117) himself explores these questions through an analysis of the virtues and ethical injunctions he identifies as being associated with the mantra and practice of *teamwork* in a 'flexible political economy'. A team ethic, argues Sennett, 'celebrates sensitivity to others', 'good' listening and co-operation skills, and makes a virtue of adaptability and flexibility. To be a *teamplayer* in this sense is to take up and perform a series of injunctions to be flexible, adaptable, sociable in contexts where persons come together to 'perform' a 'specific, immediate, task, rather than to dwell together as a village'. For Sennett this teamwork ethic, in its 'fictions and its feigning of community' represents 'the group practice of demeaning superficiality', and provides no better an answer to the question 'How should I fashion my life?' than does the 'old work ethic'. Not only that, it also creates a new range of dilemmas for those who find themselves being identified as not *good* teamplayers. The negatives here mirror the negatives of being identified as lacking a work ethic (Kelly et al. 2007). In summary, then, Sennett (1998, 59) argues that these:

> are the forces bending people to change: reinvention of bureaucracy, flexible specialization of production, concentration without centralization. In the revolt against routine, the appearance of the new freedom is deceptive. Time in institutions and for individuals has been unchained from the iron cage of the past, but subjected to new, top-down controls and surveillance. The time of flexibility is the time of a new power. Flexibility begets disorder, but not freedom from restraint.

Ulrich Beck (2000, 1–3) has suggested that these developments signal the *Brazilianisation* of labour markets in the over-developed economies of the West. Beck (2000) argues is that in a 'semi-industrialised' economy such as Brazil, full-time waged or salaried employment is a secure form of existence for 'only a minority of the economically active population; the majority earn their living in more precarious conditions'. These labour market features – the 'spread of temporary and insecure employment, discontinuity and loose informality' – are, increasingly, defining characteristics of 'first world' labour markets. Yet, as a consequence of a range of cultural, political and economic processes (*settlements*),

these labour markets had been the 'bastions' of full employment for the period of three decades or so after World War II. For Beck a life world characterised by 'nomadic "multi-activity"' is not a 'pre modern relic', nor is it any longer *just* a feature of the female labour market. Rather, what Beck identifies as *endemic insecurity* emerges in the more developed world as a fundamental characteristic of the movement from a *work society* to a *risk society* (see also Furlong and Kelly 2005).

These, and other claims, have figured prominently in a broad literature concerned with the sociology of so-called *new work orders* that has emerged in the last few decades. In the context of this discussion this literature highlights the emergence of widespread anxieties and uncertainties as individuals work away at constructing a coherent and continuing narrative of self, of identity, in an adult world of work that is increasingly precarious, uncertain, flexible (Bauman 2001, 2005a, Beck 2000, Beck et al. 1994, Giddens 1991, Rifkin 1995). Zygmunt Bauman (2005a, 27) argues, for example, that a 'steady, durable and continuous, logically coherent and tightly structured working career is … no longer a widely available option'. In new work regimes the idea and the reality of a *job for life* disappears, to be replaced by jobs that are 'fixed term, until further notice and part-time'. In these regimes the 'catchword is flexibility, and this increasingly fashionable notion stands for a game of hire and fire with very few rules attached, but with the power to change the rules unilaterally while the game is still being played': '*In AT&T we have to promote the whole concept of the workforce being contingent, though most of the contingent workers are inside our walls. "Jobs" are being replaced by "projects" and "fields of work"*' (AT&T executive cited in Sennett 1998, 22, see also Kelly et al. 2007).

In a discussion in *The Individualized Society* Bauman (2001) makes a number of observations that are particularly relevant here. Pointing to the novel processes of individualisation at play in the world of work, Bauman (2001, 24) argues that working lives have become 'saturated with uncertainty'. In some respects, as Bauman concedes, there is little that is 'particularly new' about this situation – 'working life has been full of uncertainty since time immemorial'. Bauman's argument, however, is that contemporary workplace uncertainties are of a 'strikingly novel kind' – these uncertainties are a 'powerful *individualizing* force'. For Bauman, such uncertainty 'divides instead of uniting, and since there is no telling who might wake up in what division, the idea of "common interests" grows ever more nebulous and in the end becomes incomprehensible. Fears, anxieties and grievances are made in such a way as to be suffered alone'. Bauman (2001, 39) suggests that a capacity to embrace uncertainty and the demand for flexibility becomes a structuring, dividing force in globalised settings: 'The entry ticket to the new global elite is the "confidence to dwell in disorder" and the ability to "flourish in the midst of dislocation"; the membership card is the capability of "positioning oneself in a network of possibilities rather than paralysing oneself

in one particular job".' This apparent capacity to dwell in disorder, to flourish in uncertainty, to embrace flexibility emerges as a structuring element in an individualised biography because, as Bauman suggests, 'these features exert quite opposite effects on life depending on the circumstances of their bearers. The traits of character which beget exuberant and joyful spontaneity at the top turn "self-destructive for those who work lower down in the flexible regime"'.

Lash and Urry's (1994, 3) examination of these processes of transformation emphasises the consequences of globalising 'economies of signs and space' in which objects and subjects are characterised by their differing forms and states of mobility and flexibility. This mobility, understood in terms of 'flows', is both 'structured and structuring'. They point to a vast expansion in transnational practices and flows of 'capital, money, goods, services, people, information, technologies, policies, ideas, images and regulations' (Lash and Urry 1994, 280). As a consequence of the globalisation of these networked flows a 'range of different kinds of socio-spatial entities are emerging which are not nation-state societies of the north Atlantic sort' (Lash and Urry 1994, 281). The development of truly interconnected global cities is one example of these emerging entities. Global cities such as New York, London, Tokyo and Sydney are the 'new homelands' of 'cosmopolitan subjects' who may exhibit little of the older attachments to the Nation, as a shared community of fate. These 'reflexivity winners' in the transformed world of transnational flows might, instead, identify with 'neo-worlds' such as 'the art world, the financial world, the drug world, the advertising world, as well as the academic world' (Lash and Urry 1994, 323).

Bauman (2001, 39–40) argues that in these increasingly globalised spaces, in which opportunities and demand for paid work emerge, are structured and regulated, 'the new freedoms of the contemporary reincarnation of absentee landlords make the life regime of "those lower down" more flexible by the day (and so increasingly uncertain, insecure and unsafe); if not by design, then in the unintended yet nevertheless inevitable effects'. *Uncertainty*, *flexibility*, *choice* – all look and feel different as a consequence of differing locations in various cultural, economic, geographic networks, relations and spaces: '[T]hose on the top "celebrate what others suffer". The enchanting and willingly embraced lightness of being turns into the curse of cruel yet indomitable fate once it moves down the social ladder' (see also Furlong and Kelly 2005).

My primary purpose in this discussion has been to sketch the ways in which certain key social theorists have tried to imagine, order, and make sense of the ways in which work environments, spaces and relations have been transformed in the last three decades. These theorists provide a means to grasp some significant, large scale, even globalised, social transformations that have reconfigured the spaces in which work takes place, is managed and regulated, is imagined. I make no claim that these formulations capture an essence, or reveal an underlying reality that is

not available to others who might not buy into these so-called epochal accounts. They provide, in effect, sometimes useful vantage points, and useful maps from which some sense can be made, some tendencies, developments and directions identified. In this sense this work can be located in what C Wright Mills (1970, 13–14) powerfully identified as the *sociological imagination*:

> For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another – from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self – and to see the relations between the two.

Some of the key metaphors – ordering devices – that have been developed in these projects provide an avenue for apprehending and naming the contours of twenty-first century capitalism. Liquid modernity, the risk society, reflexive modernisation capture – however fleetingly, and at a large scale – aspects of the conditions of possibility that enable, even energise, diverse ideas about enterprise, reflexivity and risk that shape what Weber would understand as *ethically slanted* maxims for the *conduct of a life*. A common theme in many of these accounts is a sense that these discourses of enterprise, reflexivity and risk both give rise to, and try to order, what appear to be widespread anxieties and uncertainties as individuals work away at constructing a coherent and continuing narrative of self, of identity, in increasingly globalised labour markets that are, at a fundamental level, precarious, uncertain, flexible.

These understandings should not be seen as determining the forms of selfhood that we, as workers of the world, are encouraged and/or compelled to practice in the labour markets of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. But if twenty-first century flexible capitalism structures the fields of possibility in which we practise our freedom, then these fields, following Foucault, should be understood as not being entirely open, and as not being wholly constrained. There is always the possibility of acting otherwise, but in acting otherwise there are always consequences for a self. Some that might, reflexively, be foreseen, some that, no matter how reflexive, enterprising, entrepreneurial we might be, are unforeseen.

The various engagements with and reworkings of political economy and sociologies of work have a particular relevance to my claims that in twenty-first century flexible capitalism managing the self as an enterprise provides the framework for the conduct of our lives. As Thrift (2005, 10) argues, the enhanced cultural circuits

of capitalism, new commodity forms, and the productive grid of reworked/re-imagined time and space constitute an emergent *moral economy*:

> They are a means of governing bodies and other objects for the sake of profit: through forging new practices of managing labour, many of which are designed to be internalised by both managers and workers, through the design of new commodity systems which have much greater affective potency and so a greater pull, and through the design of micro spaces and times which are intended to form a productive grid. These new forms of *vitalization* could be described as a shift in governmentality …

The metaphor of Brazilianisation, the irony it plays on, enables us to think about new forms of precariousness and individualisation in which the self as enterprise is situated on unstable, shifting ground: a space in which there is a strong sense that we have little time or opportunity to rest on our laurels.

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CHAPTER 6

THE SPIRIT OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM

In *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism* Max Weber (2002) explored the particular virtues that should be seen as attaching to work, and the particular influence that certain Protestant sects had on articulating these virtues. Weber's concern was with investigating the relationship between a Puritan/Calvinist view that hard work, done well, was its own reward, and a so-called *spirit of capitalism*. For Weber the concept of the *spirit of capitalism* is an *ideal type* that is useful in trying to analyse the diverse, sometimes contradictory, motive forces of capitalist activities, and the behaviours and dispositions (and the means of producing such *ethics*) suited to these activities.[1] Weber saw in the Protestant Ethic only one of the motive forces for the emergence of rationalised capitalism (the *spirit* of capitalism).

Weber's work, his identification of a spirit of capitalism and a Protestant ethic that energises this spirit, helps locate my interest in suggesting that the cultivation of the self as an enterprise is the calling to which individuals should devote themselves at the start of the twenty-first century. A Protestant ethic promised heavenly salvation, and an earthbound redemption as the outcome of the pursuit of the individual's calling. Twenty-first century, flexible capitalism is energised by a spirit that sees in the cultivation of the self – as an ongoing, never-ending enterprise – an *ethically slanted maxim for the conduct of a life* (Weber 2002). This spirit is identifiable as an institutionally structured, individualised entrepreneurialism: a structured series of incitements, suggestions, imperatives to manage the lifecourse, the biography as an entrepreneurial DIY project. This spirit, as I will discuss in more detail in what follows, is made explicit in the ways in which American management consultant Tom Peters, for example, imagines the type of person one must be, the forms of personhood that one must cultivate, in order to succeed in the *monstrous cosmos* of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. In his '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/ Make Money' Peters (2005a, 41–42) claims that:

1 For a discussion of this sort of approach in Weber's work see Sven Eliaeson's (2002) *Max Weber's Methodologies*.

100 WAYS TO SUCCEED #23:

DESIGN MEANS YOU!

Sure, 'design' means DHL spending Gazillion$$$$ on … YELLOW. IT'S THE NEW BROWN.

But that's not all.

Design means … me obsessing on line breaks and ' … 's in the presentation of this Blog.

Design means … me … at age 61 and somewhat successful … going through more than 25 drafts of a mere update of my Official Bio … that will be circulated to Clients for the next several months.

Design means … me worrying equally about presentation style as content … 365/6 days-per year

Design means … my abandoning a Great Publisher (Knopf) to go to Dorling Kindersley so I could get the sort of design treatment for my books (e.g., *Re-imagine*!) that added up to Marshall McLuhan's famous 'The medium is the message.'

Design means … that every action I take is Consciously Mediated by my implicit-explicit 'design filter': That is … HOW DOES THIS COME ACROSS? COULD IT BE CLEARER? CRISPER? MORE EXCITING?

(My last Client … London Drugs … 'got it.' The president told me that my goal/minimum success standard was to 'make the audience gasp.' Nice, eh?)

I 'am' design!

It works for me.

I invite you aboard!

It's a daunting journey … and an exciting one.

It's near the Heart of the Matter in a BrandYou World.

(Hint: We live in a BrandYou World … like it or not.)

You = Desire to Survive = BrandYou = Branding Fanatic = LoveMark Fanatic (thanks, Kevin Roberts) = Design Fanatic.

Q.E.D.

Tom Peters (2005a, 41–42) '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money'

Michel Foucault's later work on the care of the self – the central part played by an analysis of the relationships between knowledge/power/subjects in this work; the focus on the ways in which forms of management and regulation, and practices of the self interact to shape the ways in which we practise our freedom in neo-liberal spaces; and a refusal to ground this analytic in a theory of the Subject – provides a powerful framework for thinking about the self as enterprise. Foucault's work throws into relief questions about the ways in which we practise our freedom, and are managed and regulated as Subjects who are free to choose, and who must carry the consequences of the choices we make (Rose 1999a). The discussion that follows will incorporate an investigation of the ways in which neo-liberal governmentalities produce understandings of the self as an autonomous, self-governing enterprise that should, ideally, be capable of identifying, navigating and managing the opportunities and risks of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. The idea of the self as enterprise allows me to analyse a variety of ways in which we practise our freedom in relation to our *willing* participation in globalised, precarious labour markets. To practise one's freedom is to develop certain dispositions, behaviours, capacities and commitments – in settings and systems of interaction in which others seek to manage or encourage particular (appropriate) behaviours and dispositions. It is in the compulsion to choose, to make appropriate choices from a range of culturally and historically specific options that we not only *practise* our freedom, but also carry the responsibilities and obligations, or reap the rewards that flow from practising our freedom in these ways.

THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM?

In their editors'/translators' introduction to a 2002 edition of *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism* Peter Baehr and Gordon Wells (2002, xxix) suggest one reason for the continuing influence of Weber's essay on thinking about the cultural dimensions of paid work in capitalist regimes: 'Sociology continues to accord *The Protestant Ethic* a singular standing not because of its putative historical accuracy but because of what it permits sociologists to do and project. It is the essay's suggestiveness, not its ultimate verisimilitude, its pliability, not its irrefutability, that keeps it alive.' It is these provocative dimensions of Weber's essay that enable me to imagine how the spirit of twenty-first century capitalism might be characterised. In order to do that I need, first, to outline what Weber (2002, 8–9) understood by what he himself identifies as a 'somewhat pretentious sounding expression'. Weber provides a 'provisional illustration of what is meant here by the "spirit" of capitalism' via a 'document of that "spirit" which encapsulates the essence of the matter in almost classical purity'. What follows in *The Protestant Ethic* is an extended passage from the works of Benjamin Franklin *Necessary Hints to Those that Would be Rich* (1736), and *Advice to a Young Tradesman* (1748).

> Remember, *that time is money*. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon *that* the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides.
>
> Remember, that *credit is money*. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit, and makes good use of it.
>
> Remember, that money is of the *prolific, generating nature*. Money can beget money … The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding sow, destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might have produced, even scores of pounds.
>
> Remember this saying. *The good paymaster* is lord of another man's purse. He that is known to pay punctually and exactly to the time he promises, may at any time, and on any occasion, raise all the money his friends can spare … After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to the raising of a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings.
>
> The most trifling actions that affect a man's credit are to be regarded. The sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy six months longer; but if he sees you at a billiard table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at your work, he sends for his money the next day; demands it, before he can receive it, in a lump.
>
> It shows, besides, that you are mindful of what you owe; it makes you appear a careful as well as an *honest* man, and that still increases your *credit.*
>
> cited in Max Weber (2002, 9–11, original emphasis) *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism*

In an editors' footnote that accompanies these passages from Franklin, Baehr and Wells (Weber 2002, 39–40) provide a brief biographical sketch of Franklin, part of which refers to his literary outputs. These included, at various points throughout his life, the books previously mentioned and an unfinished autobiography; a weekly newsletter/paper (*The New England Courant*); and his apparently popular, widely circulated and read *Poor Richard's Almanacs,* which were published annually between 1732 and 1757. These almanacs consisted of what Baehr and Wells call Franklin's *homespun philosophy* – of the type that, for Weber, exemplifies the spirit of capitalism. Of interest in this footnote is a suggestion that Weber had failed to detect, or at least, acknowledge the role of humour (*satire*, *irony*) in much of Franklin's writings. The suggestion is that too much weight or significance was given to homespun philosophy that was not worthy of this sort of attention. If Weber has missed or ignored Franklin's humour, if Weber has attached too much

significance to these passages what use are they in understanding the so-called spirit of capitalism?

The point to stress here is that Weber (2002, 11, original emphasis) makes no claims for the representativeness, even truthfulness of Franklin's incitements and advice. They are, as he stressed, illustrative of the concept that he has a mind to describe and explore. Indeed, for Weber there is little doubt that what he calls 'this little sermon' is the 'characteristic voice of the "spirit of capitalism," although clearly it does not contain everything that may be understood by the term'. Moreover, the 'essence of this "philosophy of avarice" is the idea of the *duty* of the individual to work toward the increase of his wealth, which is assumed to be an end in itself'. This *spirit* has, for Franklin, 'the character of an *ethically* slanted maxim for the conduct of life [*Lebensführung*]. *This is the specific sense in which we propose to use the concept of the "spirit of capitalism"'*.

Moreover, as Weber (2002, 8, original emphasis) suggests, a concept such as the spirit of capitalism, in the ways in which it is developed and deployed in *The Protestant Ethic*, can 'only be a *"historical individual"*, that is, a complex of configurations … in historical reality which we group together conceptually from the point of view of their *cultural significance* to form a single whole'. That is, we can only come to know the thing that we name as the spirit of capitalism by gathering and grouping together elements – such as the writings of Benjamin Franklin on how one should conduct oneself in the pursuit of wealth – in a way that gives due consideration, always contestable, to their particular historical, cultural significance:

> To put it another way, only in the course of the discussion and as the essential outcome will it be shown how that which we understand as the 'spirit' of capitalism should best – that is, most satisfactorily for the points of view *which interest us here* – be formulated. These 'points of view' … are, in turn, not at all the only ones possible with which to analyze the historical phenomena we are considering. It follows that what we understand by the 'spirit of capitalism' in terms of what we deem *'essential'* from our point of view, is by no means the *only* possible way of understanding it. This is in the nature of 'historical concept formation', which for its methodological purposes does not seek to embody historical reality in abstract generic concepts but endeavours to integrate them in concrete configurations … which are always and inevitably *individual* in nature.
>
> Weber (2002, 9, original emphasis)

For Weber (2002, 12–13, original emphasis), Franklin's exhortations and incitements signify the development of the spirit of capitalism in which the pursuit of wealth is an end itself:

> Moneymaking – providing it is done legally – is, within the modern economic order, the result and the expression of diligence *in one's calling*, and *this diligence* is, it is not difficult to recognize, the real alpha and omega of Franklin's morality, as we find it in the passage quoted … ["Seest thou a man active in his calling … he shall stand before kings] … and throughout his writings.

Having identified this spirit of capitalism, Weber's (2002, 36, original emphasis) purpose in *The Protestant Ethic* is to 'establish whether and to what extent religious influences *have in fact* been *partially* responsible for the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of that "spirit" across the world, and what concrete aspects of capitalist culture originate from them'. For the greater part of his essay Weber examines the ways in which the idea of the *calling* finds expression in a number of Puritan sects; and the ways in which this idea has significant influence in shaping a variety of exhortations and suggestions designed to *make up* (Rose and Miller 1992) individuals who embody, embrace and are energised by the so-called *spirit of capitalism*.

The work of Richard Baxter provides a key reference point for Weber's identification of this Protestant ethic – particularly Baxter's *Christian Directory,* which Weber (2002, 106) claims is the 'most comprehensive compendium of Puritan moral theology in existence'. In Baxter's writing, argues Weber, a fundamental theme emerges and is repeatedly emphasised: an 'at times almost passionate, preaching of hard constant, physical or mental work', as the duty of each individual – regardless of their station in life. A sense of what Weber refers to here can be found in the following extract from Baxter's *Directory* – an extract that is explicit and passionate about the consequences of *not* working at a calling:

> For want of bodily labour, a multitude of the idle gentry, and rich people, and young people that are slothful, do heap up in the secret receptacles of the body a dunghill of unconcocted and excrementitious filth, and vitiate all the mass of humours which should be the fuel and oil of life, and die by thousands of untimely deaths (of fevers, palsies, convulsions, apoplexies, dropsies, consumptions, gout, etc) more miserably than if thieves had murdered them by the highway, because it is their own doing and by their sloth they kill themselves.
>
> Richard Baxter (1673) *A Christian Directory*, cited in Thomas (1999, 124–125)

Weber (2002, 107, original emphasis) suggests that two *motifs* converge to produce this theme. First, work is the 'specific protection against all those temptations which for Puritanism comprise the concept of the "unclean life"'. Working hard in one's calling is the prescription for dealing with a variety of worldly temptations. *Idle hands* ... ! The second motif is that 'work is *the* end and purpose of life commanded by God … Unwillingness to work is a symptom of the absence of the state of grace'. My purpose here is not so much to critique Weber's analysis, or to follow the particular line of reasoning that sees a Puritan genealogy to the spirit of capitalism. Weber (2002, 120) himself acknowledges that the *Puritan asceticism of the calling* had ceased to energise this spirit by the time that Benjamin Franklin was writing. Instead, my purpose is to identify the ways in which Weber pieces together the evidence to support his concepts of the Protestant Ethic, and the spirit of capitalism.

Weber's approach has echoes in the ways that Foucault undertook a number of his studies, in particular his work in *Discipline and Punish*. In response to criticism of the weight that he attached to Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as a means to explore the emergence of new rationalities of detention, punishment and surveillance in the nineteenth century Foucault (1991b, 81–82) argued, in part, that 'You say to me: nothing happens as laid down in these "programmes"; they are no more than dreams, utopias, a sort of imaginary production that you aren't entitled to substitute for reality'. In this sense Bentham's Panopticon 'isn't a very good description of "real-life" in nineteenth-century prisons'. Foucault's reply was to suggest: 'if I had wanted to describe "real-life" in the prisons I wouldn't have gone to Bentham … [However] these programmes induce a whole series of effects in the real … they crystallize into institutions; they inform individual behaviour, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things.' As such they are 'fragments of reality which induce such particular effects in the real as the distinction between true and false implicit in the ways men "direct", "govern" and "conduct" themselves and others'.

TOM PETERS AND THE SPIRIT OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM

100 WAYS TO SUCCEED #44:

HIPNESS!

'Hipness is the only asset that matters.'

—Paul Saffo, futurist, on Apple

Are you … Hip? If not, what … EXACTLY … do you plan to do about it?

Tom Peters, (2005a, 60) '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money'

In what some have called a postmodern, knowledge based economy – where information as data is a globalised, digitised, virtual commodity – the production, reproduction, translation and circulation of data-information-knowledge greatly enhances the opportunities for the generation and circulation of the types of advice, exhortations and incitements that Weber identifies as being indicative of the spirit of capitalism. In these spaces I could identify numerous potential sources and figures that could stand in for Benjamin Franklin or Richard Baxter in my attempt to identify and discuss a spirit of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. In this incredibly crowded, noisy and global *bazaar* (a provocative metaphor for thinking about the spaces in which we can shop for advice on the cultivation, regulation and conduct of ourselves) a number of voices and figures have a tendency to stand out. One of these figures is American management consultant (*guru*) Tom Peters. In his books (including, *In Search of Excellence* [1982 with Bob Waterman], *A Passion for Excellence* [1985, with Nancy Austin], *Thriving on Chaos* [1987], *Liberation Management* [1992], *The Brand You50*, *The Project50* and *The Professional Service Firm50* [1999a, b, c], *Re-imagine! Business Excellence in a Disruptive Age* [2003]), his website, his weblog, his *free stuff* (tompeters.com) we can identify and discuss a voice that speaks to, and of, the spirit of twenty-first century, flexible capitalism. Again, I stress the methodological rationalities that frame this claim: Peters' voice is illustrative, not necessarily representative; his is not the only possible voice; his (*homespun*) philosophies on wealth, work and success represent fragments of reality in which we can identify characteristics that tie them to other fragments of reality; when these fragments are grouped together they assume a certain cultural and historical significance – they say something notable about the issues they address. In addition, the extracts I reproduce below are not exhaustive of Peters' work. But they do indicate and illustrate some of the

key themes that run through his work, and these themes assume the *character of ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of life in twenty-first century flexible capitalism*. The following extracts come from his '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/ Make Money'.

100 WAYS TO SUCCEED #5:

TARGET #1: ME!

Stand in front of the mirror … Smiling. Saying … 'Thank you.' Doing … Jumping Jacks …

Smiling begets a warmer (work, home) environment.

Thanking begets an environment of mutual appreciation.

Enthusiasm (those Jumping Jacks) begets enthusiasm.

Love begets love

How do you 'motivate others'? Take a B-school course on Leadership?

No! (You were joking, right?)

Answer: Motivate yourself first.

By hook or by crook.

Call it: Leadership By Unilateral Attitude Adjustment.

Are there things that can be labeled 'circumstances'?

Of course.

Do bad things happen to good people?

Doubtless.

Is there such a thing as 'powerlessness'?

No! No! No!

Take charge now!

Task one: Work on ourselves.

Relentlessly! …

… Smile! Enthuse! Thank! Wow! Win! Now!

Tom Peters (2005a, 8–10) '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money'

The self here is something to be worked on: enthusiastically, relentlessly, with the purpose of producing a self capable of acting on and in the world, to transform the relations that the self has with others, with the environments it acts in. Tip number 10 in this series takes up these themes and frames the work to be done on the self as being necessary to establish and maintain a competitive advantage in relations with others. To secure this advantage we must, at least metaphorically, possibly with a little gentle irony, **GET UP EARLIER THAN THE NEXT GUY.**

100 WAYS TO SUCCEED #10:

GET UP EARLIER THAN THE NEXT GUY.

Flying to Boston from London on Saturday morning. 7 hours. Professional woman sitting in front of me. I duly swear, she did not look up for 7 hours. She produced more on her laptop than I do in … a week … a month.

I'm not touting workaholism here.

I am stating the obvious.

She or he who works the hardest has one hell of an advantage.

She or he who is best prepared has one hell of an advantage.

She or he who is always 'overprepared' has one hell of an advantage.

He or she who does the most research has one hell of an advantage.

I don't know about you, but I wouldn't have wanted to challenge 'the women in the row in front' in whatever presentation venue she was approaching.

Tom Peters (2005a, 16) '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money'

This work on the self, while it might be something that is carried out for much of the time in private, in preparation, has a very public even entrepreneurial purpose. The self prepared in this way is a self that is to be presented, marketed, sold; and the means for selling the self is the story that one is able to craft and tell about oneself. In this sense it pays to **WORK ON YOUR STORY!**

100 WAYS TO SUCCEED #17:

WORK ON YOUR STORY!

He/she who has the best story wins!

In life!

In business!

The White House!

Consider the following:

'A key—perhaps the key—to leadership is the effective communication of a story.' Howard Gardner, *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership* …

Your task—TODAY—is a short story.

Your current project is … a story.

Your career is … a story.

HE/SHE WHO HAS THE BEST STORY WINS!

SO … WORK ON YOUR STORY!

MASTER THE ART OF STORYTELLING/STORYDOING/STORY PRESENTING!

Tom Peters (2005a, 26–31) '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money'

What we see in these '100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money' are exhortations, incitements, advice for self-help, self-motivation, self-management and self-transformation that can be found in many other cultural spaces (physical and virtual) in globalised, twenty-first century flexible capitalism. In these globalised bazaars the flood of self-help, self-transformation texts (books, magazines, websites, TV and radio shows) can be critiqued (judged) from a number of perspectives. One way to think about the production, circulation and consumption of these commodities is in terms of the ethic of enterprise that I am exploring here. When the self is shaped and made knowable in terms of an ethic of enterprise then the ongoing conduct of this enterprise, as an individualised imperative and responsibility, is something that must be managed, resourced and supported. These resources and supports are things that are increasingly and readily commodified and consumed.

Indeed, the roles played by these forms of knowledge, their production, circulation and consumption, are, for commentators such as Nigel Thrift (2005), central to the transformations in globalising capitalism in the last four decades. Thrift (2005, 5–6), in looking for what lies 'at the heart of what is new' in twenty-first century capitalism, identifies as a key element the *cultural circuit of capitalism*, the 'extraordinary discursive apparatus which has been perhaps the chief creation' of capitalism in the last 40 years. This discursive apparatus, produced and energised within the institutions and relays of globalising academic and media spaces, and including such actors as 'business schools, management consultants, management gurus and the media', has, suggests Thrift (2005, 6), 'produced a process of continual critique of capitalism, a feedback loop which is intended to keep capitalism surfing along the edge of its own contradictions'. This circuit, and the flows of thinking, knowledge and positive, profitable critique that it enables, is significant, argues Thrift (2005, 6), for four main reasons: (1) This apparatus has 'made capitalism into a theoretical exercise'. In this sense an array of 'essentially virtual notions (network, the knowledge economy, the new economy, community of practice) are able to take on flesh as, increasingly, the world is made in these notions' likeness through the power of consulting solutions'. This sort of formulation mirrors many of the ideas that are framed by the understandings of the evolution of a post-industrial society or knowledge economy. Again, the challenge here is to imagine what it is possible to think by thinking in such ways rather than to suggest that Thrift or Daniel Bell, or Jean-François Lyotard is best able to capture a sense of these developments. (2) The second element that drives the influence of these circuits emerges from the emphasis that they place on bodies. For Thrift (2005, 6) much of the productive purpose of twenty-first century capitalism is 'concerned, in a touchy-feely replay of Taylorism, with producing new kinds of managerial and worker bodies that are constantly attentive, constantly attuned to the vagaries of the event, through an emphasis on the ludic and affective'. This point also references ideas from such diverse sources as Taylorism, Braverman's critique of Taylorism, and Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. Docile, disciplined bodies, for Foucault, are not servile bodies, but bodies made up in ways that make them productive in different contexts. The regulation, management and rationalisation of bodies, minds and souls is a fundamental task of rationalised capitalism. Thrift is pointing here to novel ways of thinking, framing and acting on these concerns. These novel ways of governing bodies, minds and souls are framed by the sense that the self is an enterprise, and that the productive regulation of this enterprise needs to account for the playful, affective, emotional dimensions of a self that is understood to comprise a body, a mind and a soul. (3) In the third instance these cultural circuits are powerful in-so-far-as they are self-reinforcing. For Thrift (2005, 6) this apparatus energises and produces a 'new and vibrant set of markets for capitalism'. The 'thirst for information technology, expertise, and all kinds of infrastructure' continually produce new opportunities, new possibilities for commodified forms of knowledge that make sense in, and to, these circuits. Again, my sense here is that Thrift is engaging with and naming developments that have

been imagined in a variety of ways by other writers: in terms of reflexivity by the likes of Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994), or in terms of what Lyotard (1984) in *The Postmodern Condition*, imagined as performativity. (4) This last point is made more explicit in the ways that Thrift (2005, 6) suggests that these cultural circuits are able to appropriate and incorporate knowledges and forms of thinking and communication that may, previously, have been understood as inconsequential, trivial, outside the realms of what capitalist processes need to know in order to be productive and profitable. These circuits provide the frame and the means for 'vacuuming up all those knowledges which have evaded capitalism until now'. As he indicates, these knowledges may be 'transmitted through gossip and small talk which often prove surprisingly important', and which are, now, 'able to be captured and made into profit via artefacts like new kinds of office space and tightly knit teams'.

So, I want to suggest that the ways in which Peters imagines the challenges to be encountered and mastered by the self as enterprise have a certain cultural significance, as *ethically slanted maxims for the conduct of life*, because they have significant resonance in a globalised information-scape – a large part of which is devoted to producing and providing advice on how to be successful and make money. In this sense it is of less concern how many people read or take up Peters' suggestions, although his renown and success would suggest that he has a substantial audience. Indeed, his agents, The Washington Speakers Bureau, include the following in his biography: 'In no small part, what American corporations have become is what Peters has encouraged them to be' (*The New Yorker*); 'Peters is … the father of the post-modern corporation.' (*Los Angeles Times*); 'We live in a Tom Peters world' (*Fortune*); '*Fortune* called Tom Peters the "Ur-guru" of management, and compares him to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, and H.L. Mencken. The *Economist* tagged him the "Uber-guru"' (Washington Speakers Bureau 2007). Rather, the interest here is in the forms of knowledge of the self (rationalities) that frame these tips, and the techniques that are offered for working on the self, for transforming the self in the pursuit of success and wealth. The *essence* of the spirit of twenty-first century flexible capitalism – expressed with passion and exuberance by Tom Peters – is that the cultivation of an entrepreneurial self is *the* calling to which individuals should devote themselves. That is, the self is the enterprise to which significant efforts should be directed in the pursuit of wealth and success. Twenty-first century, flexible capitalism is energised by a spirit that sees in the cultivation of the self – as an ongoing, never-ending enterprise – an *ethically slanted maxim for the conduct of a life*. The cultivation, conduct and regulation of the self is a never-ending project shaped by a variety of frameworks that promise to support, facilitate and energise this project.

GOVERNING THE SELF: FROM LIBERAL TO NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITIES

The governmentality literature of the past two decades has developed a Foucauldian analysis of neo-liberal mentalities of rule that is particularly useful in situating a discussion of the imperatives to imagine the self as an enterprise: imperatives that are so vividly laid out in the work of Peters and others. This sort of analysis is principally concerned with identifying and analysing neo-liberalism as a mentality of rule that has sought to make problematic, and reconfigure, the diverse relations between the State, the economy, civil society and the self. And to rethink the various ways in which these relations and spaces might be regulated. In essence, these mentalities of rule reconfigure the self as an enterprise, and seek, in a variety of ways, to facilitate the development of this form of personhood. An example of this sort of analysis is a collection edited by Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess (1998) *Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government*, in which contributors examine problems of contemporary governmentality such as the *corporatisation of public education* (Meredyth 1998); the *reworking of the ethical life of the unemployed* via ideas of active citizenship (Dean 1998); the construction and regulation of the problem of AIDS in ways that seek to make autonomous, choice making subjects responsible for their sexuality and its consequences (Ballard 1998); the possibilities for governing national economies in the contexts of material and discursive changes in thinking about what it is that is being governed (*the* economy), and how it might governed (in the context of such things as globalisation) (Hindess 1998); and the emergence of new forms of social contractualism framed by ideas of individual (consumer) choice in areas formally quarantined from these sorts of frameworks – ideas made concrete in such things as the UK's (1991) Citizen's Charter (Yeatman 1998).

At the turn of the twenty-first century these transformations structure, differently, the political, cultural and economic discourses mobilised in the Anglo-European parliamentary democracies, including the rhetorics mobilised by the Social Democratic Labour Parties in these settings. Nikolas Rose (1996a, 53, see also 1996b), for one, argues that what he calls 'advanced liberal' problematisations of liberal welfare governance 'can be observed in national contexts from Finland to Australia, advocated by political regimes from left to right, and in relation to problem domains from crime control to health'. Neo-liberalism, understood not as a coherent ideological or political movement, but as a rationality of government, has been successful in transforming the practices of government in Anglo-European contexts, partly due to its capacity to articulate narratives of 'personal autonomy, enterprise and choice' (Barry et al. 1996, 10) to these transformed problematics of government. Moreover, these narratives connect with certain experiences and/or concerns about the social transformations structured by the deeper currents of twenty-first century flexible capitalism.

One way to understand neo-liberalism as a series of solutions to the problem of government is to understand the emergence and practices of liberalism in similar terms. Foucault (1991a, 96) argued that liberalism, understood as a problematisation of the practice of government, emerged, partly, in relation to *mercantilism* and the *science of police*. Seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilism was structured, argues Scott Gordon (1991, 125), by the view that the regulation of every aspect of economic activity was an 'affair of state'. Further, mercantilism held that 'harmony in economic progress does not spring from the natural play of individual interest, but must be created by the wise governor' (Scott Gordon 1991, 224). For Osborne (1996, 100) the science of police, as a science of populations, was characterised by both its 'heterogeneity of concerns' and its 'totalizing aspirations'. Within the science of police the regulation of all aspects of social and economic activity was framed by a sense that minute, exhaustive, detailed knowledge of all aspects of such activity, and of the State's concerns with this activity, and of the territory and its inhabitants, could be mobilised towards the end of the State's continued strength: a strength and prosperity to be secured through the happiness and productivity of the population. For Osborne (1996, 100), the nature of the aspirations of the science of police is indicated by the vast array of activities, beliefs and processes that are constructed as being rightful objects of government: 'religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, highways, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, manservants and factory workers, the poor'. In the early modern European science of police nothing 'was to be impervious to the gaze of knowledge'. Rose (1996a, 43) suggests that the science of police sought to 'ward off disorder through a fixed ordering of persons and activities'. Faced with the 'problem of calculating detailed actions appropriate to an infinity of unforeseeable and contingent circumstances', the science of police mobilised 'exhaustively detailed knowledge of the governed reality of the state itself, extending (at least in aspiration) to touch the existences of its individual members' (Colin Gordon 1991, 10).

Osborne (1996, 101) argues that this understanding of the science of police is a useful means for thinking about the emergence of liberalism, conceived, in this sense, not as doctrine or ideology, but as a 'critique of State reason': a 'kind of habitual suspicion related to the means and ends of government'. In this sense Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations* can be read as a tract against mercantilism: a tract which takes as its objects both the pervasiveness and extensiveness of economic regulation by the sovereign State, and the 'corrupt and inefficient' bureaucracy which administered these regulations (Scott Gordon 1991, 145–146). Colin Gordon (1991, 14) argues that for Foucault, the *Wealth of Nations* marks, at another level, a 'transformation in the relationship between knowledge and government'; a transformation which was linked, in terms of this discussion, to liberalism's problematisation of the art of governing.

Liberalism can be understood, then, as a rationality of government made concrete through the mobilisation of techniques of government capable of enabling 'forms of government detached from totalizing forms of sovereignty' (Osborne 1996, 101). In a similar vein Rose (1996a, 43–44) argues that liberalism 'repudiates the megalomaniac and obsessive fantasy of a totally administered society'. Instead, within this emerging art of government, the State must confront certain, evolving, realities. These seventeenth and eighteenth century realities can be situated in relation to the intellectual and philosophical project of the Scottish Enlightenment, the emerging institutional forms of modernity and revolutionary moments, and movements, in Europe and the Americas. Liberal government in these transformed material and discursive spaces was faced with 'subjects equipped with rights and interests' that are understood – in a contested fashion – as existing outside the legitimate realm of the political. Moreover, these various spaces – the *social*, the *private*, the *market*, *civil society* – cannot be governed by the exercise of 'sovereign will' because the State lacks the knowledge and capacities to achieve these ends.

This mode of analysis of the multiple and changing problematics of liberal government is made possible by understanding these problematics in terms of the historically contingent relationships between *political rationalities* and *governmental technologies* (Rose and Miller 1992). Rose (1996a, 42) suggests that political rationalities constitute the 'intellectual machinery': the various cognitive frameworks which render 'reality thinkable' in ways which make such diverse realities 'amenable to political programming'. For Rose and Miller (1992, 175), these rationalities can be understood as the 'changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised'; the various 'moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power' by an array of authorities; particular, often changing ways for imagining the 'appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics'; and certain understandings of the 'proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and familial sectors'. Governmental technologies are imagined as the historically contingent matrix of 'programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures' that are inherited, developed and deployed by a range of authorities in various attempts to realise 'governmental ambitions' (Rose and Miller 1992, 175). For Rose (1996a, 42), these techniques and procedures, the 'materials and forces' which *come to hand* within contingent attempts to regulate certain behaviours and dispositions of target populations are suggestive, not of the 'implementation of idealized schema in the real by an act of will'. Rather, these technologies consist of a 'complex assemblage of diverse forces (legal, architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgemental), techniques (notation, computation, calculation, examination, evaluation), devices (surveys and charts, systems of training, building forms)'. All of which promise to provide the machinery, the architecture, that would make liberal government possible.

Rose (1996a, 45) also suggests that early modern liberal arts of government can be 'characterised by the hopes that they invest in the subjects of government'. Philosophical, moral, legal and political conceptions of the citizen, invest in the citizen Subject certain notions of 'freedom, liberty and rights' that require continuous recognition and articulation in as much as they fall outside of the legitimate realm of 'political or legal regulation'. This construction of a realm of the *social* beyond the direct reach of laws and decrees, the space of *freedom*, requires that liberal practices of government become 'dependent upon devices (schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic asylum, the reformatory prison)' which promise to 'create individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves', within particular, limited fields of possibilities – including education systems, labour markets and health systems.

The art of liberal government is, then, a restless enterprise. An enterprise that has diverse ends in mind, and an array of means at hand. These ends are constantly being rethought as they find the limits of the possible, as the possible itself is made problematic and rethought. Liberal governmentalities also, in many respects, lack a centre. Liberal government relies on relays, associations and relations between a variety of authorities, centres of expertise, departments, corporations and organisations. As my earlier discussion of governmentality suggested these arts of government are analysable in terms of such things as the shifting, contingent, oftentimes durable rationalities and technologies that give concrete form to government; in terms of these relays and relationships; and in terms of the relations between the forms of power that Foucault (1991a) identified as sovereignty, discipline and government.

As a key figure in the development of scholarship related to governmentality studies Nikolas Rose (1996a) makes a useful contribution to thinking about a number of transformations in the arts of liberal government during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Rose (1996a, 47–48) suggests that these transformations witnessed the emergence of the notion of social welfare as a rationality of government which would seek to '"social-ize" both individual citizenship and economic life in the name of collective security'. This reconfiguring of the limits and possibilities of liberal governmentality were situated within and against various processes which rendered problematic the rationalities of early liberal arts of government. For example, the 'philanthropic and disciplinary projects' of nineteenth century liberalism, which took as their object the maintenance of 'moral order in urban labouring classes' had largely *failed* in the 'face of the forces of social fragmentation and individualization of modern society'. In this sense, the Liberal welfare State appears as the result of diverse attempts to 'recode', across a variety of domains, 'the relations between the political field and the management of economic and social affairs'. For Rose, this rethinking of the practices of liberal government along the lines of 'social

welfare' invested in political authorities, certain responsibilities as 'guarantors' of both the 'freedom of the individual and the freedom of the capitalist enterprise'. As a *formula of rule*, the Liberal welfare State was, in this sense, 'somewhere between classical liberalism and nascent socialism'. The contested nature of these transformations was most apparent in the domain of the economic where State regulation and intervention 'weakened' the 'privacy of the market and the enterprise while retaining their formal autonomy'. These emerging governmentalities, which took as their main object 'economic security', also provoked tensions and resistances through the diverse attempts to regulate and 'act upon' the 'social milieux within which production and exchange occurred'.

Social insurance and *social work*, as two forms of this transformed practice of government, indicate the nature of the (new) domains which are marked out within these re-conceived political, moral and economic rationalities. An analysis of these two *axes of government* provides some indication of both the changed ways in which expertise is mobilised within the State of welfare, and the ways in which the Subject of welfare is reconfigured (Rose 1996a). Rose (1996a, 48–49) argues that social insurance is an 'inclusive' technology of government, in so far as it has as its object (contested) notions of 'social solidarity'. These technologies of government, such as the schooling system, child welfare practices, unemployment benefits, widows' pensions, supporting parents' benefits, attempt to *collectivise* the regulation of the disintegrative effects of modernity. Here the *dangers* and *risks* associated with a 'capricious system of wage labour, and the corporeal riskiness of a body subject to sickness and health', are reconfigured, within liberal welfare governmentalities, as rightfully falling under the 'stewardship of a "social" State'. As a practice of liberal welfare government, social insurance is an attempt, then, to establish new articulations 'between "public" norms and procedures and the fate of individuals in their "private" economic and personal conduct'. These social insurance technologies took various forms in different national contexts, and found expression in such diverse schemes and procedures as public housing development, 'health and safety legislation and laws on child-care', As a consequence of these emerging problematics of government there was a re-framing of the relative 'autonomy of both economic and familial spaces'. For Rose the emerging practices of the welfare state can also be thought of as promoting 'new vectors of responsibility and obligation' between 'State and parent, child or employee'.

Rose (1996a, 49–50) suggests that this attempt to regulate, in the name of collective security, the 'vicissitudes' of individual 'life histories' within the disintegrative processes of modern social life, was complimented through the emergence of the practice of *social work*. Social work, as a practice of liberal welfare government, represented a strategic intervention into individual life processes which sought to 'individualize' and 'responsibilize' the citizen subject within these processes. There were moves here, within 'complex assemblages' of centres of expertise (schools,

courts, hospitals, health centres, State bureaucracies) to target, most often within the 'matrix of the family', citizens and would-be citizens (the child, the adolescent) judged to be *pathological* in relation to social norms. In these contexts new forms of positive, professional and expert knowledges were concerned with the production and circulation of knowledge, about the 'everyday activities of living, the hygienic care of household members, the previously trivial features of interactions between adults and children'. These forms of expertise promised, as 'technologies of expert social government', to 'align the self-governing capacities of subjects with the objectives of political authorities by means of persuasion, education and seduction rather than coercion'. There is then a particular relationship between expertise and the citizen subject within liberal welfare arts of government, which is signalled, for Rose, by a particular articulation of *security* and *responsibility*. This articulation sees the subject of welfare 'reconceptualized as a citizen, with rights to social protection and social education in return for duties of social obligation and social responsibility, both refiguring and retaining the Liberal character of "freedom" and "privacy"'.

Neo-liberal governmentalities have attempted to reconfigure these understandings of risk, social insurance, individual autonomy and choice, the State, the economy, civil society and the self through an ethic of enterprise. These efforts to re-imagine the conduct of conduct are not inevitable, are not uniform and are not guaranteed to be successful. Yet they are widespread, and they have assumed a particular character in many of the industrialised, liberal democracies over the last 40 years.

NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITIES AND THE SELF AS ENTERPRISE

Foucault's analysis of liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities in his series of lectures at the College de France identifies the significance of the German *Ordoliberalen* and the American Chicago School of Economics in framing post World War II problematisations of liberal welfare government.[2] Again, this is not the only possible means for understanding these developments. In a number of fields this framework would be critiqued for neglecting ideology, or class structures, or political systems and legislation and laws, or financial and economic processes and developments. However, I have made a case for the analytical power of this approach, and the way that it enables me to identify in these emerging mentalities of government and regulation the ways in which the self is made knowable as an enterprise, so that it might be managed, and manage itself as an enterprise (McNay 2009). Colin Gordon (1991, 41) argues that in the case of the *Ordoliberalen*, the problematisation of the interventionist practices of government

2 Published by Palgrave in 2008 as *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979.*

should be situated within the historical experience of National Socialism. Burchell (1996, 22) argues that for the *Ordoliberalen,* National Socialism is not 'some monstrous aberration'. Instead the *Ordoliberalen* identified the emergence and the experience of Nazism as the 'quite inevitable outcome of a series of *anti-liberal* policies'. In the historical context of the emergence of the German nation State, these policies included the experience of 'national protectionism, the welfare policies of Bismarckian State socialism, wartime economic planning and management, and Keynesian interventionism'. Post-war American neo-liberalism emerges primarily from the Chicago School of Economics and the work, amongst others, of Milton Friedman and Frederich von Hayek – Hayek is described on the jacket notes of his (1988) *The Fatal Conceit* as the *ideological mentor* of the Reagan and Thatcher *revolutions*. Burchell (1996) argues that while the historical context is quite different to German post-war neo-liberalism, the 'general form of the argument is quite similar'.

Some discussion of Hayek's understandings of markets, enterprise and persons can help situate the ways in which these ideas act, as Foucault (1991b) would suggest, as *grids for the perception and evaluation of things*. Rose (1996a, 50) argues that for Hayek, the mentalities of the *interventionist* State, as practiced within war time planning and regulation of the economic and the social, were 'inefficient and self defeating'. Moreover, Hayek (1944) saw in such practices the '*Road to Serfdom*'. That is, interventionist practices of government impel the nation State in the direction of the totalitarian State as it emerged, and would emerge, in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and China. Robert Heilbroner (1969, 272) argues that Hayek saw in National Socialism the operation of an 'internal law' which emerged at a certain level of government intervention into the market order. There was a sense, for Hayek, that once this level was reached, government 'had no alternative but to embrace the economy in a top-to-bottom rigid grip'. Heilbroner (1969, 272) suggests that Hayek was not against government regulation *per se*. Instead Hayek's concerns were directed towards forms of economic regulation or planning which were 'characterised by a peculiar inability to call a halt to itself. Once set in motion, an *inner* necessity forced it to expand'. This logic did not stem from the intentions, or 'personal motives', of planners, bureaucrats and experts to plan *more*, but rather from the inability of plans to match the contingencies, failures and unplanned for aspects of human interaction in complex extended orders (such as modern markets). In the context of these failures these mentalities of government created a demand for *better* planning, *more* surveillance and *greater* intervention into these complex systems. Hayek's framing of this argument (see also Hayek 1967a, b), at a time when other Western intellectuals were arguing that post Depression and war-time practices of government had demonstrated the desirability and capacity of the State governing 'the whole of the productive and social organization of a nation', would emerge 30 years later in political critiques of welfare government in many of the liberal democracies (Rose 1996a, 50–51).

For Hayek (1988, 6–7 original emphasis) the origins, and the survival, of 'our civilization', as a form of the social which is able to sustain large populations and economic growth, and promote ideals of 'liberty, property and justice', is dependent on what he calls 'the extended order of human co operation' facilitated by the 'competitive market order'. Hayek argues that this extended form of co-operative human interaction 'resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously'. The conflict, for Hayek, between the social welfare state (Socialism) and neo-liberalism is one between, in essence, 'those who demand deliberate arrangement of human interaction by central authority based on collective command over available resources', and the 'advocates of the spontaneous extended human order created by a competitive market'. Hayek argues that Socialism's position is both 'factually impossible to achieve or execute', and 'logically impossible'. For Hayek the important issue here is Socialism's assumption that 'since people had been able to *generate* some system of rules' governing their conduct, then, logically, 'they must also be able to *design* an even better and more gratifying system'. Here the *Fatal Conceit* of Socialism is, for Hayek (1988, 7), set against neo-liberalism's *promise* that by 'following the spontaneously generated moral traditions underlying the competitive market order (traditions which do not satisfy the canons or norms of rationality embraced by most socialists)', then it becomes possible to produce 'greater knowledge and wealth than could ever be obtained or utilised in a centrally-directed economy whose adherents claim to proceed strictly in accordance with "reason"'. Hayek's (1988, 8 original emphasis) intention is to 'attack the *presumption* of reason on the part of socialists'. Here there is a concern to construct, counter to Socialism, a view of reason (and reasoned human action) which 'recognises its own limitations'. Further, these limitations suggest, for Hayek, 'that order generated without design can far outstrip plans men consciously design'. Within these emerging neo-liberal rationalities the market is no longer constructed, argues Colin Gordon (1991, 41), as 'being a spontaneous (albeit historically conditioned) quasi-natural reality'. An attachment to this classical liberal view would 'constrain government to the practice of *laissez-faire*'. Within neo-liberal governmentalities it becomes 'incumbent' on government 'to conduct a policy towards society such that it is possible for a market to exist and function'.

In this intellectual framework there is a sense that the central problematic of government 'is not the anti-social effects of the economic market, but the anti-competitive effects of society' (Gordon 1991, 42). The *idea* of the *death* of the social, given expression in Margaret Thatcher's 1980s proclamation that *there is no such thing as society*, signals an attempt within neo-liberal rationalities to govern through the behaviours and dispositions of individuals, rather than society (Rose 1996a, 1996c). Government, as it is conceived here, ought have as its object, a furthering of the 'game of enterprise as a pervasive style of conduct, diffusing the enterprise-form throughout the social fabric as its generalised principle of functioning' (Gordon 1991, 42). Citing Alexander von Rustow Gordon (1991, 42) argues that neo-liberal governmentalities suggest that the 'whole ensemble

of individual life be structured as the pursuit of a range of different enterprises'.[3] The range of these enterprises is diverse: from the number of possible relations of oneself to oneself (as a reflexive project), through to the conduct of professional, family, work and cultural relations. These relations are all, as far as possible, to be 'given the ethos and structure of the enterprise-form'. This *vitalpolitik* (vital policy), for von Rustow, would seek to 'foster a process of "creation of ethical and cultural values" within society'. This recasting of the social as a 'form of the economic', proceeds via a process whereby the domain and nature of economics, as a discipline, as a system of thought, is transformed and enlarged in terms of the interests, issues, practices, behaviours and dispositions that are its objects. For Gordon (1991, 43) this process witnesses a movement from a neo-classical view that 'economics concerns the study of all behaviours involving the allocation of scarce resources' to diverse ends, through to a view that economics takes as its object all rational thought and action 'entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means and promises'. In this sense the practise of freedom is both ethical and economic.

Gordon (1991, 43–44) argues that *homo economicus*, as the subject of neo-liberalism, is both a 'reactivation and a radical inversion' of the subject of Scottish Enlightenment liberalism. This *reactivation* centres on imagining human behaviours and dispositions in terms of rational, choice making *man*. For early liberalism this male pronoun was an entirely appropriate way of constructing the subject as a 'rational, interest-motivated economic ego', engaged in private, individual, 'atomistic, egoistic' exchange relations which emerge from a particular 'natural and historical milieu' (Burchell 1996, 24). In this sense, argues Burchell (1996, 23, original emphasis), Liberal rationalities of government must take as their object, 'the *natural* private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market *exchanging* individuals', in so far as the behaviours and dispositions of such individuals are the foundation which enables various markets to operate 'optimally' in relation to their very essence. The *radical inversion* of this principle of liberal rationalities of government takes a number of forms. Gordon (1991, 43–44) argues that the subject of liberalism originally signified a subject whose motivations and desires must 'remain forever untouchable by government'. For neo-liberalism however, '*homo economicus* is *manipulable man',* a subject who is 'perpetually responsive' to environmental cues, opportunities, incitements and risks. Within this way of thinking about the self, 'economic government joins hands with behaviourism'. This articulation works to construct a view of the subject as an 'individual producer-consumer' who, in certain quite fundamentally new ways is 'not just an enterprise, but the entrepreneur of himself or herself'.

Where the meanings of life are transformed into meanings which are structured by the market form, then the subjects of neo-liberal rationalities of government

3 von Rustow is identified as an *important* member of the *Ordoliberalen*.

emerge, argues Burchell (1996, 22–23), as 'free', 'entrepreneurial', competitive and economically rational individuals. However, within these governmentalities this form of selfhood is not so much a 'given of human nature as a consciously contrived style of conduct'. That is, this subject has to be *made up* – encouraged, incited, directed, educated, trained – via the mobilisation of diverse techniques, as the active, autonomous, responsible entrepreneur of her or his own DIY project of the self. Rose (1996a, 57) argues that the self, in this sense, is conceived as an active, self-creating individual seeking to *enterprise* themselves. Individual biographical projects are the result, within this rationality, of the *maximisation* of the chances for a *good life* through *acts of choice* – through the practise of freedom. Life is accorded 'meaning and value to the extent that it can be rationalized as the outcome of choices made or choices to be made'.

An ethic of enterprise is a fluid, shifting, generalised, and at the same time contingent and contextual body of thoughts, ideas, recipes, imperatives, forms of advice, injunctions and suggestions for how it is that we should know ourselves and act on ourselves. This ethic emerges from and gives shape to an array of always limited fields of possibility in which we are encouraged to imagine ourselves, our options, our choices, our aspirations in particular ways if we want to participate, on an ongoing basis, in precarious labour markets. Participation that will provide, it is hoped, the forms of salvation – even purpose and meaning – that paid work promises.

In the work of Tom Peters, for example, we see the moral imperatives to conduct one's life, one's self as an enterprise, writ large. The proselytising, evangelical tone to these exhortations often appears to brook no argument. Indeed, the work one must do on oneself, the labour required to know oneself in terms of being the producer and promoter of one's own biography, and the diverse aspects of this biography that position the self in a favourable light in the precarious labour markets of twenty-first century flexible capitalism, are presented as imperatives. Success, on the terms demanded by this *monstrous cosmos* (Weber 2002), is dependent on being able to manage the self as a successful enterprise:

TASK ONE: WORK ON OURSELVES. RELENTLESSLY!

HE/SHE WHO HAS THE BEST STORY WINS! SO … WORK ON YOUR STORY!

You = Desire to Survive = BrandYou = Branding Fanatic = LoveMark Fanatic = Design Fanatic

Are you … Hip? If not, what … EXACTLY … do you plan to do about it?

Whether we have the capacity, the desire, the skills, the comportments necessary to know or to recognise ourselves in such ways cannot be determined in advance. Herein lies the risks and responsibilities of managing the self as an enterprise. Despite the ambitions of neo-liberal governmentalities the self as enterprise can not be willed into existence. The regulation of the conduct of oneself and others is, in many respects, a failing exercise, an incomplete project, a more or less successful enterprise. The costs and benefits associated with this enterprise, the responsibilities for managing the consequences, the outcomes of this enterprise (intended or otherwise), and the capacities to identify and manage the risks and opportunities that confront this enterprise are, within neo-liberal mentalities of rule, imagined as residing in and with the individual. As individuals we are imagined as being responsible for the choices we make, for the outcomes of choices made (and not), for managing the material ambiguities (Bauman 2001) and emotional costs of globalised, precarious labour markets (Elliott and Lemert 2006). As Nikolas Rose (1999b, 491) has argued in a powerful, sometimes scathingly personal critique of Third Way governmentalities, many of the processes that shape different life choices, chances and courses at the individual and local level are structured by global processes – and by some quite fundamental 'human forces of greed and exploitation … complacency, prejudice and hypocrisy'. Much of what follows will try to make some of the hazards, and benefits, of conducting the self as an enterprise in twenty-first century flexible capitalism more apparent.

CHAPTER 7

BETTER THAN SEX, AND TOIL AND DRUDGERY

> *Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of matter at or near the earth's surface to other such matter; second, telling other people to do so. The first kind is unpleasant and ill paid; the second is pleasant and highly paid.*
>
> Bertrand Russell (1935) from *In Praise of Idleness*, cited in Thomas (1999, 532)

It could be argued that in the complex, globalised, flexible labour markets of the twenty-first century the idea that there are two kinds of work is a nonsense. But the title of this chapter creates a sense that I too have a view that work takes few forms, and that these forms are in effect polar opposites: *toil and drudgery* or *better than sex*. In some respects part of the work of this chapter is to be accomplished by establishing this simplified duality, and I acknowledge from the outset the limitations of this strategy. Such a move is inherently simplifying, and in the process of this simplification a great deal of useful, important complexity may be lost. But this simplification has a purpose.

With my interest in identifying and examining elements of the ethic of the self as enterprise I want to imagine the possibilities that arise from seeing or experiencing work as *toil and drudgery*, or as *better than sex*. What do these ways of seeing and experiencing work say about the self as enterprise? I want to work with the idea that in these ways of experiencing work we can configure the self as an enterprise as a faltering, even failed process – where work is experienced as *toil and drudgery*; or as an enterprise that is unfolding beautifully, even ecstatically, in ways that produce pleasure, meaning and purpose – where work is experienced as *better than sex*.

For some, as Zygmunt Bauman (2005a, 33–36) would argue, *vocation is a privilege*: work is profoundly satisfying, enriching, enjoyable and meaningful (at least most of the time). Some jobs, however, are understood (almost universally) as 'abject' and 'worthless', and there is no way that they are the object of 'willing, unforced choice'. You do such jobs because you have little or no choice. In the movement

from a society of producers to a culture of consumption work has been invested with new meanings. Put simply, where the work ethic dominates any job can be, indeed, should be, done well and the *reward* is in the doing of it well. Where an aesthetic of consumption dominates, the work that you do signals the nature, the range, the consequences of the choices you are able to make. Work has become an aestheticised object of consumption/choice, and, as a consequence, a powerful signal to others, and affirmation to oneself, of the worthiness of the lifestyle that an entrepreneurial self can fashion.

BETTER THAN SEX …

Keith Thomas' (1999) extensive, always interesting, and, at times, amusing anthology from which I have taken these two extracts, and others in this book, provides a window into the multitude of ways in which humans have imagined work through the course of history. These ways of thinking about work – its purposes, its benefits, its physical and emotional costs and joys, its relationships to social hierarchies and divisions, its outcomes, its inequities – point to the impossibility of agreement about any of these things. There is, as Foucault would argue, a *permanent agonism* that characterises the ways in which humans make work, and its place in individual and collective lives, understandable and knowable. Given this *agonism* my aim at this time is to briefly sketch how work might be imagined as provoking the almost ecstatic, rapturous states proclaimed by the likes of Freud and Dekker et al., and made explicit in the title of a recent book by Helen Trinca and Catherine Fox (2004). In their book the historical tendency by some to see in work the rapture (with its implied religious dimensions) of a calling, a vocation, is given a particularly late twentieth, early twenty-first century flavour which suggests that work is the *sexiest* thing out: that a great job, with great pay and conditions, significant opportunities for self-achievement, self-growth, self-actualisation is within reach of us all with appropriate levels and forms of skill, attitude, commitment and connection. In this view, as we shall see, work as toil or drudgery is little recognised, because work is *better than sex*. As I indicated earlier Trinca and Fox (2004) structure a discussion of the roles that paid work plays in the lives of Generation X workers through this very theme. The title of their book says much about the argument that they set out to develop: *Better than Sex: How a Whole Generation Got Hooked on Work*.

Their discussion aims to illuminate the tensions generated in work regimes that demand ever-increasing levels of commitment and performance, and which promise substantial rewards in terms of a sense of achievement, worth and of self. From the outset though they make some qualifications about the sorts of work, and the worlds of work that they are talking about: 'our focus has been the big end of town, the corporations where work is being reshaped by globalisation and new technology and where working hard has taken on a whole new meaning.' Their

work as journalists is illustrative, for them, of the transformations and meanings associated with work that they are interested in identifying and discussing. Journalism, as they experience and practise it, provides them with a sense of excitement, enjoyment and fulfilment: 'the research, the writing, the practice of our craft' – when they all come together 'we have felt inspired and empowered'. These feelings of achievement, self-actualisation, fulfilment are hinted at as being guilty pleasures. It is almost as if admitting that you like what you do for a living is a social *faux pas* – or at least may have been for generations at work during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The 1990s and noughties have, apparently, made it more socially acceptable to say that you love your work: 'Feel good about your work? Look forward to getting to work so you can get stuck into it all again after the weekend?' Once 'you would have been embarrassed to admit to embracing work as more interesting and engaging than other parts of your life. But today it's easy. You're in good company' (Trinca and Fox 2004, 3–5).

The work environments, activities and tasks that Trinca and Fox (2004, 14–15) describe as illustrative of work regimes in the twenty-first century would be recognisable to many. They detail how they work on the 25th floor of a 'swish

Finally, it is evident that mental application or concentration or an intellectual accomplishment will result, especially in youthful persons, but in elder persons as well, in a simultaneous sexual excitement. This may be looked upon as the only justified basis for the otherwise so doubtful etiology of nervous disturbances from mental 'overwork'.

Sigmund Freud (1905) from 'Infantile Sexuality', *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, cited in Thomas (1999, 155)

Art thou poor, yet hast thou golden slumbers?
O sweet content!
Art thou rich, yet is thy mind perplexed?
O punishment!
Dost though laugh to see how fools are vexed
To add to golden numbers, golden numbers?
O sweet content! O sweet, O sweet content!
Work apace, apace, apace, apace;
Honest labour bears a lovely face;
Then hey nonny, nonny, hey nonny, nonny!

Thomas Dekker, Henry Chettle and William Houghton (1603) from *The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissell*, cited in Thomas (1999, 143–144)

high-rise' building in central Sydney (Australia's largest city). Here some of their co-workers at the large Australasian print media company John Fairfax have 'brilliant' views across Darling harbour. Those familiar with Sydney, its Opera House, and its harbours (even if at the level of image and representation) might imagine this as a spectacular and pleasant environment in which to earn a living. Their office environments would be familiar, they suggest, to many office workers, in many corporations in the globally networked cities of twenty-first century capitalism: 'When we head out to interview some-one at the blue-chip management consultants McKinsey & Company or at one of the bank or investment houses, we are in familiar territory'. In these concrete, steel and glass towers many workers are *freed* from the physical imperative to do work in a particular place. The nature of creative, or knowledge, or information based work means that many workers do not have to be at their desk, or in a more or less fixed configuration of time and space, to be working. Such workers are subject, still, to performance demands and reviews, and forms of regulation that can create the impression of not being policed by more direct forms of management surveillance. In *doing* work in these contexts Trinca and Fox are able to describe themselves sitting in leather chairs on the ground floor of their office building, drinking coffee purchased at one of the cafes/bars inside the building. Here on most weekday mornings they find themselves in the midst of dozens of others – many of whom are working, though some are just passing through, possibly shopping. Of those working many are 'deep in conversation, documents open on the low table in front of them. Others talk or send text messages on mobile phones.'

This building, and the multitude of similar buildings around the globe, is the theatre in which twenty-first century corporate work life is staged and often, though not always, played out. It is, as Trinca and Fox (2004, 15) suggest, the space in which 'life and work collide and where one is no longer quarantined from the other'. Here work, in the form of meetings (with fellow project/team members, or clients, even supervisors); or in the form of checking, responding to, sending emails from a wireless laptop or tablet or smartphone; or in the form of preparing reports, compiling/editing spreadsheets, documents and presentations, can take place in a variety of physical and/or virtual spaces. Trinca and Fox (2004, 8–9) suggest that for many of the inhabitants of globally networked cities and corporations the borders/boundaries between work and play have become blurred: 'In our cities, workers sip lattes at 11 a.m. as they talk to clients or do some paperwork. When they leave the office they might go … out for an evening where the drinks and food are subsidised by the company. When they get home they check their emails, perhaps complete a report and finally go to bed.' In these increasingly 24/7 spaces work is 'not only about long hours but is a seamless connection of time on and off the job'. This apparent seamlessness is explained, in part, by the nature of much work in a so-called knowledge economy. As the work that many of us do has become uncoupled from a fixed machine, or desk, or workplace, or a particular physical object that we have been working on, then it becomes relatively easy

for that work to not only be done in various configurations of time and space (the desk at 10.15 am, or the kitchen table at 9.30 pm), but for that work to colonise and claim all time/space (24/7). Especially in environments structured by powerful narratives of competition, performance, audit/accountability, and the self-doubts and anxieties that these stories can engender in most of us at some point in time: 'You can keep thinking about a work related problem when you're on the train going home, or doing laps at the pool before work. It means that, for better or worse, much of your work is portable.' A 24/7 'life is not just about the long hours in the office but also about the time spent thinking about the office when you're at home' (Trinca and Fox 2004, 17).

In this context it is easy to imagine, as Trinca and Fox (2004, 6–7) do, that for many individuals work is where you feel 'real', and where life is 'sometimes smoother than at home'. Trinca and Fox suggest that various globalised economic, social and cultural transformations of the past three decades – including the second-wave feminist movement and the associated entry of large numbers of women into the labour markets of the developed economies, changes to family structures, reproduction and carer responsibilities, and consumerism – have resulted in a search for meaning beyond what Beck (1992) has called the co-ordinates of industrial modernity. More reflexive, individualised, globalised settings of human interaction and productivity compel us, as individuals, to assume the roles of managing the choices, dilemmas and uncertainties of a DIY project of the self (a large slice of which is work/career oriented). For many in these settings work has emerged as the thing that makes 'life worthwhile'; it is 'crucial to survival, both physically and emotionally' – a paradox indeed, given that the labour markets of twenty-first century capitalism are among the principal drivers of anxiety and uncertainty in many people's lives in the industrialised democracies.

The irony and ambiguity that should rightfully attach to notions of *willing*, and of *choice* should be apparent here. This irony and ambiguity ought not suggest that individuals do not, indeed, exercise forms of freedom and choice. Rather, the exercise, even practice, of freedom, as Foucault suggests, occurs within fields of possibility that are necessarily constrained, and these limits are shaped by diverse relations, practices and technologies of the self. A useful way to think about the irony and ambiguity that attaches to the possibility that work might be better than sex is provided by Trinca and Fox's (2004, 122–130) discussion of the idea of *volunteerism*, and its close cousins *empowerment*, *trust* and the *team*, and the ways in which neo-liberal managerial discourses mobilise these ideas to imagine and explain the ideal relation between employee and employer.

Trinca and Fox (2004, 122–124) use the example of the start-up of Richard Branson's low cost domestic airline Virgin Blue in Australia in 1999 to explore the manner in which volunteerism frames discussions of why, in some workplaces, in certain fields of possibility, heightened, even ecstatic levels of energy, enthusiasm

and excitement appear to characterise working lives. Some commentators and consultants have claimed that in Virgin Blue's early days staff were in *volunteer mode*: 'Yes, they were getting paid on the flight deck, but in the spirit of the new deal, Virgin Blue wanted them to opt in and choose work, choose life, *be totally there*, every day.' When they are imagined as volunteers Virgin Blue's employees appeared to be working 'for love, meaning and other intangible rewards'. These intangibles might have some relationship to the apparent charisma of Virgin's leader (Branson), its reputation as an employer of choice, the excitement of a new venture that was taking on established operators in Australia's domestic air market, or any number of other things: 'whatever the ingredients, if Virgin Blue could have bottled the result it would have made a fortune selling it.' Trinca and Fox are cautious, even sceptical, about the idea of volunteerism, but they rightly suggest that what seems to be happening in some of these contexts is a willingness to practice a form of the self that develops and displays levels of engagement, enthusiasm and commitment to the cause, to the mission: 'The idea is that they have struck a deal about how far they will go in terms of their involvement with the job and the organisation. They have put their hands up for the task.'

These twenty-first century work regimes would be recognisable to many. I can certainly imagine some of my work practices described in similar terms. I am less convinced that work is better than sex, or that the organisation that I work for is an appropriate object of rapture, ecstatic enthusiasm and commitment – it isn't! The enthusiasm and commitment I sometimes experience and display is, more truthfully, directed at teaching and research – not the organisation. However, many would not recognise themselves or their work in Trinca and Fox's (2004, 16) descriptions. They are at pains to point out that this sense of what work is, of when and where it can be carried out, what it means to an individual's sense of self, how much you get paid for doing it, and how it needs to be managed, regulated and scrutinised by a variety of surveillance techniques is not necessarily representative of all work in the twenty-first century. 'We know,' they say, 'that not every sector has the licence we have long enjoyed as journalists.' In factories and workshops around the globe work is 'far more regimented, with employees held to strict break times and with little chance to leave work' to attend to other tasks necessary to sustain relationships, care for children, do some shopping, drop off/pick up laundry, go to the bank or ATM. As a retail salesperson, or call centre telephone operator, or any number of other occupations in other industries 'you can't suddenly down tools and head for a latte'. Apart from the differing regimes that might govern and regulate work in these other settings, the work itself is often less fulfilling, is less a vehicle for self-actualisation and personal meaning, and is often poorly rewarded into the bargain. There are other forms of work in twenty-first century capitalism: in this world low wage, physically and mentally draining work is *toil and drudgery*.

TOIL AND DRUDGERY …

> And as I have mentioned the word labour, I cannot help saying that a great deal of nonsense is being written and talked nowadays about the dignity of manual labour. There is nothing necessarily dignified about manual labour at all, and most of it is absolutely degrading. It is mentally and morally injurious to man to do anything in which he does not find pleasure, and many forms of labour are quite pleasureless activities, and should be regarded as such. To sweep a slushy crossing for eight hours on a day when the east wind is blowing is a disgusting occupation. To sweep it with mental, moral, or physical dignity seems to me to be impossible. To sweep it with joy would be appalling. Man is made for something better than disturbing dirt.
>
> Oscar Wilde (1891) from *The Soul of Man Under Socialism*, cited in Thomas (1999, 413)

> *And yet as a path to happiness work is not valued very highly by men. They do not run after it as they do after other opportunities for gratification. The great majority work only when forced by necessity, and this natural human aversion to work gives rise to the most difficult social problems*.
>
> Sigmund Freud (1930) from *Civilization and Its Discontents*, cited in Thomas (1999, 8)

For Freud there is an identifiable *natural human aversion to work*. Such an aversion is a consequence of the psychic (conscious and unconscious) forces and drives that place *id*, *ego* and *superego* in an eternal conflictual state. This conflictual state tends, from this viewpoint, to internalise the drama played out between civilisation and individuals. It is not the nature of certain types of work that is the issue, but the conflicts, repressions and displacements unleashed within an individual psyche. These internalised processes are then seen to be emblematic of the human condition and lead Freud to imagine a natural aversion to work. For Wilde, however, as for many other nineteenth and twentieth century socialists, it is the de-humanising nature of much of industrialised work that should be placed at the centre of any discussion about the roles that work could or should play in the lives of humans. From this standpoint work, when it is toil and drudgery, strips men and women of human dignity and possibilities, and condemns them to unfulfilled lives, and lives of little opportunity and choice. Barbara Ehrenreich's (2002) *Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-Wage USA* is a contemporary commentary on work as toil and drudgery that sits comfortably in relation to the position articulated by Wilde, but which also locates this discussion in the context of late twentieth century neo-liberal discourses of welfare reform, and of individualised choice and responsibility for the conduct of the self as enterprise.

Ehrenreich's (2002) *Nickel and Dimed* is an exposé of the trials and tribulations, the uncertainties, the insecurities, the toil, the humiliations, the drudgery, of minimum wage work in the US at the end of the twentieth century. Her exposé focuses on the work regimes, practices, tasks and duties of the low paid. Indeed, by the end of the book she is loathe to identify the low paid as *unskilled* in as much as the low paid are often highly skilled at the tasks they perform; in the arts of survival on next to nothing; and in getting the job done in ways that meet the demands of their line managers, supervisors and bosses at the same time as preserving some dignity and some reserves of energy and endurance to do it all again. However, her study also situates the reality of minimum wages, long hours and insecurity in and alongside the need to find and secure affordable housing. This is no mean feat in many Western economies where individualisation processes require us all to fend for ourselves and plan for self-funded retirement in ways that make private residential property investment both attractive and expensive – thus increasing housing affordability indices and shutting out many individuals and families from the possibility of ever owning their own home: 'It did not escape my attention, as a temporarily low-income person, that the housing subsidy I normally receive in my real life – over $20,000 a year in the form of a mortgage-interest deduction – would have allowed a truly low-income family to live in relative splendor' (Ehrenreich 2002, 201). Her descriptions of the struggles that many go through to secure housing in markets where cheap rental accommodation is scarce, and often substandard and insecure, makes problematic any understandings of *trailer trash* as an appropriate descriptor of tenants in the many trailer parks that provide accommodation for the low paid in America. In addition, the lack of medical insurance and of contract conditions such as sick leave entitlements, or carers' leave or annual leave rights, meant that many of the men and women Ehrenreich worked with at various locations and jobs were often forced to work through illnesses, injuries, family care and relationship crises for fear of losing their jobs and the meagre, hard won incomes these jobs provide. Low wage work in the US is *working scared* at its extreme.

What was the impetus for this study? Ehrenreich details a conversation with her editor at *Harper's* magazine concerning the debate about, and the implementation of, federal and state based welfare reforms in the US in the mid 1990s that have been described as signalling the *end-of-welfare-as-we-know-it*; and of forcing welfare recipients from *welfare-to-work*. These reforms were designed to end a so-called welfare dependent culture that supposedly afflicted minority groups, single mothers, the residents of inner city housing estates, and other groups on the margins of mainstream economic activity. The impending end-of-welfare provoked Ehrenreich (2002, 1) and her editor to wonder: 'How does anyone live on the wages available to the unskilled? How, in particular … were the roughly four million women about to be booted into the labor market by welfare reform going to make it on $6 or $7 an hour?' From this wondering Ehrenreich designed a project that required her to live undercover (so to speak) as a low paid worker: to seek and apply for minimum wage jobs (not using her PhD qualification or

highly developed and extensive professional middle class skills, networks and connections) in various locations around the US. And to house, clothe, feed, and transport herself on the income these minimum wage jobs provided. As she indicates she could easily have reduced this task to a simple mathematical exercise involving some desk bound research into wage rates, rental markets and costs, and a weekly food and transport budget. Indeed, this sort of modelling already existed, and it suggested that 'if the question was whether a single mother leaving welfare could survive without government assistance in the form of food stamps, Medicaid, and housing and childcare subsidies, the answer was well known': *only* if she was able to achieve what a number of advocacy groups in the US had assessed as a living wage of $8.89/hour in 1998. The odds of a 'typical' welfare-to-work case landing a job at this rate were calculated as 97 to 1 – which are not good odds in any context (Ehrenreich 2002, 3).

The project's genesis was not so much the mathematics of the problem but the day-to-day struggles, dilemmas, imperatives and choices that Ehrenreich suspected must characterise the lives of the low waged. The book details her adventures and travails at various times during 1998–2000 as she worked as a waitress, a domestic/home cleaner for a cleaning services franchise, a care worker in an aged-care facility, and a sales assistant (associate) at Wal-Mart. As Polly Toynbee's (2002, ix) introduction to *Nickel and Dimed* highlights, what Ehrenreich uncovers through her experiment as a minimum wage worker is another America: a 'secret continent invisible to itself, far from the television sitcoms or Hollywood screens'; a country of 'widespread, growing and inescapable poverty'; and a nation of multiple local economies, labour and housing markets within a national economic frame where the 'essential work is done by people paid below subsistence wages'. What Ehrenreich discovers and illuminates (often powerfully) is that:

> It is not physically possible for a fit single woman to get by on the wages she is paid. Even for those living in low-rent apartments, motels and caravan parks, a back-breaking job at the minimum wage does not bring in enough to pay for rent, transport and food. How do the low-paid survive? They don't. Only those strong enough to work two jobs or those who can share rooms and accommodation costs can manage at all.
>
> Polly Toynbee (2002, ix–x)

In her Evaluation of her performance and capacities as a minimum wage worker (which she self-rates as a B, B+), Ehrenreich (2002, 193–221) gives an accounting of the various stages of this experiment: an accounting that puts flesh (most often sore, tired and aching) on the advocate's poverty models and Toynbee's claim. In Portland, Maine, for example, she worked two jobs: one as

a $6.65/hour (40 hours/week) house cleaner for a domestic cleaning franchise, The Maids (a pseudonym); the other as a $7/hour (Saturday and Sunday) dietary aide in a locked Alzheimer's ward at the Woodcrest Residential Facility (another pseudonym) for the elderly. It was in Portland that Ehrenreich by her own reckoning 'came closest to achieving a decent fit between income and expenses'; but, and it is a significant but, 'only because I worked seven days a week'. Between cleaning the homes of the well heeled for 40 plus hours per week (lots of unpaid overtime), and feeding and cleaning up after the aged and enfeebled on Saturday and Sunday, she earned $300 for a seven day week (after taxes). Of those earnings 40 per cent, or $480/month, went on rent, which included utilities – she was also able to get a number of free meals on weekends during her shifts in the nursing home. However, this *decent fit* did not allow for working in Maine during the off-tourist season (cheaper rents); or for being able to sustain a seven days per week work schedule on an indefinite basis without incurring the health and injury costs so many of her longer term house cleaning co-workers had to contend with.

At one point her capacity for self-restraint in the circumstances of minimum wage, domestic cleaning was, she admits, sorely tested by the female owner of a million dollar, three level 'condo' with views of the Maine coast. This woman requested some extra heavy duty scrubbing of the grout in her marble tiled shower cubicle to deal with *bleeding* of the brass fixtures onto those walls:

> That's not your marble bleeding, I want to tell her, it's the world-wide working class – the people who quarried the marble, wove your Persian rugs until they went blind, harvested the apples in your lovely full-themed dining room centerpiece, smelted the steel for your nails, drove the trucks, put up this building, and now bend and squat and sweat to clean it.
>
> Barbara Ehrenreich (2002, 90)

Ehrenreich had, for a number of reasons, rejected the possibility of herself – as a busy, upper middle class professional – employing a domestic cleaner. The main reason, she claims, is that this is 'just not the kind of relationship I want to have with another human being'. A relationship that for Ehrenreich (2002, 92) is made knowable via a meditation on human excrement and its removal:

> Let's talk about shit, for example. It happens, as the bumper sticker says, and it happens to a cleaning person every day. The first time I encountered a shit-stained toilet as a maid, I was shocked by the sense of unwanted intimacy. A few hours ago, some well-fed butt was straining away on this toilet seat, and now here I am wiping up after it. For those who have never cleaned a dirty toilet, I should explain that there are three kinds of shit stains. There are remnants of landslides running down the insides of toilet bowls. There are the splash-back remains on the underside of toilet seats. And, perhaps most repulsively, there's sometimes a crust of brown on the rim of a toilet seat, where a turd happened to collide on its dive to the water. You don't want to know this? Well, it's not something I would have chosen to dwell on myself, but the different kinds of stains require different cleaning approaches. One prefers those that are interior to the toilet bowl, since they can be attacked by brush, which is a kind of action-at-a-distance weapon … Or we might talk about that other great nemesis of the bathroom cleaner – pubic hair …

What 'surprised' and 'offended' her most about the low wage work environment were the myriad, mundane, take-for-granted ways in which low wage workers are routinely required to 'surrender one's basic civil rights and – what boils down to the same thing – self respect' (Ehrenreich 2002, 208). Included in this *surrender* are the occasions and requirement to have your person, and personal belongings (bags, purses, etc), searched by management. Included also is the apparently widespread practice of pre-employment, urine sample based, drug testing protocols: a practice designed to weed out (so to speak) potentially unreliable, untrustworthy, possibly dangerous, applicants. Associated personality testing/profiling in large, minimum wage paying organizations such as Wal-Mart are also identified by Ehrenreich as intrusive, and as producing doubts about the worth of a self: 'It is unsettling, at the very least, to give a stranger access to things, like your self-doubts and your urine, that are otherwise shared only in medical or therapeutic situations' (Ehrenreich 2002, 209). Workplace rules and management practices that prohibit *gossip* or *talking* – 'little unexplained punishments' including shift and roster changes, task and job allocations and requirements, 'dismissal without explanation' – all work to erode what Ehrenreich understands and expects as basic civil, economic and democratic rights as a member (on a usual basis) of the professional middle class in twenty-first century America. Minimum wage, insecure, physically, and emotionally demanding work has consequences for the ways in which an individual knows and understands her/himself:

> So if low-wage workers do not always behave in an economically rational way, that is, as free agents within a capitalist democracy, it is because they dwell in a place that is neither free nor in any way democratic. When you enter the low-wage workplace – and many of the medium-wage workplaces as well – you check your civil liberties at the door, leave America and all it supposedly stands for behind, and learn to zip your lip for the duration of the shift. The consequences of this routine surrender go beyond the issues of wages and poverty. We can hardly pride ourselves on being the world's preeminent democracy, after all, if large numbers of citizens spend half their waking hours in what amounts, in plain terms, to a dictatorship. Ehrenreich (2002, 210)

Under these circumstances – repeated too often, and in too great a number in both the over-developed, industrialised democracies, in the emerging, developing economies and in the failing economies of a globalised market order – choices are still made, and freedoms are still exercised. However, individualised choice and freedom appear in a significantly diminished form, and the fields of possibility in which the self as enterprise can imagine itself and be recognised by others are substantially limited. Yet, too often the responsibilisation that accompanies choices under the ethic of enterprise seeks also to individualise the outcomes and consequences of a failing self as enterprise. This responsibilisation takes different forms in different contexts. Low wage workers in the industrialised democracies are imagined in these spaces as being responsible for failing to recognise, understand and manage the opportunities and risks that give shape to globalised, flexible labour markets. The self-image of an enterprise culture, and the ethic of enterprise that reaches into all aspects of individual lives to give this culture its shape, configure freedom and choice in such a way as to lay the blame for work as toil and drudgery at the (tired, aching, sore) feet of those that can't, sometimes won't, manage the challenges, opportunities, costs and risks of the self as enterprise. Toynbee's (2002, xiv) concluding comments in her introduction to Ehrenreich's book make this point clear:

> Newspapers barely cover poverty issues these days and trade unions no longer make news. The self image of all Western societies is of consumer glamour, upward mobility, ever-growing economies and ever-rising expectations. In Britain average living standards rose by 30% in the last decade and will probably rise by the same amount in the next ten years. In the general exhilaration of boom times, no-one wants to know about the bottom, and the less the rest of society sees and knows, the more they assume the people in dead end jobs are hopeless cases or semi-mental defectives.

VOCATION AS PRIVILEGE

In a summary of his approach to the problems of identity and subjectivity Paul du Gay (2007) points to a means to make some sense of my claim that when work is *better than sex* the self is conducting itself as an enterprise in ways that open up possibilities for finding purpose and meaning, for making choices; and, when the self is only able to find work that is *toil and drudgery*, then the self is a failing, even failed, enterprise that is unable to exercise choice or conduct a life in ways that would offer meaning and purpose.

My return to du Gay revisits a number of methodological points made earlier, but which are useful to think about again. Du Gay (2007, 11) makes explicit his interests in a 'sociological-anthropological approach to the organization of identity, or the material-cultural making up of person'. For du Gay his

orientation moves away from what he identifies as generalised theoretical approach to the problems of identity 'towards an understanding of the specific forms of "personhood" that individuals acquire as a result of their immersion in, or subjection to, particular normative and technical regimes of conduct'. In this sort of approach 'instituted norms and techniques of conduct are regarded as instruments for the cultivation of particular "personal" deportments, whose historical circumstances, purposes and distribution are meaningful objects of/ for analysis'. As I have indicated the positive attributes of such an approach include the emphasis on identifying and analysing the particular, the contingent, the contextual ways in which we are encouraged, cajoled, compelled to think about sets of behaviours and dispositions, different aspects of ourselves as persons. This is a form of analysis that can bring into view what Dean (1995) has called the historically contingent horizons of identity. So in different settings – offices, factories, sporting clubs, schools – we can see what it is to be a manager, a journalist, a cleaner, professional, athletic … whatever. But the limits of working in this register, as I have said, are that we tend to lose any generalised or relational sense of how injunctions to be a particular type of person operate in more generalised (sometimes globalised) contexts such as schooling systems, legal systems, labour markets, economies: all of which at certain times, and for certain purposes, operate with, invoke or call for a somewhat more generic, even universal, subjectivity or identity.

So the self as enterprise is a framing of a particular way of being a person: a framing that doesn't preclude the particular and the contingent. Indeed, from one direction it can be argued that it is from the particular and the contingent, and the multiple, diverse and various attempts to make up this form of personhood that the self as enterprise emerges and becomes visible. But in taking this position it can also make some sense to think about the self as enterprise as a more generalised orientation to the conduct of a life in the labour markets, housing markets and consumer spaces of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. The relative, often context specific, often more generalisable success or failure of this enterprise becomes apparent in the sorts of accounts presented by Trinca and Fox, and Ehrenreich. The ways in which Zygmunt Bauman has written of twenty-first century work as an aestheticised object of consumption and choice can also give insight into these dimensions of the self as enterprise.

In a discussion of what he argues is a shift from a society of producers to a culture of consumers Bauman (2007, 28) defines *consumerism* (as distinct from *consumption*) as a form of 'social arrangement that results from recycling mundane, permanent and so to speak "regime-neutral" human wants, desires and longing into the *principal propelling and operating force* of society'. These forces facilitate and structure processes of social reproduction, stratification, integration and 'the formation of individuals'. In making up persons *consumerism* gives shape to identities, processes of identification and differentiation, and

provides direction and purpose to the making and enacting of 'individual life policies'. In this formulation 'consumerism is an attribute of society', not of individuals. The development of consumerism requires that individual desires, fantasies and longing must be 'detached (alienated) from individuals' – thus mirroring a particular way of imagining the roles played by labour capacity in energising a producer/industrial society. Once alienated from the individual, desire, fantasy and longing need to be 'recycled/reified', as Bauman (2007, 28) argues, into forces external to the individual which then propel 'the "society of consumers" in motion and keeps it on course as a specific form of human togetherness': an individualised, even privatised, form of human experience with the capacity for 'setting specific parameters for effective individual life strategies and otherwise manipulating the probabilities of individual choices and conduct'. An individualised, consuming life is a life that, paradoxically, given the values accorded to individualised choice and freedom, takes its form, its substance and its purposes from structuring processes that produce these possibilities and these limits, that compel the person to be free, to make choices, to carry the responsibilities for the consequences (burdens, benefits) of making choices.

Bauman (2005a, 31) argues that in a consumer culture the freedom to choose, the capacity to exercise choice establishes the frames in which we give shape to our 'life aspirations – a frame that defines the direction of efforts towards self improvement and endorses the image of a "good life"'. Choices are imagined, shaped and exercised within always limited fields of possibility. These limits and possibilities are, of course, imagined and experienced differently by different individuals and populations. Wealth and income have, historically, provided status, position and the capacity to generate more wealth, facilitate opportunity and to exercise choice. For Bauman (2005a, 31) it is this last element that is the most significant signal and marker of a self and a life in a consumer society. Wealth and income produce and enhance the range and nature of choice: 'the role of wealth and income as *capital* – that is, money which serves first and foremost to turn out more money – recedes to a second and inferior place … The prime significance of wealth and income is in the stretching of the range of consumer choice.' So, in a consumer culture persons are – at one and the same time – both the *promoters of the commodities*, and the *commodities they promote*. This way of being a person requires that we are 'the merchandise and the marketing agents, the goods and their travelling salespeople' (Bauman 2007, 6).

Throughout history there have existed jobs that bring with them different levels and kinds of satisfaction and fulfilment. Meaning, purpose and a sense of achievement are to be found more readily in some jobs than in others. For Bauman (2005a, 32–33) this reality charts what he sees as the movement from a work ethic to an aesthetic of consumption. Within the terms of a Calvinist/Puritan work ethic no jobs or forms of work were considered to be 'deprived of value

and demeaning'. All forms of work had the potential to add something to 'human dignity and all work equally served the cause of moral propriety and spiritual redemption'. The feeling of a 'duty fulfilled was the most direct, decisive and in the end sufficient satisfaction work could bring'. In this sense all kinds of work were on an equal footing. The work ethic functioned, in some respect, to enable all to see in their toil, their labour, the potential for a satisfaction to be found in their calling. However, as Bauman argues, when work becomes an aestheticised object of consumption the belief that all work has an equal value is diminished, even removed: '[the] status occupied by work, or more precisely by the job performed, could not but be profoundly affected by the present ascendancy of aesthetic criteria.' It is in this sense that we can imagine that work has 'ceased to be the focus of particularly intense ethical attention in terms of being a chosen road to moral improvement, repentance and redemption'. In a culture of consumption the ways in which we imagine and experience work come 'first and foremost under aesthetic scrutiny. Its value is judged by its capacity to generate pleasurable experience'. When work is devoid of a capacity to generate an aestheticised, pleasurable experience, when it fails to deliver some form of 'intrinsic satisfaction', then such work is increasingly imagined and experienced as if it was 'devoid of value'. An *aesthetic scrutiny* and *evaluation of work* emphasises differences and distinctions between forms of work and particular jobs, and 'elevates certain professions to the rank of engrossing, refined objects of aesthetic, indeed artistic experience, while denying to other kinds of renumerated livelihood-serving occupations any value at all'. At the same time other means for understanding and valuing work 'cannot withstand the competition and are not powerful enough to save work from condemnation as useless or even demeaning for the aesthetically guided collector of sensations'. In sum then, suggests Bauman, 'it is the aesthetics of consumption that now rules where the work ethic once ruled. For the successful alumni of consumer training the world is an immense matrix of possibilities, of intense and ever more intense sensations, of deep and deeper still experiences.'

In this sense when work that is, by all accounts, toil and drudgery is undertaken by persons who are held to be responsible for conducting themselves as an enterprise then we can imagine such a self as a failing enterprise: 'No fully fledged consumer would conceivably agree' to do these sorts of jobs of 'her or his own will, unless cast in a situation of no choice (that is, unless his or her own identity as a consumer, a free chooser, has already been forfeited, withdrawn or otherwise denied)' (Bauman 2005a, 34).

In a consumer culture values such as freedom, choice, mobility, flexibility and vocation become powerful structuring forces that give shape to the sense of the self as an enterprise. Work which is 'rich in gratifying experience, work as self-fulfilment, work as the meaning of life, work as the core or the axis of everything that counts', work as *better than sex*, work as the 'source of pride, self-esteem',

these, then, are the markers of vocation as privilege (Bauman 2005a, 34). Vocation as privilege has become a 'distinctive mark of the elite, a way of life the rest may watch in awe, admire and contemplate at a distance'. In these spaces, when work is better than sex, the trick, as Bauman (2005a, 34) suggests, is not to 'limit work time to the minimum', but to 'efface altogether the line dividing vocation from avocation, job from hobby, work from recreation; to lift work itself to the rank of supreme and most satisfying entertainment'.

Under the regime of the work ethic the moral value attributed to the calling, to the duty attached to doing any job well meant that an individual's, even a population's orientation to this duty was a powerful signal of character, of virtue, of worth. *She's got a great work ethic! He just lacks a work ethic! Aborigines won't work! She works on Maori time!* In many respects this moral overtone is still explicit in the ways in which distinctions continue to be drawn between the deserving and undeserving poor, those apparently willing to work, and those who are not. Seeing work as an aestheticised act of choice, a matter of consumption, of the capacity to freely choose that which will give meaning, purpose and satisfaction does not replace this moral imperative. Rather, it displaces this moral judgement onto the acts of choice and the self, as enterprise, who exhibits a seemingly limited capacity to exercise choice. These moral judgements, argues Bauman (2005a, 36), enable us:

> to believe that the voluntary 'flexibility' of the work condition freely and enthusiastically chosen by those at the top, and once chosen cherished and keenly protected, must be an unqualified blessing to everybody else, including those to whom 'flexibility' means not so much freedom of choice, autonomy and the right to self-assert, as lack of security, forced uprooting and an uncertain future.

Where work is deeply felt, experienced and understood as satisfying, enriching, enjoyable and meaningful – better than sex – then the self as enterprise can be understood as successful, for now. Where work is toil and drudgery, where work is abject, even worthless, something that few would willingly choose, then the self as enterprise can be imagined, by the self and others, as a failing, even failed endeavour. It is these properties of individualised choice and freedom, and the significant incentives and imperatives to imagine one's life choices, chances and options in terms of these values, that are so powerful in giving shape to the sense that the self is, ought to be, an enterprise: and an enterprise that finds in differing work related capacities, desires and fantasies a means to materialise the character and contours of this ongoing, never-ending project. Here 'What do you do?' becomes less an opening gambit in conversation that might locate a self, and more an indication of the current state of the self as enterprise: a state

that might be failing, might appear as successful, but a state that is, as we are all aware, parlous, precarious and always in need of close, intense, reflexive scrutiny and care.

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CHAPTER 8

STRESS AND THE EDGE OF CHAOS

IF YOU CAN'T STAND THE HEAT, GET OUT OF THE KITCHEN!

In his book *Kitchen Confidential* American celebrity chef Anthony Bourdain (2000) provides, so it is claimed, a no-holds-barred, warts-and-all account of his rise through the ranks of food preparation, to line-cooking, to chef in the American restaurant industry. This sensation(alised) account of the often seedy world of the restaurant industry is an account echoed in any number of similar exposés (Buford 2006, White 2006). In a chapter titled *Who Cooks?* Bourdain (2000, 55–57) asks what is not, necessarily, an obvious question: *Who is cooking the food that you eat in a restaurant?* The question becomes obvious because it is highly unlikely, at least in the world of *starred* chefs, that the celebrity chef is the actual person who has prepared and cooked the meal that is served to customers. Part of the reason that Bourdain poses the question is to identify the *type* of person he looks for to staff the lines and stations in his kitchen. Line cooking, which Bourdain claims to be the *real business* of food preparation in the restaurant industry, is about 'consistency, about mindless, unvarying repetition, the same series of tasks performed over and over and over again in exactly the same way'. This well disciplined, regimented, hierarchical monotony is not where you want to be confronted by an 'innovator, somebody with ideas of their own who is going to mess around with the chef's recipes and presentations'. *Chefs*, suggests Bourdain, 'require blind near fanatical loyalty, a strong back and an automaton-like consistency of execution under battlefield conditions'. In Bourdain's account line *cooks* are a 'dysfunctional, mercenary lot, fringe-dwellers motivated by money, the peculiar lifestyle of cooking and a grim pride'. In the US where Bourdain works these types are usually embodied as Ecuadorian, Mexican, Dominican and Salvadorian cooks who know best the 'American dream of hard work leading to material rewards' – better than 'some bed-wetting white boy whose mom brought him up thinking the world owed him a living, and who thinks he actually knows a few things' (see Kelly and Harrison 2009, 180–182).

In New York in 2002 Bill Buford, a regular contributor to the *New Yorker* magazine was asked to write a profile on the life and achievements of celebrity chef Mario Batali. As a way of conducting research for the profile he offered himself as an

amateur, apprentice kitchen hand and line cook in a number of restaurants owned by Batali, including Babbo's. His account of this amateur apprenticeship was published in 2006 as *Heat: An Amateur's Adventures as Kitchen Slave, Line Cook, Pasta-Maker and Apprentice to a Butcher in Tuscany*. The book's subtitle hints at the flavour that this account creates of the sort of work practices and hierarchies, and types of person to be found in this industry. As an amateur line cook Buford (2006, 81) was eventually introduced to the pressures and intensities of Babbo's grill station where the meat portions of dishes were cooked:

> The grill station is hell. You stand at it for five minutes and you think: so this is what Dante had in mind. It is in a dark, hot corner – hotter than any other spot in the kitchen; hotter than anywhere else in your life. Recently air-conditioning was installed in the kitchen, but there is none over the grill during service; how else can it maintain its consistent hot temperature? The light is bad, for no sensible reason except that there isn't enough of it, reinforcing a feeling of a place where no one wants to be – too greasy, too unpleasant. What light there is seems to come from the flames themselves; they are lit about an hour before the service starts and remain burning for the next eight hours.

Buford describes a particular night two or three months into his apprenticeship when he got *hammered* as a line cook at the grill station. This night, early in June, was a hot summer night where more than 250 customers had booked into Babbo's. On hot summer nights, apparently, nearly everyone orders from the grill. Buford (2006, 85–87) tells how:

> One of the mysteries of a restaurant is that there is one thing that everyone seems to order, and you never know what it's going to be … One evening, it was rabbit. Then: no rabbit. Tonight it was lamb chops, cooked medium.

The first wave of customers/orders start to come in at 5.30 pm. This wave was to last 90 minutes:

> 'Ordering branzino, two lamb medium, one lamb well done, one lamb m. r.,' Andy called out. I answered, 'Branzino, two lamb medium, one well done, and one m. r.'*
>
> * Branzino [the Northern Italian name for European sea *bass]; m. r. [medium rare].*

The action, and the grill station, starts to heat up:

> 'Ordering!' Andy sang out. 'Two lamb medium, squab, tender, rib eye.' I spun around, dipped into the lowboy, loaded up, spun back, dropped the meat onto the raw tray, and seasoned it. I lined up the chops on the grill in two rows of five, all pointing to the right, flopped the tenderloins into another corner, put on the rib eye, but hadn't got to the squab when I heard the ticker tape: 'Ordering three branzino and two lamb medium'. The same routine: another two rows of chops pointing to the right but in a different spot from the first batch (which I had turned and were pointing to the left), because these were medium rare. But what was I to do with the branzino? There was no room.

And no time to figure it out:

> The ticker tape again. 'Ordering three lamb medium, branzino, rabbit.' More? I stopped what I was doing – I had to get the new orders on the raw tray to season them, at least that, because otherwise I was going to forget them with the next batch of orders, and if I fell behind I'd throw the kitchen into chaos.

In this heat, under these pressures, your capacities, the type of person you are/can be, are very much on public display:

> I noticed that Memo had taken up a position nearby, waiting to jump in if I got overwhelmed: what the kitchen calls 'the meltdown' or 'crash-and-burn moment,' when there's more than your head can remember.

But still the pace did not let up, indeed, was just beginning:

> Again the ticker tape. This was starting to feel like a sporting event. Sweat was running off my nose, and I was moving fast, as fast as my concentration allowed, flipping, turning, poking, being burned, one row pointing to the right, another to the left, poking again, stacking up meat here, rushing over the branzinos that had been waiting for a spot, turning, the flames in the corner of the grill still burning, fed by the fat cascading off the new orders.

And how does this *heat* feel?

> Again the ticker tape. My mind was at full capacity, with only one stray thought, a question, repeated over and over again: What happens if I fall behind? And still there were more: lamb medium, lamb m. r. What's wrong with these people? I was surrounded by meat. Meat on the grill. Meat in the seasoning tray. Meat on the resting tray, in big heaps. So much meat that it no longer seemed like meat. Or maybe it seemed exactly like meat. It was tissue and muscle and sinews.

The orders keep coming, the pressure intensifies, the heat rises:

> 'This is the buzz,' Memo whispered, still behind me. 'This is what you live for,' Andy said, picking up plates from the pass, adding, mysteriously, 'it feels really fucking good.' And the remark remained in my head for the rest of the night, and I thought hard about what I was feeling: exhilaration, fear, weirdness, some physical-endorphin-performance thing. But good? It was, I concluded, my first glimpse of what Mario had described as the 'reality of the kitchen' – a roomful of adrenaline addicts.

The grill station sounds hellish, Dantesque. The lot of a line cook resembles that of indentured labour, of the slave. At the same time the rush seems intoxicating. The fear of failing palpable, the buzz of success exhilarating. *Better than sex*? Of course, the choice to work in such places, under these conditions, is, in the end, still that, a choice: a choice that may, however, be limited.

In a cultural sense we can all imagine jobs, forms of work, certain workplaces that must look and feel like this, Stressful, pressured, hierarchical, relentless, heavily scrutinised, your performance on display. At the level of meaning – subjective and shared – we can imagine thinking that it takes a certain type of person to work under these conditions. And to know, deep down, whether or not we are that type of person; know whether we have what it takes to be a line cook at a grill station, or a … (whatever). If we didn't know these things then we wouldn't know what it means to say: *If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen*. We wouldn't know that this saying says much about many of the things that we know about stress. One of the things that we know about stress is that we tend, on most occasions, to think of it in terms of how different people respond to a particular set of events, or circumstances, or relationships, or practices. As a Victorian State Government (Australia) health and well-being website puts it:

> Stress is a process, not a diagnosis. Stress is experienced when there is an imbalance between the demands being made on us and our resources to cope with those demands. The level and extent of stress a person may feel depends a great deal on their attitude to a particular situation. An event which may be extremely stressful for one person can be a mere hiccup in another person's life … Stress is not always a bad thing. Some people thrive on stress and even need it to get things done.
>
> Better Health Channel (2010)

So, we can probably agree that some jobs, workplaces, occupations are, intuitively, more stressful than others. Some individuals/persons are probably more suited to these occupations. Some probably aren't. Yet, as C Wright Mills (1970, 15) observed, a sociological imagination can enable us to make some distinction, make some movement between personal *troubles* and public *issues*:

> When, in a city of 100,000, only one man is unemployed, that is his personal trouble, and for its relief we properly look to the character of the man, his skills, and his immediate opportunities. But when in a nation of 50 million employees, 15 million men are unemployed, that is an issue, and we may not hope to find its solution within the range of opportunities open to any one individual.

For the last 20 or 30 years workplace stress has been a major occupational and public health concern. It is also a costly economic issue – both public and private. Workplace health and well-being and stress are also significant areas of academic interest to the fields of (organisational) psychology, sociology of work, industrial relations and employee relations, and human resource management (see, for example, Burke 2010, Buys et al. 2010, Byers 1987, Fast and Frederick 1996, Greenberg and Baron 1993, Holt 1982, Kahn and Byosiere 1994, Lewisa et al. 2010, Love et al. 2010, Ray and Miller 1991, Ross and Altamaier 1994). An introduction to some of the concerns that frame my engagement with the issue of stress comes from an Australian Council of Trades Unions (ACTU 2001) Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) campaign from the beginning of the 2000s that targeted workplace stress. The campaign drew on a variety of Australian and overseas studies to highlight 'the health, social and economic costs of the rising incidence [of] stress at work, resulting from precarious employment, excessive workloads and unreasonable demands being placed on Australian employees'. The campaign argued 'The more stressful the workplace, the greater the likelihood that employees will suffer from fatigue, anxiety, headaches, insomnia, dizziness, panic attacks, depression, cardiac disorders, backache and other muscular syndromes, with a

resultant rise in workplace injuries and absences.' The campaign went on to cite a number of studies, including a report from the American Institute of Stress which suggested that 'between 75 per cent to 90 per cent of visits to doctors are related to stress, 60 per cent to 80 per cent of accidents on the job are related to stress, and 40 per cent of staff turnover is due to stress at work'. In addition, the ACTU referred to a 1996 British Institute of Management report which claimed that 'an estimated 270,000 people take time off work every day because of work related stress. This represents a cumulative cost in terms of sick pay, lost production and NHS charges of seven billion pounds annually' (see Kelly and Colquhoun 2003, 2005).

Of course the ACTU sought to construct a particular view of workplace stress, and what might be some of the causes and consequences of this condition: 'The campaign aims to establish workplace conditions, not the individual, as the source of the problem. It will encourage employees to raise questions about the sources of stress in their workplaces, and to work together to overcome them' (ACTU 2001). Around the same time others saw the issue in starkly different terms. Garry Brack, identified as chief executive of Employers First, was quoted in the *Sydney Morning Herald* as arguing that workers 'need to take more responsibility for their own wellbeing and not blame it on their jobs. "If work is a drag and you hate your co-workers and you feel your job is adversely affecting the rest of your life, then find another job that you like"' (Vincent 2002, 1).

My aim in the discussion that follows is to move between a number of different registers to examine the ways in which, in many instances, discourses of workplace stress individualise the problem of stress. The individualisation of stress means that we imagine the person, the self as enterprise, as choice making (*If you can't stand the heat* …), as resilient, as being able to identify whether or not they have the skills, capacities, behaviours and dispositions most suited to particular occupations, and the work practices, processes and relationships that are characteristic of these occupations. Or, indeed, have the skills and dispositions to remake the self in the ways demanded by these circumstances and spaces. The self who can identify and manage, successfully, these relationships, work practices, elements of their life beyond the workplace, in ways that mean that the self is not stressed, is recognised as competent, resilient, even professional.

In this discussion I am not so much concerned with the nature of stress as an indication of individual physical, emotional or psychic health and well-being, or with the myriad things that might *cause* stress. If we focus primarily at the level of things that cause stress and individual responses to these causes we become trapped in the discursive spaces in which individual competence, capacities and resilience become the focus of attention. In these spaces some things are easier to imagine than others. Some things can be said and others can't. In these spaces we find it difficult to move beyond the idea that some people may just not be suited to the demands of a particular workplace. I, for one, would not relish, or

willingly seek out the sorts of work done in restaurant kitchens – I couldn't handle the pressure, the stress. But it is in the irony and ambiguity that should attach to ideas of *willing* and *choice* that should alert us to the dilemmas and paradoxes of individualising stress and complexity. I may not be able to *get out of the kitchen*. Should I then just have to stand the heat? What understandings of the self, what aspects of work environments, and work practices and processes, are mobilised, even obscured, by suggesting that success or failure in these environments is a mark of individual competence, or character, or professionalism, as markers of the self as enterprise?

In what follows I will explore certain aspects of the problem of workplace stress in relation to the claim that transformations in the nature of teachers' work, and the ways in which teachers' work is regulated and managed, mean that large populations of teachers are stressed (*Teaching is stressful! Not everyone is cut out to be a teacher!*). In this context it is often claimed that teacher stress and the resultant negative impacts on teacher health and well-being reduce the effectiveness of schools. Here a particular mode of being (stressed), and a particular mode of managing this way of being (by adopting an entrepreneurial, professional disposition to your health and well-being), is held to be responsible for the success or otherwise of a massive, state-regulated institutional process.

Following this discussion I will draw on the work done under the heading of Complexity Science, located at the hard and sharp edge of biological and mathematical sciences, to sketch a metaphor which suggests that organisations such as schools can be thought of as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). This metaphor enables us to imagine organisations as consisting of 'multiple systems of interaction that are both ordered and chaotic'. This complexity tends to produce 'random disturbances', 'unpredictable events and relationships', that flow through a system 'creating novel patterns of change' (Morgan 1997, 262). This metaphor enables me to imagine that processes of globalisation have tended to make organisational and workplace environments more complex. At the same time the knowledge production and circulation processes that drive a knowledge economy have tended to produce more complex understandings of this complexity. I want to suggest that this *complexification of complexity* tends to individualise the responsibility for managing *complexity*. A process of individualisation that is most capably carried by those workers who have developed a professional, even entrepreneurial, disposition to the many possibilities and *surprises* generated by this complexification. Under these circumstances who wants to run the risks associated with being identified as *unprofessional*?

TEACHERS' WORK: CHANGING, COMPLEX, STRESSFUL?[1]

Over a number of decades concerns about the world of teachers' work have been expressed via a managerial interest in issues such as job satisfaction, occupational and organisational health, teacher morale, motivation and professional responsibility. Linda Evans (1997, 831), for example, argues that 'the morale of the teaching profession has, for many years, been an area of concern' in many industrialised nations. She also indicates that this area of concern has produced an extensive literature in the UK, North America and Australia on morale and job satisfaction generally, in areas such as human resource management, organisational psychology and management. The ACTU (2001) campaign also makes reference to the issues of stress in the teaching profession, an example which introduces a range of concerns that will help frame the discussion that follows: 'A survey of stress in 2500 teachers identified workload, restructuring and feelings of powerlessness and anxiety among the overarching issues': approximately 'two thirds of respondents reported implementing new curricula as stressful. Over half the teachers surveyed said that their lack of influence [on] decisions regarding their work was a major cause of stress. Nearly one in five reported a medically diagnosed stress disorder'. As one teacher said: 'Apart from teaching, we are also expected to be councillors [sic], carers, advisors to parents, writers of curriculum, reports, programmes – not to mention learning new skills in our "own" time – I don't have any "own" time left – I also have a family who need the odd bit of time!'

Dinham and Scott (1996), in a background briefing to a study of teacher 'satisfaction, motivation and health', argue that the last decades of the twentieth century were marked by major transformations in the nature of teachers' work and the means by which it is regulated. One Sydney teacher, cited by Dinham and Scott (1996, 19, original emphasis), claimed:

> The disillusionment [we feel as teachers] is compounded by the fact that it's so much harder to teach these days. You have to teach *and* be a social worker. The kids are more rebellious, there's more pastoral care necessary, and extra records have to be kept because everyone is worried about so much … concerning the welfare of children.

These transformations in the nature of teachers' work have been structured, in part, by the long-run historical tendency to imagine schools as providing both the site and the means by which a range of social problems might be addressed (see, for example, Hunter 1994). In a period that has been marked by large-scale

1 This section draws on work that was originally published, in various forms, in Kelly and Colquhoun 2003 and 2005.

(global) social, economic and political transformations this historical tendency has witnessed moves to make teachers and schools responsible for addressing a range of issues that traditionally were not of concern for schools. In the Australian context during the 1990s and early 2000s a renewed emphasis on basics (literacy and numeracy), and a shift towards framing curriculum in terms of outcomes and competencies within a series of Curriculum Standards Frameworks (CSFs) for identified Key Learning Areas (KLAs) was accompanied by attempts to conduct educational interventions in relation to a range of concerns such as drug use, sexuality and safety. As Dinham and Scott (1996, v) suggest, schools have, historically, been positioned as spaces considered appropriate in which 'to seek solutions to an increasing range of social, economic and political problems'.

In addition, teachers now teach greater numbers of young people in regions and localities where youth unemployment levels and government income support and training policies conspire to coerce many students to attend post-compulsory schooling (Kelly, 1999). These processes of change have contributed to the restructuring of teaching practices and school curriculum. During the past three decades there has been a series of problematisations of the ways in which massive state-regulated education systems might be governed. Variable-term contracts for teaching staff (rather than permanency) are now common in Australian government schools, and working conditions have, in many schools, included increased class sizes and increased performance expectations. Within these policy spaces the regulation of schooling has been re-imagined within discursive formations that foreground neo-liberal understandings of accountability, devolution and self-management. As Dinham and Scott (1996, v) point out:

> Educational systems worldwide … have experienced considerable change over the last decade. Changes have affected teaching practice and curricula, greater involvement of stakeholders in education, and restructuring educational bureaucracies with greater emphases upon accountability, rationality and self management.

In the Australian state of Victoria, the mid 1990s version of these programmes was called *Schools of the Future*. In this strategy there was a movement towards decentralisation, a reduction in the size of education bureaucracies, and the establishment of linkages between local decision-making, administration and management of schools. According to the then Department of School Education (DSE, 1994) features of the Schools of the Future programme included: increased responsibilities for school principals; locally based decisions on curriculum; greater community accountability through school charters, annual reports and triennial reviews; greater powers for school councils, and increased flexibility for financial management and professional development. These changes in the ways in which

schools were regulated affected the nature of school and teacher responsibilities for the management and delivery of educational experiences to students and their families – changes that were added to by the discourse of 'effective schools'. In this discourse, differences in student outcomes were argued to be 'not simply due to the effects of schools receiving different types of students but rather that they were associated with differences in the way the schools were managed and in the quality of teaching and learning' (Mortimore, 1996, 4).

The physical, emotional and psychic responses of teachers to these, and other, transformations in their work practices and settings, and the ways in which their work is regulated should not be discounted or even dismissed as being indicative of some degree of personal inadequacy. However, the nature of these responses is not my principal concern. I am not concerned with establishing that teachers are really stressed or not. Following the lead of Foucault, and of some of the work that draws on his legacy, my analysis is not *realist*. I do not try to characterise how work–life really is for individual teachers or groups of teachers, and why they might be stressed, or otherwise (Rose and Miller, 1992). Rather, following Rose and Miller (1992, 177), I want to 'attend to the ways in which authorities … have posed themselves these questions: what is our power, to what ends should it be exercised; what effects has it produced; how can we know what we need to know, and do what we need to do in order to govern?' My primary purpose, then, is to identify and analyse the ways in which the teacher self is conceived as a stressed self, and the practices of government which are considered appropriate for regulating this mode of being in the context of realising the goal of effective schools.

The late twentieth early twenty-first century tendency to imagine the self as stressed, and to re-imagine the management of teachers via a discourse of professional stress, can be situated within cultural spaces that are increasingly structured by therapeutic discursive formations. In these therapeutic spaces we are encouraged to discover an authentic inner self, to nurture and care for this self in environments that are said to be hostile and dangerous to it (Rose 1990, 1998). This duty of care towards the self that is placed at risk in these environments becomes an ethical responsibility for individual teachers and those who govern the work practices of teachers; a form of government that is enabled by conceiving of the teacher self as a whole self, a self with a range of physical, emotional and psychic needs. In a preface to the DOE kit for building an Action Plan for Staff Health and Wellbeing and Effective Schools, Peter Allen (1998), then Deputy Secretary of Schools, provided a particular reading of human nature and the stressful effects that contemporary work practices have on this nature. Allen argued that 'our emotional and physical make-up predates our social and professional behaviour at work'. Our physical and emotional selves and the 'brain chemistry responsible' for our emotional states have, argued Allen, 'changed very little' in the past 20,000 years. Yet in that time we have moved from a species of 'self paced', nomadic

'hunters and gatherers' to a species that works in environments (such as schools) that are technologised, rationalised and regulated by processes and practices quite distant from us. For Allen, a manager of self-managing schools, it is our emotional needs, responses and states which 'provide the basis for longer term states of mind such as stress, morale and the perceived quality of work life'. The point of problematising the contemporary emotional state of stressed teachers via a referral to a human nature that has, apparently, changed little in 20 millennia is to suggest that emotions 'provide a point of demarcation between the needs of people and computers'. People 'are not machines'. While we may be 'in the grip of a technological revolution, our emotional and physical selves are still hunting and gathering'.

In his address to those responsible for managing the work practices of stressed teachers Allen (1998) positioned the self-governing school management team as being responsible for recognising that teachers 'are at their productive best when their emotional and physical selves are balanced and integrated into daily working life'. These practices of 'responsibilization' (Burchell, 1996) required school managers to recognise 'people for the work they do' and provide these teachers 'with regular feedback'. Moreover, in order to 'maintain the balance between emotional, physical and professional health', school managers needed to provide opportunities for 'small teams to work together enabling positive interaction and the building of self-esteem. We need to get better control of the systems that are an important part of our professional lives' (Allen, 1998). This process of *responsibilisation*, as a means by which the conduct of stressed teachers might be governed, emerges as a powerful technique of government precisely because it is grounded in the *naturalness* of these therapeutic discourses; discourses that in this instance mobilised the World Health Organisation's (1948) definition of health as being constituted by 'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being' (DOE, 1998, 4). In the foreword to the DOE kit, David Parkin (1998, 2) drew on this truth in claiming that 'People are not pentiums. They have physical and emotional needs that do not cease to exist at work. If people are to do their professional best, their managers need to accommodate their changing physical and emotional needs'. Parkin argued that a 'comprehensive approach to staff health and well-being will include promotion and support for healthy lifestyle choices. A good programme will encourage a personal balance between the physical, mental and emotional self. This theme will extend to a balance between the needs of work, family and self'. If self-governing school managers failed this ethical responsibility, they placed at risk the possibility that the massive state-regulated schooling system could be more effective.

In Foucault's (1985, 26; see also 1986, 1988) genealogies of ethical practices of the self he directed aspects of his analysis of processes of self-formation towards 'the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference' to elements of a particular code of conduct. Foucault (1985, 26–28) argued that

with regard to specific types and codes of action there are a multiplicity of 'ways to "conduct oneself" morally, different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent but as an ethical subject of this action'. In analysing particular modes of being, and the possible range of ethical practices that govern the self and its relation to particular techniques of self-formation, it is possible to consider four dimensions to the diversity of ways of conducting oneself: the *determination of the ethical substance*; the *mode of subjection*; the *forms of elaboration*, that is the *ethical work*; and the *telos* of the ethical subject. Foucault (1985, 29) argued that these concerns could frame a historical analysis of particular 'forms of moral subjectivation and of the practices of the self that are meant to ensure it'. This way of thinking about the self would take as its object the manner in which 'individuals are urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct', the particular suggestions offered for establishing and maintaining a certain 'relationship with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself', and, finally, the particular reconfigurations that 'one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object'. I want to use this framework to think about the range of governmental-ethical practices that structured aspects of the Victorian Department of Education (1998) Action Plan for managing Staff Health and Wellbeing and Effective Schools, and which imagined the management of teacher stress as an ethical matter, a professional duty-of-care, if the promise of effective schools was to be delivered.

What do such governmental-ethical practices seek to govern? What is the range of personal capacities, attitudes, desires, hopes, ambitions, behaviours and dispositions that are conceived as being of consequence in the management of the stressed self? In the Action Plan (DOE, 1998, 14) the leadership team of a school was encouraged to think about developing in teachers a capacity to balance competing claims, pressures and responsibilities in different spheres of activity – schools, homes and relationships. Teachers also needed to be encouraged to develop a 'sense of fun, adventure and appropriate risk taking', together with a capacity to access and act upon the 'wealth of health promotion' resources that are 'valuable' in 'planning a physical and mental health promotion programme with staff'. Here capacities for self-reflection and choice have as their focus the development of a sense of being responsible for individual and institutional health and well-being so that schools can be more effective.

What is the governing work that promises to manage the forms of selfhood which constitute the stressed teacher? What techniques, activities, checklists, attendance requirements, and management practices are mobilised in various sites and relationships to regulate the behaviours and dispositions of stressed teachers in order to deliver effective schools? The Action Plan (DOE, 1998, 3–14) identified and provided school managers with a 'step by step process' for developing staff health and well-being. This plan outlined, in a series of progressions, 'nine key categories' for 'building effective schools'. These nine categories were grouped

in a 'preferred order' of seven areas – Policy (leadership), Professional Health, Organisational Health, Personnel Operations, Physical Environment, Social and Recreational Health (incorporating personal well-being and physical health) – that required attention in order to 'achieve satisfied and effective staff which in turn should lead to greater school effectiveness overall'. In each of these areas, issues and problems and management rationalities were identified: for example, Quality Systems Models for promoting systems effectiveness in Personnel Operations. Progression through this series of areas identified as producing health and well-being in teachers was regulated and monitored by the successful completion of checklists. These checklists required school managers to respond to questions such as: 'Has the core professional role of teaching been fully explored with staff and an agreed school position been determined?'; 'Do you have a process for monitoring important systems and improving breakdowns and bottlenecks?'; 'Have you undertaken a functional audit of facilities and equipment usage?'; 'Do staff have a time out or rest area free of interruptions?'; 'Does the school encourage a healthy balance between home and work activities?' 'Have you used the School Organisational Climate Survey to determine whether there is an issue with how staff interact professionally?'

Who are the governing subjects in this programme for governing the problem of stress and its likely impact on organisational effectiveness? Here we can identify the stressed teacher as a type of person who is recognised as having certain emotional, physical and psychic capacities and needs. The nature of these capacities and needs was problematised in order to incite a form of teacher selfhood which is actively responsible for managing, ethically, individual health and well-being so that schools can be more effective. These problematisations occur at the level of those who are responsible for managing teachers, and at the level of teachers who are incited to manage themselves in ways that develop their capacity to cope and be more effective. Here the ideas that 'people are not pentiums' and that 'managers need to accommodate their changing physical and emotional needs' (DOE, 1998, 2) are indicative of particular, historically contingent *horizons of identity* (Dean, 1995). These versions of what it is to be human are suggestive of ways that school managers and teachers should see themselves and their responsibilities to themselves and others in the project of delivering effective schools.

What is the telos of these governmental-ethical practices? What forms of existence do they seek to engender in relation to the multiplicity of ways of being a teacher, when only certain modes of being promise to provoke forms of ethical self problematisation with regard to the goal of effective schools? Important here were processes that sought to identify teachers as 'professionals' with the capacity to recognise their 'role at work and how this fits with the goals of the school' – goals that included the capacity to identify 'the relationship between professional growth, job enrichment and morale' (DOE, 1998, 7). Being a professional, in this sense, requires that certain practices of ethical self-problematisation are mobilised

so that school managers and teachers can recognise the stressed self as placing at risk the promise of effective schools.

In a number of ways this discussion of teacher stress, effective schools, of the ethical problematisation of the self is about the professionalisation of workplace identities. These identities take many forms but have in common an encouragement to develop certain capacities in a workplace/organisational environment. These capacities then entitle a person to be identified, by themselves and others, as *professional*. The thing about these processes of professionalisation is that a professional identity generates certain obligations that accompany a positive identification as a professional. These obligations are themselves diverse and are intimately related to the particular positive manifestations of a professional identity generated by different *professional* contexts (Dent and Whitehead 2002a 2002b, Sullivan 1995). A side issue here is that the professionalisation of workplace identities has been set free from the *professions*. Professional becomes a mobile signifier of certain capacities, behaviours and dispositions, settling in new and, some might say, strange contexts of *professional activity* (elite level football for example; see Kelly and Hickey 2008, 2010).

In this sense the formation of a professional identity can be understood as the development of a specific relationship to oneself and others. To be a professional is to be a person who must do certain, quite specific work on oneself so that one can be considered to be a professional, a particular kind of person. To be professional as a teacher, for example, means different things, requires a different relationship to oneself and others, requires the individual to do different work on the self, than to be professional as, say, a Premier League footballer, or a police officer. This idea of the development of a professional identity suggests a process rather than a state. A process that can be analysed, in part, as a series of suggestions, incitements or sanctions that emerge from a range of settings and authorities, and which have as their aim the development of certain behaviours and attitudes that identify the person as professional (see also, Kelly and Hickey 2010, 2008). To be a professional invokes, also, a sense of *asceticism*, within this process of professional development – a certain disciplining of the self so that one might be, or become, *more* professional. This is a key element in considering the sorts of *sacrifices* individuals are prepared to make to become professional (Foucault 2000a, 2000b). At one and the same time these ascetic practices are both productive and limiting. They *produce* particular relations to the self and to others through the work one does on oneself – often on the encouragement, direction or advice of the teacher, or the counsellor, or the manager. They are *limiting* because they close off other ways of being, other forms of relationship to the self and others because such relationships would mark one as *unprofessional*.

It is from this understanding of the professionalisation of workplace identities that I want to move to developing an understanding that the capacity to manage stress

in contexts of complexity, change and uncertainty emerges as one mark of what it means to be professional, one mark of what it means to be able to make choices that energise the self as a healthy enterprise.

COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS – FUZZY BOUNDARIES, EMERGENT BEHAVIOURS AND THE EDGE OF CHAOS

> In an organisational context, complexity provides an explanatory framework of how organisations behave. How individuals and organisations interact, relate and evolve within a larger social ecosystem. Complexity also explains why interventions may have un-anticipated consequences. The intricate inter-relationships of elements within a complex system give rise to multiple chains of dependencies. Change happens in the context of this intricate intertwining at all scales.
>
> LSE (2003)

What follows is a sceptical engagement with a set of discourses that have generated and attracted much popular, policy and academic discussion – and which offer a range of possibilities for addressing my concern with stress and the forms of personhood that mark the self as professional and entrepreneurial. For Thrift (2005, 52–53) complexity theory is a 'scientific amalgam … an accretion of ideas, a rhetorical hybrid', whose intellectual stimulus is an 'anti-reductionist one, representing a shift towards understanding the properties of interaction of systems as more than the sum of the parts'. For Thrift, this amalgam or assemblage can be thought of as an 'economy of concepts' grounded in what is, in effect, a series of 'question marks' such as 'non-linearity, self organization, emergent order, and complex adaptive systems'. In this space complexity can be understood in a material sense. That is, the networks, connections, relationships, interdependencies – what Thrift (2005, 71) calls a *complex ecology of things* – characteristic of a more globalised world at the start of the twenty-first century can be made thinkable in terms of some of the key ideas from complexity sciences. Complexity is also a discursive space that is intimately connected to the material. That is, the *real* is rendered knowable, for an array of reasons and ends, in ways that complexify, rather than simplify. Complexity is in many settings, processes and practices something that is to be recognised in its complexity, embraced for the possibilities that complexity promises. Simplicity and simplification are to be shunned for the things that they leave out. None of this, as I will suggest, is without problem.

Complexity theories argue that Newtonian scientific rationalities and metaphors have tended to produce organisational and management metaphors that suggest a

mechanical universe of action and thought – a space in which 'big problems can be broken down into smaller ones, analysed and solved by rational deduction' – and by the planning, building and operation of appropriate systems. Yet, as some have argued, 'the machine metaphor lets us down badly when no part of the equation is constant, independent, or predictable' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 625). It has been argued that the science of CAS offers the possibility of producing new metaphors for understanding the contingency and uncertainty of organisations – metaphors that would see organisational research and practices 'abandon linear models, accept unpredictability, respect (and utilise) autonomy and creativity, and respond flexibly to emerging patterns and opportunities' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 628). A conference at the University of Texas in April 2003 took up this idea of embracing uncertainty and surprise. Titled *Uncertainty and Surprise: Questions on Working with the Unexpected and Unknowable,* the conference was grounded in the proposition that 'unpredictability and surprise are dependable elements' of our world – a view which suggests that rather than imagining social systems as manageable machines (if we just have the right information and pull the right levers, or identify the main *drivers*) we should view such systems as 'self organising', with identifiable properties and logics that emerge from interaction among agents (Plexus Institute 2003).

Of course the limits of a human capacity to live with the ongoing 'ontological insecurity' that often characterises settings of uncertainty (Giddens 1990, 1991) would suggest a need to be sceptical of the redemptive tendencies apparent in some claims for this 'new science'. Indeed, it is possible to imagine the apparently widespread incidence of workplace stress as a reflection of this 'ontological insecurity'. This is a point I will revisit later.

CAS have a number of characteristics. A CAS can be characterised as a collection of actors or agents (human or otherwise) with capacities to act 'freely', 'unpredictably', and independently and interconnectedly within a systems environment – in ways that can, indeed, change the contexts in which these agents act. In this sense an immune system, an ant colony, a financial market, 'and just about any collection of humans' – for example, a family, a classroom, a school, a Department of Education – can be understood as a CAS (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 625).

A CAS can be further characterised by comparing it to a mechanical system in which 'boundaries are fixed and well defined, for example what is and is not part of a car is no problem'. CAS, on the other hand, have 'fuzzy boundaries', changeable actor membership and the possibility that members can simultaneously be members of several systems. These 'fuzzy boundaries' can 'complicate problem solving and lead to unexpected actions in response to change' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 625). In one example cited in the literature a part-time partner in a large medical practice proposed to extend the clinic's opening times by 30 minutes over lunchtime. This relatively small proposed change to organisational

practices and working conditions was met with a hostile response by other partners and workers at the practice – a hostile response that was confusing to the partner who made the suggestion. From a CAS perspective this hostile response can be understood by imagining the proposed change as not just impacting in a small way on the clinic's organisational practices. Rather, the change impacted, also, on the involvement by clinic staff and partners in other 'social systems' such as 'meeting a child from school, attending a meeting or study class, or making contact with others who themselves have fixed lunch hours' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 625–626). From this perspective working lives, and changes in these working lives, cannot be quarantined from other systems of human interaction – families, schools, partners' jobs, etc. Much of the contemporary debate about Work Life Balance makes a similar point (see, for example, Taylor 2002).

CAS are 'embedded within other systems and co-evolve'. This embeddedness is facilitated by those interactions and relationships that can be characterised as institutional and systemic, and those that are carried on at the level of the individual and the informal: 'Since each agent and each system is nested within other systems, all evolving together and interacting, we cannot fully understand any of the agents or systems without reference to others' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 626). Each element within a CAS is 'interdependent' – its identity and function is imagined as being dependent on its relations to other elements within various networks (Lichtenstein 2000, 534). These processes of interaction, adaptation and co-evolution lead to an acknowledgement within complexity theory that tension and paradox are inevitable outcomes of complex interactions and need not be seen as things to resolve – they can, indeed, be productive in ways that are not entirely predictable. This tension and unpredictability results in the phenomenon of 'continually emerging, novel behaviour' – a phenomenon that suggests that any 'observable outcomes are more than simply the sum of the parts'. The 'noise and shimmer of a babbling brook', for example, cannot be simply constructed as the sum of the interaction and properties of hydrogen and oxygen atoms (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 626).

Within a CAS a complex of 'internalised rules', and cognitive and affective models, shape members' actions. In a CAS these rules and models 'need not be shared, explicit, or even logical when viewed by another agent' (Plesk and Greenhalgh 2001, 626). Moreover, these rules and models are not fixed; they are, indeed, changeable. Here CAS are imagined as being shaped by 'dynamic ordering' processes – patterns or figurations that emerge to allow a system to more or less successfully meet its goals. The achievement of these goals then enables these patterns to be reproduced; a 'dominant logic' emerges from and reproduces particular values, beliefs, structures and strategies (Lichtenstein 2000, 534–535). These characteristics point to the adaptive dimensions of these complex systems – adaptation that can be foreseen and unforeseen, planned and unplanned. Of interest also are the ways in which existing patterns are changed or disrupted as

a consequence of the emergent behaviour that characterises CAS at the *edge of chaos* – that zone where change occurs (both planned and unplanned) (Kauffman 2002, Lewin, 1992, Merry 1995, Morgan 1997, Waldrop 1992). This edge of chaos is a key element/space in the science of complexity, and potentially a useful means for imagining the circumstances in which workplace stress emerges in the context of change.

In a discussion of 'self-organisation and flux' Benyamin Lichtenstein (2000, 528) argues that constant change is a feature of CAS. In this understanding organisations can be imagined as 'dissipative structures' – as systems that consist of 'self-generating' and 'self-renewing' processes that are constituted through, and dependent on, significant and turbulent flows of energy, information and resources – in the form of ideas, persons, technologies. As Lichtenstein argues this 'flux generates constant pressure to change, and this pressure to change is at the core of self-organization'. Complexity science argues that systems 'survive and thrive' when they are 'pushed away from equilibrium'. If they stay near equilibrium 'they die'. In 'far-from-equilibrium' conditions systems have to 'experiment and explore their space of possibilities'. Such conditions impel systems to 'discover and create new patterns of relationships, different structures and innovative ways of working' (LSE 2003). In this space at the edge of chaos complexity theories argue that 'order and organisation may arise spontaneously out of disorder' via a process of self-organisation (LSE 2003). Stresses and tensions in 'far from equilibrium' systems can energise non-proportionality, where small changes can have marked consequences – and substantial changes can have little effect – in terms of desired, *planned* outcomes. Complexity theories talk about *thresholds* where uncertainty is the result of complexity. At this edge of chaos change can go in a number of directions with any number of consequences. It is in this state that new order, new logics, new cultural practices, new forms of communication, new thinking can emerge – but nothing is guaranteed, the possibility must always exist for catastrophe and collapse to emerge from this space (Lichtenstein 2000, 536–539; LSE 2003).

We get close, here, to the view that never-ending processes of quality improvement (*kaizin*) can be energised via techniques of *management by stress* – where systems and actors are pushed to their limits to identify system weaknesses and drive productivity gains: with little regard for whether these *weak spots* are people, processes or technologies (Rifkin 1995; Weissman 2001). In a critique of the performance of the General Electric Corporation under the stewardship of CEO Jack Welch – a stewardship marked by relentless driving down of costs and massive increases in shareholder value – Robert Weissman (2001, 22) identifies some of the human costs associated with what he calls management by stress:

But the jargon included in the Crotonville course book and sprinkled throughout GE documents – 'continuous improvement,' 'high performance,' 'developing and maintaining competitive advantage,' 'boundaryless' teams, organisations and relationships, 'change acceleration process,' 'culture change,' 'change management,' 'human resources best practices,' 'productivity solutions,' and much more – conceal the human impacts of the global management-by-stress model.

For Weissman (2001, 22) these costs include physical, emotional and psychological health and well-being issues associated with 'living with constant fear of job loss and managers employing KITA [Kick-In-The-Ass] strategies' and with 'working on sped-up lines'. He also identifies such things as the 'community devastation resulting from GE shifting production around the world in search of ever-lower cost wages' and the 'lost collective opportunities and benefits for employees who would unionize but for GE's "non-union philosophy, practices and strategy"'.

My scepticism about a number of elements of the complexity assemblage, and their translation into explanations of organisations, change, behaviours and types of person, emerges in the context of this *faddishness*, and from a number of tensions in complexity theory. Dorothy Illing (2002, 32), for example, in a brief article titled 'Eccentric discipline puts change in context', points out that the 'new science' of complexity develops a non-reductionist view of systems and systems interaction which suggests that 'objects are not only considered in isolation, but also in their system context and how the system emerges out of their interactions. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts'. Further, interactions between and within systems are complex, 'endless and often unpredictable'. She argues that complexity is the 'new business buzzword' in the US, where its 'big attraction' is its 'recognition' of the unpredictable, messy and complicated nature 'of the world, of human beings and of organisations'.

Thrift (2005, 57–58) traces the ways in which complexity theory emerged out of separate but related work in fields such as mathematics, computing and biology: a 'complex genealogy' which meant that 'by the late 1970s as a result of manifold additions to the theory of non-linear dynamical systems and exponential advances in computing power' many of the core elements of complexity theory were already assembled. As Thrift suggests a feature of the evolution of complexity theory (as might be suggested by key elements of the assemblage) is its fluidity, the apparent ease with which complexity metaphors have been translated into disciplines as diverse as economics, geography, architecture, literary theory, history, sociology anthropology, and management and organisation studies. Complexity metaphors have displayed an ability to adapt, evolve, migrate, morph: an ability that might lead a cynic to argue, suggests Thrift, that as 'these metaphors have travelled, so

they have become almost completely meaningless. Flexibility produces lack of friction which produces fatuousness'.

Part of Thrift's (2005, 61–63) purpose in finding a place for complexity in his framing of twenty-first century capitalism is to identify why it might be that management and organisational academics, business schools, entrepreneurs and consultants – some of the key players in his cultural circuits of capitalism – have been so receptive to, and have facilitated, the translation of complexity ideas into the cultural logics of twenty-first century organisations. The *why*, for Thrift, is sketched around five main points:

- The pre-existing influence of systems theory in management and organisation studies prepared fertile ground that facilitated the growth of complexity studies.
- The information and technological (computational) revolutions provided a common logic between complexity science and business and enabled a ready translation of ideas.
- The cultural circuit of capital is energised by a 'constant flow of ideas/metaphors'; *business fads* 'roll by year after year'.
- Business and academic conferences and seminars play important roles in inscribing:

> metaphors in the conduct of business organizations and business bodies. In particular, the management seminar has proved a fertile means of introducing complexity into embodied corporate practices. At their most effective, they can produce strong shifts in what it means to be a person … Here, then, the circuit of cultural capitalism interacts with the new 'psy disciplines' … and part of that interaction is metaphors like complexity.

- The production of complexity science is intimately connected to business: in terms of the ways in which companies such as Citicorp sponsor, support and fund research and establish partnerships with the producers of this science, and in the ways that centres of complexity expertise such as the Santa Fe Institute act as facilitators, producers and disseminators of the findings and applications of complexity metaphors and concepts.

My wariness about the use of this economy of concepts also relates to the 'search for universality' (Cilliers 1999) that appears, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, in much of the science, and management practice, that is done under the CAS metaphor. This search for universality, or a return to the promise of predictability, is often driven by a range of managerial, commercial and instrumental rationalities

that might, at one level, acknowledge complexity, but at another level seek to manage this uncertainty, to predict consequences, to define, and confine, issues within less fuzzy boundaries. An example of this tendency to mobilise complexity metaphors in quests for certainty can be found in a statement attributed to Colin Crook, senior technologist at Citicorp. Cook, in a comment on how the 'the mathematics of complexity' helped predict when Citibank call centres would experience periods of high demand, said: 'I'm no complexity zealot … But this stuff is very, very precise.' In another example of this sort of appropriation of complexity Christopher Meyer, director of Ernst & Young's Centre for Business Innovation in Boston, is reported as saying that one day 'complexity will even make management less of a black art' (Brownlee 1996, 57).

This tension, even paradox, emerges, in part, because in some fields the use of the CAS metaphor is enabled and accompanied by the use of powerful computer technologies, modelling and simulations. In the Citibank example the organisation used 'complexity algorithms to search for patterns in its huge volume of customer call records'. In another situation Telesim, a computer simulation of a deregulated telecommunications market, was used by a number of telecom companies to provide them with 'a taste of competition in a deregulated marketplace'. This simulation was powerful enough to enable the organisations inside this virtual reality to 'actually learn as the game continues, shifting their strategies as the human players change theirs' (Brownlee 1996, 57). So, when faced with uncertainty the embrace of complexity is something that often energises attempts to *tame the wild profusion of existing things* (Foucault 1994), to order, to quantify, to systematise.[2] Powerful technologies that can model complexity promise a return to predictability and control – a promise that is a powerful attractor in management discourses which construct reality through these and similar imperatives in the complex world of twenty-first century flexible capitalism. The edge of chaos, while productive, is also destructive as new forms of organisation, work, ideas and persons emerge. Doing stuff here (work, planning, managing) requires a particular form of personhood in order to answer to, to embrace logics of complexity, competition, profit, efficiency, merit. Thrift (2005, 62) quotes at length from a 1997 paper ('Community, Creativity and Society') by the late mathematician and biologist Brian Goodwin, a leading thinker in complexity science and author of books such as *How the Leopard Changed its Spots*, as an illustration of the particular *economy of concepts* that complexity makes available to business in these cultural circuits. For Goodwin:

2 The role of so-called *quants* – mathematically sophisticated analysts and the models that they claimed could eliminate history, risk and downside in the securitisation of an array of bonds, futures and derivatives (including the US sub-prime mortgage bonds re-packaged and sold around the world as AA rated investments) – in the events that precipitated the 2008/09 GFC is an instance of attempts at the mathematical *ordering* of complexity (see, for example, Burrogh 2010, Ferguson 2010, Lewis 2010, McLean 2010).

> Business corporations have been among the first to see the potential relevance of these ideas to management structure and creative organisational changes. Since their everyday experience is 'living on the edge', any insights into dynamic structures that facilitate adaptive response are welcomed. The suggestions of complexity theory for business practice are a flattening of the management hierarchy, distribution of control through the system with fluid networks of interaction between the parts, and the necessity of periods of chaos for the emergence of appropriate new order.

From the perspective of the mathematician and the biologist who is keen for business to see the ready application and benefits of these ideas, these concepts come with particular understandings of the forms of personhood that might flourish within the spaces framed by this economy of concepts. For Goodwin:

> The move towards a more anarchic, spontaneous dynamic is clearly threatening to the controlling managers, but it appears to be the path to creativity and diversification. This in no way guarantees survival, just as there is no long term survival guaranteed to adopted, adapting spaces in evolution. What it allows for is innovative expression, which has intrinsic value for the members of the enterprise, as well as providing the best chance of the organisation's persisting in a constantly changing corporate world. All the participants in this sector of social organisation can then experience a higher quality of life, since they have greater freedom, more opportunities for creative play, and richer interactions – good for them and good for the organisation. The primary goal would not then be to survive through maximisation of profits, but to make possible a fuller and more creative life for all members of the company and thus to maximise the chances of appropriate collective responses to perpetually changing circumstances.
>
> cited in Thrift (2005, 62)

What we see in this economy of concepts is a form of sense-making that embraces uncertainty, surprise and complexity. And which envisages and calls for a certain kind/form of personhood that is endowed with the capacities to embody this embrace.

At a metaphorical level complexity suggests new ways of framing an understanding of organisations such as schools. New means for thinking about such things as the following: how organisations evolve, adapt, change; how these adaptive processes might be regulated or managed; how uncertainty, surprise and the unplanned are immanent forces and possibilities for organisations; how agents, including embodied persons, are embedded in other systems; how this embeddedness always results in co-evolutionary behaviours, practices and processes – often with consequences that are unimagined and *unmanageable*. And which, indeed, may be *stressful* to differently located actors within CAS. The widespread, often physically,

emotionally and psychologically damaging incidence of workplace stress points, possibly, to some of the limits that many humans experience at this edge of chaos. The experience of these limits may, indeed, produce the sorts of *emotional costs of individualisation and globalisation* that Elliot and Lemert (2006) identify.

CAS: STRESS, SURPRISE AND THE SELF AS ENTERPRISE

This manner of imagining how organisations function has resonances in many of the ways in which workplace stress is thought about and managed – even if these are not articulated from a CAS perspective. In effective schools discourses, for example, it is claimed that small, seemingly minor changes in the things that schools do, have the potential for greatly improving student outcomes in systems 'where even minor difference may affect significantly the life chances of students' (Mortimore 1996, 4).

The Department of Education (DOE) (1998) Action Plan for managing stress sees the potential for developing/promoting teacher health and well-being, and thus, effective schools, emerging from small interventions across a complex array of organisational processes, practices and relations. Here there is a sense in which the DOE imagines schools (and the Department) as complex systems, but in ways which see these systems as being amenable to linear, rational models of risk identification, calculation, regulation and minimisation. The issue of work related stress is also increasingly conceptualised as a question of finding and maintaining a balance between different aspects of our lives – different systems of interaction. Such a view is captured in a preface to the DOE Action Plan where it is claimed that 'a comprehensive approach to staff health and wellbeing will include promotion and support for healthy lifestyle choices. A good programme will encourage a personal balance between the physical mental and emotional self. This theme will extend to a balance between the needs of work, family and self' (Parkin 1998, 2).

What the Action Plan doesn't acknowledge are the relationships between global capital markets, International Credit Ratings Agencies, Victorian State Government debts, and education system change that was dependent on particular understandings of these relationships in Victoria in the 1990s. At this time ratings of state government debt by Moodys and Standard and Poors drove massive cuts in government spending – resulting in large scale changes in the state education system. Moreover, the Action Plan acknowledges complexity within some parts of the system but takes as given things such as school closures, teacher sackings, Department restructuring, budget and school governance changes (Blackmore 1999, Dimmock 1998, Dinham and Scott 1997, Watkins 1996). And it reduces an acknowledgement that teachers have relationships into other systems, to a view that *professionals* ought to be able to balance these relationships. Indeed, they have *obligations* to find this balance.

In using this CAS metaphor I can make connections to sociological literatures and traditions that have explicitly addressed the complexity, contingency, unpredictability and unintended consequences of human and system interactions. In doing so I can link to the ways in which these traditions have considered the ontological consequences of continual change, uncertainty and surprise for human actors in a range of system settings – settings that are increasingly globalised and complex. In these problem spaces we can imagine another reality – one which suggests that the responsibility for managing this complexification of complexity becomes increasingly individualised (see, for example, Bauman 2001, Giddens 1991), a responsibilisation hinted at in sayings such as: *The one constant in today's world is change*. In such statements we see indications of the ways in which an acknowledgement of change, uncertainty and complexity itself co-evolves, adapts, mutates and emerges in a hybridised form as a consequence of its relationships with other systems of thought – market logics, competitive rationalities, cost/benefit analyses, risk and globalisation discourses, productivity and effectiveness logics.

In effect, if we imagine organisations and the environments they operate in as a *matrix* of co-evolving, surprising, chaotic, inter-connected systems *'Who you gonna call?'* A professional, of course. A person with the capacities to operate effectively, in-balance, and *professionally* at the edge of chaos. These issues are significant because in this discussion I have not been concerned with individual responses to stress – whether someone *copes* well or not. Rather, I am much more concerned with the ways in which individuals are governed and live and work in CAS on the basis of perceptions/understandings of their capacities to cope at the edge of chaos – *If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen!*

I make no claims for a cause–effect relationship between workplace health and well-being, and complexity, uncertainty and surprise. Rather, the ways of imagining professionalisation and systems change that I have discussed here can contribute to discussions about the forms of obligation and responsibility that might accompany a positive identification as *professional*. Including an obligation to manage one's health and well-being in ways that will enable organisations to be more effective. And an obligation to develop a balance in one's life as the systems we are embedded in become more complex, and our understanding of this complexity evolves in more complex, hybrid ways.

So, while the CAS metaphor is generative in terms of understanding the ways in which systems change and evolve (often in unmanageable ways), it needs to be considered and located in the different social, political, economic, cultural and local realities of twenty-first century flexible capitalism – where, some might argue: *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

CHAPTER 9

THE BODY, MIND AND SOUL OF THE SELF AS ENTERPRISE

> It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power … on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives.
>
> Michel Foucault (1995, 29) *Discipline and Punish*

THE CORPORATE ATHLETE'S BACK END INDEX

In 'New Work Ethics?: The Corporate Athlete's *Back End Index*' colleagues and I (Kelly at al. 2007) developed some initial ideas about the things that interest me in this chapter. Much of the discussion there was concerned with presenting an analysis of a workplace health and well-being programme in the Australian operations of a large, multinational IT company (identified by the pseudonym Labyrinth Corporation). Drawing on the framing concepts and vocabulary that emerge from using Foucault's work on the care of the self we argued that the sort of extensive, even intrusive, workplace health and well-being programme that Labyrinth bought in from John's Health (a workplace health consultancy) had as its principal purpose the development in Labyrinth's employees of a sense of themselves as 'embodying the behaviors and dispositions that mark the person as a corporate athlete' (Kelly et al. 2007, 269). We based this figure of the *corporate athlete* on Jim Loehr and Tony Schwartz's (2001) influential work on the body, mind and soul dimensions of executive performance. I want to return to a fuller discussion of this figure later in this chapter. In our analysis of this workplace health and well-being programme we suggested that the various elements of the programme, in seeking to *make up* persons who imagine themselves as corporate athletes, would develop an ethic, an orientation to the conduct of the self, in which the figure of the corporate athlete, and the work that individuals have to do to become this type of person (if only they choose to!), is one that can embody

individual desires 'for health, performance, well-being, career'. And, at the same time, embody the organisation's desires for 'productivity, performance, cost and risk minimization' (Kelly et al. 2007, 269).

Such an ethic doesn't appear from thin air. Such an ethic cannot be willed into being by management practices or through an organisational culture that might value such a thing. This ethic will emerge, so the promise goes, via the mobilisation of a variety of practices, processes and techniques within an overall workplace health and well-being programme logic.

As we suggested (Kelly et al. 2007, 276–277) the figure of the corporate athlete takes shape, in a material and discursive sense, through things such as the following: the argument for a quite specific, identifiable and measurable *normal* body type and shape; various examinations, by an array of experts, of the many possible states appearances and functions of different parts of the body; the conduct, recording and evaluation of a variety of tests which score the individual's performance in relation to a series of population based norms; individual participation in a range of meetings, seminars and discussions in which various individual indicators of success, failure and/or achievement are revealed, reflected upon, even confessed to; the mass of programme materials, pamphlets and individual booklets that introduce the individual to the programme, its philosophies and logics, and its measurements and assessments. These materials included a range of booklets covering the *Programme Philosophy*, the *Exercise Prescription*, the *Occupational Health and Fitness Assessment*, *Quality of Life at Labyrinth*, *Back Management* and *Stress Management*.

In our discussion we (Kelly et al. 2007, 278) referenced the *Occupational Health and Fitness Assessment* booklet which includes a number of questionnaires designed to be completed by the individual, and to provoke the individual to develop new awareness, understandings and reflections on the different elements and functions of their embodied health and well-being. These personal evaluations include the completion of a number of profiles, including a Fitness Profile, a Musculo-Skeletal Risk Factor Profile, a Diet Profile, a Chemical Profile, a Mind and Body (Stress) Profile, a Career Satisfaction Profile, and a Summary of Profiles. In the Mind and Body Profile, for example, individuals are asked to score themselves from 0 to 10 (None, Hardly any, A fair bit, A lot) for 30 items covering such feelings/states/conditions/complaints as: Headaches; Lack of energy and vitality; Poor sleep; Crook back; Irritable bowel and/or unsettled stomach; Constipation and/or diarrhoea; Being over-weight and/or putting on weight; Shortness of breath due to asthma, or poor fitness; Chest pain, palpitations; Rashes, zits, skin outbreaks, psoriasis, itchy; Reduced sex drive; Grinding teeth; Drinking too much alcohol; Smoking too many cigarettes; Drinking too much caffeine; Popping too many pills, pain/sleep/depressant; Anxious about life in general; Insecure and/or apprehensive

about the future; Depressed and/or sad; Angry at life; Underappreciated (at work and home); Negative and/or pessimistic.

The introduction to the Mind and Body Profile starts by stating that 'the head is connected to the body'. This statement of the obvious enables the link to be made between states of mind and states of body: 'When we get stressed, the stress is relayed to the body via the autonomic nervous system. Whilst you may not even realise that you are stressed until you complete this questionnaire, your body does, and it has the means to tell you.' It is also suggested: 'It does not matter whether the causes of your distress are from conscious or unconscious sources, the body will pick it up.' The challenge in completing this profile, in thinking actively, reflexively about your 'habits and mannerisms', relates to whether this reflection on different elements of the self means that you are 'awake and listening to what your mind and body are telling you about your lifestyle'(Kelly et al. 2007, 278). In Allender et al. (2006a, 138) we cited the Director of the Health Programme at Labyrinth suggesting that when employees complete the Mind and Body Profile it 'does make people stand up and take stock, stand up and take notice because they don't realize that some people don't get headaches, don't have sore shoulders, they sleep like kittens, they've got lots of energy'. When 'you say that normal healthy people get less than 20 on that profile and you've got 130 and the key recipe is getting fitter, some of them, for the first time, are confronted by that and they start to take notice'. The challenge for the self as enterprise is to consider how you compare to the score of a *normal, fit and healthy human being*, and what are you able or prepared to do in terms of your relation to this norm?

We saw in this array of rationalities, assessments, checklists and tests a number of attempts to develop new forms of knowledge about aspects of the self, and new behaviours and dispositions informed by this knowledge. The care of the self in this form promised to align individual and organisational concerns for individual and organisational health and well-being with individual and organisational performance. Labyrinth's employees, in the particular field of possibilities of this IT organisation and the labour market for IT professionals, were being encouraged, sometimes compelled, to think about themselves, their bodies, their habits and mannerisms in new, often challenging ways if they wanted to position themselves in this field as athletic, as enterprising. Recruitment, sacking, promotion, the value of the self as enterprise are all influenced and shaped by this capacity to position the self in these ways. On a number of occasions John's Health makes these relationships explicit. For example John's Health suggests that the 'statistical report' that they present to management at the end of the assessment phase of the programme (including a 'graph of every parameter measured') provides a 'very good audit tool for evaluating health and fitness, not only of individuals but also of the organization' (Kelly et al. 2007, 279). In the introduction to the Programme Philosophy booklet they argue that:

> Our approach to OH&F [occupational health and fitness] is underpinned by the belief that people who are fit and healthy, who have a clear idea of what they want from their lives and their careers, and who are on the way to getting what they want, feel good, and the risk of employing them is low. They contribute to the vitality and productivity of themselves and their organization.
>
> **PERSONAL AND CORPORATE WELL-BEING**
>
> Things go well when you're working well. When you're not going well, the personal cost is high and so is the cost to the organization.
>
> Kelly et al. (2007, 281)

What is of interest for the issues that I want to discuss in the remainder of this chapter is the changing character of the limits and possibilities that are imagined as impacting on the performance potential of persons (employees) when they are imagined as having a body, mind and soul. And when it is imagined by management, and the consultant expertise bought in by management, that it is appropriate to imagine that *all* elements of a person's body, mind and soul have the potential to impact on performance; that these elements hold out the promise of being able to be marshalled in the pursuit of individual and, hence, organisational performance. This widening of the horizons of identity reconfigures relationships between an organisation, its managers and employees; reconfigures understandings of the responsibilities and obligations and relations between the organisation and the body, mind and soul of persons; reconfigures relations between bodily functions and performance; reconfigures relations between the public and the private. These reconfigurations have their own limits and possibilities. However, imagining the self as a corporate athlete creates novel understandings of what it is appropriate for management and its health consultants to be concerned about. And what is appropriate for individual persons to think about as they reflect on their health and well-being, and the bodily functions, habits and mannerisms that have the potential to influence performance. In the logic of this programme it is appropriate, then, for what John's Health calls its *Back End Index*, to suggest that:

> Traditional ways of looking at diet have tended to focus on what's going on at the front end of the system. However, if things are ticking over nicely at the back end of the system, if food is moving through the body efficiently, then there is a good chance that you've got a good, high fibre, low fat diet, high water content diet. 'It' should be loose, floating and happen two or three times a day.
>
> Kelly et al. (2007, 220)

John's Health's Back End Index, with its coy, but nevertheless vivid, description of the bowel movements of *a normal, fit, healthy person*, and what *it* should feel, look and act like is a particular instance of the vast array of knowledge that takes all aspects of the body, mind and soul of persons as its object. And the purpose of these endless, oftentimes competing, always provisional problematisations is to imagine how these aspects of the body, mind and soul impact on individual performance, or might be recruited to enhance this performance in the pursuit of organisational performance and productivity.

This interest and concern with bodily functions, with the array of biological, psychological, emotional, even spiritual dimensions of the person need not be imagined as sinister. Labyrinth and John's Health are explicit about the ways in which they imagine the seemingly endless widening of the parameters and the predictors of individual performance. They acknowledge that they are looking to individuals who can imagine themselves in these terms, individuals who see the benefits, the upside of choosing, freely, willingly to know and work on themselves in these terms: *people who are fit and healthy, who have a clear idea of what they want from their lives and their careers, and who are on the way to getting what they want, feel good, and the risk of employing them is low. They contribute to the vitality and productivity of themselves and their organization.*

This is not to say that in this particular, limited field of possibilities that there are not consequences for being able to, or not able to imagine or perform the self in these terms. However, my main interest at this time is to explore, in more detail, the manner which all elements of the person, their body, mind and soul, are drawn into the orbit of concerns with individual and organisational performance. And to think about these developments in ways which trace a shift from what Foucault identified as a disciplined body, to a sense that the self as an enterprise should recognise itself, act on itself, take care of itself by giving due regard to its body, mind and soul. In this sense the care of the self as a corporate athlete is one form the self as enterprise can take, a form which takes its cues from the care of the self as a high performance athlete (see also, Kelly and Hickey 2008).

DISCIPLINED BODIES, WILLING MINDS, SOUL WORK?

Like all Foucault's (1995) work *Discipline and Punish* has been much debated, and subjected to multiple interpretations in many of the social sciences where it has been inserted into *disciplined* spaces. Again, my aim here is not to review this literature and the many, often contradictory, readings of this text. My point of entry, instead, is via my earlier account of Foucault's concept of governmentality. In his development of this concept Foucault engaged with the limits of his earlier work, including the ways in which he understood such things as *discipline*, *bio-power* and *panopticism*. However, in ways that are sometimes ignored or

discounted, Foucault's engagement with what he had done/become did not amount to a renunciation of his earlier work. Indeed, in his work on government of the self and others Foucault (1991a, 101–102) wanted to preserve both a distinction and an intimate connection between sovereignty, discipline and government: 'we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government.' Rather, Foucault imagined a 'triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security'. Moreover, the idea of a choice making, autonomous, responsible personhood – the ideal of liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities – 'renders more acute the problem of sovereignty' (framed in terms of particular understandings of the limits and exercise of power, the rule of law and the legitimate use of violence that is invested in state agencies/forces, and the rights and responsibilities of actors/agencies in contested spaces such as the economy, civil society and private life); and 'all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline' (including understandings of the productive utility of docile bodies, of normal, deviant and/or delinquent individuals and populations, and the mechanisms available to situate, know and govern them).

The part of *Discipline and Punish* that interests me in this context is that section on *Docile Bodies*, and Foucault's discussion of new problematisations of the productive capacities and possibilities of embodied labour emerging at the rise of rationalised capitalism. Foucault (1995, 135) opens his discussion of the docile body, as he often does, with a compelling account of a particular historical figure: in this case the 'ideal figure of the soldier as it was still seen in the early seventeenth century'. This figure, according to the seventeenth century account cited by Foucault (1995, 135), is imagined as emerging, almost ready made from an existing social stratum or class:

> The signs for recognizing those most suited to this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet, because a man of such a figure could not fail to be strong and agile.

A century later Foucault (1995, 135–136) suggests that there has been a transformation, not so much in the emphasis on the body of the soldier, but in the ways in which it is imagined that the soldier's body is something that can be made: 'out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed'. In this shaping of the soldier:

> Recruits become accustomed to 'holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and to help them acquire the habit, they are given the position while standing against a wall in such a way that the heels, the thighs, the waist and the shoulders touch it, as also do the backs of the hands, as one turns the arms outwards, without moving them away from the body … Likewise they will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass … to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the head, the hands or the feet … lastly to march with a bold step, with knee and ham taut, on the points of the feet, which should face outwards' (ordinance of 20 March 1764).

With these sorts of developments Foucault (1995, 136–138) argues that the human body 'was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it'. In this process a '"political anatomy", which was also a "mechanics of power", was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines'. Importantly, discipline, understood in this way, 'produces subjected and practised bodies, "docile" bodies': a body is 'docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved'. As Foucault suggests, the emergence of a political economy of discipline was not the first time that the body was subjected to scrutiny, supervision, training. Disciplinary mechanisms had long existed in such places as 'monasteries, armies, workshops'. However, it was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that discipline became generalised as a *formula* of rule.

Foucault (1995, 136–137) argues that the techniques of discipline operate at a particular scale, a scale that does not imagine the body, 'en masse, "wholesale", as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it "retail", individually'. At this scale discipline seeks to work at the 'level of the mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity'. Next, discipline brings into view, focuses upon a particular object: 'it was not or was no longer the signifying elements of behaviour or the language of the body, but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization; constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs'. Finally, discipline operates in, or is concerned with, a particular modality. Discipline 'implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement'.

Foucault devotes a great deal of space to exploring the *little practices*, the *micro-physics* of discipline that enable discipline to be enacted and exercised. In doing so many have suggested that he crafted a sense of human action and being-in-the-world that is *always* constrained, determined, by power. *If bio-power and*

discipline are everywhere then what? Where is the outside of these relations? How can this power be resisted?

However, Foucault pointed to certain ways to think through the aims, the objects, the limits and possibilities of discipline. Discipline, suggests Foucault (1995, 170) 'makes individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise'. But, in doing so it is 'not a triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself in its omnipotence'. Rather, discipline is a 'modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy'. In schools, in factories, in families, in prisons the *little practices* of discipline are 'humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state'. Docile bodies, by definition, are *unruly* bodies. Unruly bodies (minds and souls) always threaten to escape utility and the rationalities, the modes of ordering that make utility possible. In the exercise of discipline, in the development of the forms of thinking and positive knowledges that promise to make production, education and training more efficient and effective new objects emerge, one of which is the body made knowable in new ways:

> This new object is the natural body, the bearer of forces and the seat of duration; it is the body susceptible to specified operations, which have their order, their stages, their internal conditions, their constituent elements. In becoming the target for new mechanisms of power, the body is offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is the body of exercise, rather than speculative physics; a body manipulated by authority, rather than imbued with animal spirits; a body of useful training and not of rational mechanics, but one in which, by virtue of that very fact, a number of natural requirements and functional constraints are beginning to emerge.
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> Foucault (1995, 155)

So there is always already an outside that discipline seeks to make docile. And these attempts at discipline are always confronted with their own limits, and the unruliness of that outside. These limits and possibilities drive processes of positive knowledge production. I don't want to trace the many twists and turns, continuities and discontinuities of training and discipline that might mark the period between the 1700s and the start of the twenty-first century. Many have made some sense of the rise and practice of mass, compulsory education, the regulation and management of workers and labour processes, and penal and criminal justice systems during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by drawing on Foucault's understandings of bio-power, surveillance and panopticism. Many have also critiqued these positions.[1]

1 See the extensive collection edited by Clare O'Farrell (1997) for critical

In *Working in Jamie's Kitchen: Salvation, Passion and Young Workers* we (Kelly and Harrison 2009) examined the ways in which the celebrity chef Jamie Oliver, the Fifteen Foundation, and its social enterprise Fifteen restaurants (in London, Cornwall, Amsterdam and Melbourne), structured training programmes for marginalised, unemployed young people in an attempt to transform them into passionate workers (cooks, chefs) in the restaurant industry, who could understand food (its production, preparation and presentation) in the ways that had made Oliver famous. Part of the work we did in that book was to examine the ways in which this transitional labour market programme employed a variety of knowledges, techniques and management practices in its efforts to transform unemployed young people into passionate workers. What is relevant to this present discussion is the ways in which we framed part of our analysis of these processes in terms of the relations between knowledge/power/subjects. A central element there was to identify and explore the relationships between sovereignty, discipline and government in the shaping and management of these formerly unemployed young people. In brief, we argued that passion emerges from and frames particular forms of knowledge and ways of knowing – the self, vocational training, paid work, the restaurant industry, food. So, marginalised young people are understood in certain ways, and as requiring certain processes and practices to be put in place to enable a passion to emerge or develop from an initial sense of self that is anything but passionate. We identified that in the time and spaces spanned by the original TV series (*Jamie's Kitchen*, screened in the UK in 2002), the emergence of a vision to develop Fifteen as a global social enterprise brand, and the Australian TV series (*Jamie's Kitchen Australia*, screened in Australia in 2006), knowledges about how to achieve this vision had been reformulated to produce, for example, different ways of understanding the entering behaviours of these young people, and of the practices, processes and relationships that might facilitate processes of self-transformation – with lower attrition rates and less focus on individual failings/lacks. Early in the first series we got a sense that trainees ought to enter the programme with evident, pre-existing and substantial levels of passion. Passion in this time/space was largely seen as intrinsic, it was something that you brought with you.

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engagements with this work from fields such as literature, history, architecture, philosophy, psychoanalysis, feminism, law, medicine, the arts of government, management, post-colonialism, education, health and nursing.

Ruth Watson: *What do you want? What kind of people are you looking for?*

Jamie Oliver: *I just want people that are observing what is happening. If the food is burning I want them to take it off. We are looking for an inner instinctiveness about food. They don't have to be able to cook. They just have to feel it. Do you know what I mean? … All I know is that they're not employed and not in education. But I'm not sure I need to know too much about them really – I think this is about spending quality time and a bit of inspiration and encouragement really*.

Jamie's Kitchen, Episode One, Broadcast in Australia on Channel 10, 21 July 2003

Late in the *Jamie's Kitchen Australia* series there was evidence of a different, not unproblematic, understanding of why some trainees might struggle with the demands and expectations of the programme, why some of the trainees might not appear as passionate as they should.

Jamie Oliver: *I came from a very middle class background where everything was perfect and nothing went wrong. Most of the students we have haven't got fathers so it is mainly single families. The stability at home is very questionable … if there is any at all. I've never been through any of that so who am I to judge really?*

Jamie's Kitchen Australia, Episode Four, Broadcast in Australia on Channel 10, 5 October 2006

In this training/employment environment we suggested that knowledge also had as its objects the sorts of understandings of food that Jamie Oliver is famous for. Food, understood in these ways, is something to get passionate about. It can excite the passions. It can be produced, prepared, presented and consumed with passion. Because food is understood in these ways the work that goes on in a restaurant kitchen is also something to be passionate about. However, much of the manufactured drama of these series – which tended to focus on the apparent (self-evident?) deficits of some of the young trainees (a lack of commitment, of a work ethic, of passion) – suggested that not all the training and regimentation, the rule learning and obeying, and the skill development that is a necessary precursor, and developmental stage, to becoming a cook or a chef is all that passion provoking. Indeed, the menial and mundane nature of many of these practices of the self can dampen passion, can make you bored. Michael Pizzey, a trainee from the original series, illustrated all too well the often ephemeral nature of passion in a work and training context.

Michael Pizzey: *I love every second of it. Do it again and again and again. Brilliant. The way you have to make everything perfect and on time. It is undescribable how I feel. I am so chuffed with myself*

Jamie's Kitchen, Episode One, Broadcast in Australia on Channel 10, 21 July 2003

The following scene from a later episode featured an exchange between Michael Pizzey and Jamie Oliver in the living room of Michael Pizzey's house. There appeared, at this time, to be some shift in Michael's earlier excitement, passion.

Jamie Oliver: *So what's going on then?*

Michael Pizzey: *I'm just totally … I'm just bored at the moment.*

Jamie Oliver: *Bored?*

Michael Pizzey: *Yeah, because nothing really exciting is happening.*

Jamie Oliver: *Right, what do you mean by that?*

Michael Pizzey: *Well, my colleagues were cooking and enjoying it, and some of the staff (inaudible) doing it all over again, but when it comes to Mondays and all we do is parcel these boxes upstairs … It's just not really exciting me much.*

Jamie Oliver: *Unfortunately, the start is always the most boring.*

Jamie's Kitchen, Episode Three, Broadcast in Australia on Channel 10, 5 August 2003

We also argued that passion is produced, regulated and managed within relations of power that emerge from and give structure/shape to particular fields of possibilities. It was in this context that we returned to Foucault's discussions of sovereignty, discipline and government. In this training programme – undertaken in various spaces including training colleges and restaurant kitchens – sovereignty represents the relationship of power which locates authority in the hierarchy of chefs, cooks and assistants that characterise the restaurant kitchen. In these spaces military metaphors are often used to identify command and control structures that are understood as being vital to the task of preparing and presenting substantial amounts of food to order, and on time. Sovereignty resides in the capacity to order someone to do something – *Now! Yes, Chef!* – and to the required consistency and quality. Throughout both series, in kitchens and in off-the-job training spaces, we saw the exercise of sovereignty by Head Chefs, trainers and teachers, at the same time as we witnessed trainees resisting, or choosing to conform, to these demands. From this perspective we argued that the aim of the exercise of sovereignty was to establish the field, and its limits, in which appropriate forms of passion might

emerge. Sovereign power can't *will* passion into existence, but it might establish the conditions in which it emerges or is uncovered.

In this training and work environment disciplinary power takes a form that requires trainees to submit to the often menial, mundane tasks of cleaning, of maintaining a workplace/space and utensils such as pots, pans, knives. It also involves learning, repeating, mastering the mechanics of food preparation. At one level this cleaning, sweeping, tidying, dicing, slicing treadmill seeks to develop essential skills. At another it also promises to develop new forms of self-awareness and self-knowledge: as someone who can discipline themselves; who can conform to the demands of rationalised clock time, workplace practices and behaviours; who can situate and understand their membership of a crew or team which is more than the sum of its individual parts; who can become passionate about doing these things well through a sense that they have a purpose, and that this purpose contributes to a larger project which can deliver feelings and understandings of self-worth, competence, ability. Again, discipline cannot *will* passion into existence, but these forms and relations of power promise to produce a skill, knowledge and attitude base from which passion might be uncovered or emerge.

We identified the ways in which the exercise of sovereignty and discipline were intimately connected to governmental, pastoral forms of power that aimed to develop a form of well regulated autonomy, a capacity for passionate self-regulation, via an encouragement to develop new forms of self-knowledge and self-awareness. These new ways of knowing the self – as passionate, as skilled, as capable, as self-governing – would, so the programmes promised, emerge as a consequence of developing skills, capacities, behaviours and dispositions in fields in which the self has submitted to the demands and discipline of others such as Jamie Oliver, trainers and/or work-placement chefs.

A final point to make at this stage is that the central place given to passion in these training and work environments promised to energise the development and performance of an entrepreneurial, passionate self. In our analysis we suggested that in *Jamie's Kitchen* and in the Fifteen programme these practices of the self included the following things: attendance requirements at both college and in work placements; the mundane, menial tasks of cleaning work benches, ovens, grills and hotplates, floors and utensils; learning how to correctly dice, slice and generally prepare and present ingredients so that dishes can be cooked, assembled and presented for consumption – the seemingly endless practice of diverse skills and techniques that are vital to food preparation in the hectic, frenzied, chaotic context of commercial kitchens; tasting and testing of foods in ways that develop new vocabularies, understandings and orientations to food and its possibilities; shopping and sourcing expeditions to develop and practice skills necessary to knowing food as having different origins, different qualities, different possibilities in terms of preparation and as ingredients for particular dishes; team building

excursions to test the limits of the self, to locate the self in different fields where different understandings of the self, and of others, and of a team might be encouraged to form and emerge.

We suggested that these types of social enterprise based transitional labour market programmes provided some young people with the promise of an always precarious form of salvation in the face of the material and social oblivion that faces those who can't find and keep employment in the *monstrous cosmos* of twenty-first century capitalism (Bauman 2005a, Beck, 1992, Weber 2002). This promise was largely dependent on an individual's capacities to transform themselves (under the tutelage, and with the support of the Fifteen Foundation) in ways that promised to position them as passionate and enterprising.[2]

THE MAKING OF THE CORPORATE ATHLETE

Contemporary concerns with the whole person – with the condition of their body, mind and soul, with their physical, emotional and mental health and well-being, with the influence of these on individual work performance, and, hence, organisational performance – make visible particular manifestations of both disciplinary forms of power, and of the government of the self. Manifestations that are grounded in certain assumptions about the need to train and coach the person for performance in ways that draw on the figure of the high performance athlete. In another context a colleague and I (Kelly and Hickey 2008) developed this argument in an analysis of what we called *The Struggle for the Body, Mind and Soul of AFL Footballers*. Our discussion there examined the competing demands and expectations associated with the professionalisation of player identities in the Australian Football League (AFL) as the game of Australian Rules football evolved into the dominant sports entertainment business in Australia. In this context, which is characterised by the intense scrutiny and surveillance of player behaviours on and off the field – by the media, the AFL Commission, Clubs, coaches, managers, fans and spectators – discipline is embodied in the ways in which players are highly coached, regimented, drilled and scrutinised. And, in the ways that their bodies, and their performance are rendered amenable to measurement, calculation and rationalisation. At the same time a variety of training and education and coaching practices aim to develop in players an orientation to the conduct of themselves as professionals, as elite athletes, as sports celebrities. In this sense we argued that the *Struggle for the Body, Mind and Soul of AFL Footballers* is situated in mundane, everyday, but nonetheless, very powerful processes of scrutiny, surveillance, discipline and (self) regulation and government. It is a struggle that tells elite athletes what to eat, and when. What to drink, and when. What not to drink (alcohol), and when (at 1.00am in a night club during the season). It is a

2 The discussion here is drawn from Kelly and Harrison (2009, 155–159).

struggle that focuses on the strength and conditioning and building and recovery of their bodies. It is a struggle that compels players to attend a series of sessions (skills, weights, aerobic, Pilates, ice baths) at a given time. To complete an array of tasks, drills and exercises. It is a struggle that aims to educate and train them in the complexities and nuances of a team game plan, set plays and positioning in zones. On how to get to where the football is and what to do when they get there. On what to do when a teammate or opposition player has the ball. It is also a struggle that requires that they attend a variety of workshops, seminars and lectures – on such things as Gambling, Anti-doping Policy, Racial Vilification and Harassment, Sexual Harassment, AFL Players and the Law, Drink Driving, Speeding, Family Planning – so that they can identify, recognise and perform what is means *to be* professional in this sports entertainment environment. It is a struggle that aims to develop the discipline and the work ethic and the sense of self-sacrifice necessary to achieve high levels of performance in this team based sports environment (Kelly and Hickey 2008, 210).

Increasingly this sports environment is imagined as an industry. The training and development in preparation for participation at the elite level, and the playing of the game itself, are imagined as occurring in a workplace. A workplace that is characterised by particular work practices, labour processes and management/coaching techniques. But it is a most peculiar workplace. A rather strange environment in which performance is heavily scrutinised (*There is no place to hide on a sporting field, in front of thousands of spectators, before an audience of millions*), and the ingredients that make up performance are identified, taken apart (within increasingly scientised logics), and reconstituted in the quest for competitive advantage. However, in the hyper-competitive, globalised, flexible spaces of twenty-first century capitalism, the strangeness of this environment is becoming more familiar as the relationships between body, mind and soul and performance are translated into other work environments where logics of performance, and the quest for competitive advantage, are dominant.

Jim Loehr and Tony Schwartz's (2001) 'The Making of a Corporate Athlete' charts much of what interests me in this discussion. They provide a compelling, clear and technical framing of the ways in which we should imagine the person if we want to promote, even extract, sustained high levels of individual performance in workplaces at the start of the twenty-first century: 'If there is one quality that executives seek for themselves and their employees, it is sustained high performance in the face of ever-increasing pressure and rapid change'. This holy grail, they claim, is 'as elusive as the fountain of youth'(Loehr and Schwartz 2001, 120). The figure that they draw on to support the observations and claims that they make is that of the 'world-class athlete'. In their consultancy and coaching work with both athletes and executives (with their company LGE Performance Systems) they claim to have come to the realisation that 'in effect … these executives are "corporate athletes"'. This realisation suggested that if corporate athletes 'were

to perform at high levels over the long haul' then they 'would have to train in the same systematic, multilevel way that world-class athletes do' (Loehr and Schwartz 2001, 122).

From their perspective many of the numerous approaches to driving and managing performance by management theorists and consultants are limited because they 'deal with people only from the neck up, connecting high performance primarily with cognitive capacity'. In making this claim they acknowledge a growing interest in the ways in which such things as emotional intelligence and the spiritual dimensions of persons might also be imagined as impacting on performance. Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 120) suggest that in this framing of the person and performance almost 'no one has paid any attention to the role played by physical capacities'. It is via this claim that they introduce their idea of a hierarchical *performance pyramid*: 'A successful approach to sustained high performance … must pull together all of these elements and consider the person as a whole'. What they call their 'integrated theory of performance management addresses the body, the emotions, the mind, and the spirit'.

This performance pyramid has four levels and Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 123) suggest that what they identify as the Ideal Performance State (IPS) – a state of 'peak performance under pressure' – is realised 'when all levels are working together'. The base of the pyramid, the foundation of sustained high performance, is identified as *Physical Capacity*. This physical dimension provides the basis for building 'endurance and promotes mental and emotional recovery'. The next level is *Emotional Capacity*. At this level reside the factors, processes and states that shape the 'internal climate' that drives the IPS. Above *Emotional Capacity* comes *Mental Capacity* which enables the would-be corporate athlete to focus 'physical and emotional energy on the task at hand'. At the top of the performance pyramid sits *Spiritual Capacity*: that dimension of the person which 'provides a powerful source of motivation, determination, and endurance'.

A key issue for Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 123) is that these capacities need to be understood, developed and worked on in order for the person to arrive at and work in the IPS. The person who wants to imagine themselves as a corporate athlete must be introduced to and coached in a variety of *rituals* in order to develop those habits, behaviours and dispositions that would make them this type of person. These rituals – such as periods of vigourous exercise that promise to produce 'a sense of emotional well-being, clearing the way for peak mental performance' – link the levels of the performance pyramid, and are the tools and techniques and forms of knowledge that are the *making of the corporate athlete*.

This *making* is analysable in ways that draw of Foucault's work on *technologies of the self*. Foucault (2000c, 87–88) argued that in identifying and examining the forms that the self, that self-knowledge, and the interdictions, incitements and

encouragements to know the self in certain ways, have taken at different times then: 'neither a recourse to an original experience nor the study of the philosophical theories of the soul, the passions, or the body' could be the principal interest. Instead his interest was in *technologies of the self*: those 'procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of mastery or self knowledge'. For Foucault the self has no original or ultimate essence, but takes a number of forms that emerge in particular ways, in particular contexts, in relation to particular purposes. An analysis of these forms, practices and technologies of the self could be guided by questions such as the following: 'What should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the self?' How might 'one "govern oneself" by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?' (see also Kelly and Harrison 2009, 154–155).

For Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 123–124) the key insight that frames their focus on the ways in which individuals can train the self to achieve an IPS is the need to oscillate between periods of stressful performance and recovery. And to develop various practices that will enable this oscillation to occur. The issue is not so much that individuals' lives 'are increasingly stressful as they are so relentlessly linear'. Many of the individuals that they work with/train 'push themselves too hard mentally and emotionally and too little physically. Both forms of linearity undermine performance'. They recall the example of Rudy Borneo, who they identify as the Vice Chairman of Macy's West, to illustrate the importance of a firm foundation on which to build Physical Capacity, and to enhance the IPS. They claim that when they met Borneo he was overweight and prone to 'erratic energy levels, wide mood swings and difficulty concentrating'. Borneo had poor eating habits, did not eat breakfast, ate too much junk food, too many sugary snacks, and too often ate a large, late evening meal: 'Digesting that much food disturbed Borneo's sleep and left him feeling sluggish and out of sorts in the morning. Sound familiar?' Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 123–124) outline a set of rituals/habits that promise to break such habits and establish a *firm foundation* on which to build Physical Capacity.

1. **Actually do all those healthy things you know you ought to do**
   Included here is a list of seemingly banal activities, that are, at the same time precise and explicit about their impact on the body: eat five or six small meals a day; always eat breakfast; eat a balanced diet (50 to 60 per cent complex carbohydrates; 25 to 35 per cent protein; 20 to 25 per cent fat; reduce or eliminate simple sugars); drink four or five 12 (US) ounce glasses of water each day; get physically active (at least four 30 minute cardio sessions per week).
2. **Go to bed early and wake up early**

3. **Maintain a consistent bedtime and wake-up time**
   These two points are closely related and linked to the key claim that Loehr and Schwartz make that recovery is the key to performance. For Loehr and Schwartz an individual can, with training, establish new sleep rituals: 'Biological clocks are not fixed in our genes.' In addition, establishing regular sleep cycles can 'help regulate your other biological clocks and increase the likelihood that the sleep you get will be deep and restful'.
4. **Seek recovery every 90 to 120 minutes**
   Loehr and Schwartz recruit the expertise of 'chronobiologists' to suggest that 'the body's hormone, glucose and blood pressure levels drop every 90 minutes or so'. If we ignore these bodily rhythms and cycles, and do not take the opportunity to build in recovery rituals, our 'overall capacity is compromised'. They suggest a number of rituals to aide recovery in these cycles: 'eat something, hydrate, move physically, change channels mentally, and change channels emotionally.'
5. **Do at last two weight-training workouts a week**
   The advice here is that weight training sessions are the form of exercise that is most effective in 'turning back the markers of age': 'it increases strength, retards osteoporosis, speeds up metabolism, enhances mobility, improves posture, and dramatically increases energy.'

Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 124) report that the impact on Borneo of imagining himself and the things he must do in terms of these rituals and habits was *dramatic*: 'I now exercise for my mind as much as for my body.' At the age of 59, he claims to 'have more energy than ever': 'I can sustain it for a longer period of time. For me the rituals are the holy grail. Using them to create balance has had an impact on every aspect of my life.'

For Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 124–125) Emotional Capacity is also something that can be worked on, can be strengthened through the application of appropriate thinking and effective rituals. They discuss emotions in a positive sense, using terms such as *calm*, *engaged*, *optimistic* and *confident* to indicate emotional states associated with peak performance (Unfortunately, for their claims here, they use the example of US sprinter Marion Jones and her reflections on her multiple gold medal winning performance at the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000: *I'm out there having a ball. This is not a stressful time in my life. This is a very happy time*. However, in 2007 Jones was stripped of her gold medals for using (ritually?) performance enhancing drugs. In 2008 she was jailed for six months for lying to federal agents and a grand jury about her involvement in what became known as the BALCO steroid ring). Loehr and Schwartz also discuss negative emotions – *frustration*, *anger*, *impatience*, *fear* – and the ways in which these can be, literally and figuratively, *toxic* for well-being and performance. Again, they provide an example drawn from their consultancy, and a series of techniques that promise to provide the means for corporate athlete's to work on their emotional capacities.

Alan is introduced as an investment company executive who had a reputation for being a *perfectionist* and an *overly critical* boss prone to *angry tirades*. In coaching Alan, Loehr and Schwartz introduced him to the benefits of a regular exercise programme, and what they call a 'precise five-step ritual to contain his negative emotions whenever they threatened to erupt'. These five steps, to be followed when Alan recognised 'signals from his body that he was on edge – physical tension, a racing heart, tightness in his chest' – include, in order: closing his eyes and breathing deeply; consciously relaxing his facial muscles; making an effort to soften his voice and speak slowly; trying to imagine the situation from the point of view of the other person; and using positive language to structure his interactions with those he manages and supervises. They discuss a number of other rituals that might be used to work on the emotional self, but claim, for Alan, that an initial awkwardness he experienced in trying to use these tools was soon replaced by them becoming 'automatic – a highly reliable way to short circuit his reactivity'. They argue that the outcome for Alan was that he became a 'far more effective manager'.

In turning to Mental Capacity Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 126–127) shift their attention to those things that they claim can 'enhance our client's cognitive capacities'. They acknowledge that these sorts of attributes of the person are most often targeted in 'traditional performance-enhancement training'. In their approach to training would-be corporate athletes they target a person's *focus*, and *time-management* and *thinking* (positive and/or critical) skills. They, again, provide examples to illustrate the individual traits that are of interest here, and the sorts of techniques that might be introduced to and used by the person to enhance these capacities. Included here are things such as building periods of recovery (time out) into a working day; quarantining periods of the day (evenings after 8.00pm) and the week (the weekends) as being free from doing, thinking and talking about work; and visualisation exercises that focus on positive aspirations and outcomes. In their discussion of these capacities and rituals they praise the virtues of meditation as a technique, as a 'highly practical means of training attention and promoting recovery'. The *art* of mediation, as they imagine it, requires no 'guidance from a guru'. For the busy executive seeking to enhance focus and positive thinking mediation can simply involve 'sitting quietly and breathing deeply. Counting each exhalation and starting over when you reach ten'.

The idea of Spiritual Capacity is, according to Loehr and Schwartz (2001), often troubling to many of the individuals and organisations that they work with because of the sense that it says something about religious beliefs. However, for Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 127–128) the spiritual is something akin to the 'energy that is unleashed by tapping into one's deepest values and defining a strong sense of purpose' This capacity 'serves as sustenance in the face of adversity and as a powerful source of motivation, focus, determination, and resilience'. The spiritual is also technical (in much the same way as Foucault identifies the soul within

disciplinary mechanisms), and this capacity can be worked on via rituals that 'give people the opportunity to pause and look inside'. Included here are techniques such as 'meditation, journal writing, prayer and service to others'. They tell the story of a New York stockbroker whom they identify as Richard who worked long hours in the city and had a long commute to and from the office. He left home in the morning before his children were awake and returned home usually after 7.30 in the evening. He saw little of his family and was usually tired and grumpy when he did see them. He was, seemingly, *trapped* in a cycle of travel, work, tiredness, despair and declining performance at work. As Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 128) tell this story Richard stumbled upon a ritual that was to break this cycle. It happened when he was commuting home one evening and 'found himself brooding about his life'. Lost in his thoughts he became overwhelmed by emotion and 'stopped his car at a park ten blocks from home to collect himself'. In that moment he 'began to weep. He felt consumed with grief about his life and filled with longing for his family'. And so began a pattern of cathartic behaviours that would, apparently, last for two years. On most days Richard would stop his car on the way home from work and allow his emotions to reduce him to tears before going home to embrace his family. Loehr and Schwartz suggest that Richard had 'stumbled into a ritual that allowed him both to disengage from work and to tap into a profound source of purpose and meaning – his family'. For Loehr and Schwartz the repetition of this ritual over an extended period, built as it was on a pattern of stress and recovery, and the need to connect to a deeper sense of purpose, enabled Richard to become 'more focused, positive and productive'.

So, when the self is an enterprise the self can take a number of forms, can be imagined in particular ways in particular contexts, can be imagined as a corporate athlete. The metaphor of the corporate athlete enables those who trade in the self as a commodity, who provide the expertise, the techniques and the rituals that promise to facilitate the ongoing development and success of the self as enterprise to make connections to the highly visible, often admired figure of the elite athlete. The *world class athlete* provides an example of both a successful enterprise, and of the sorts of work, forms of knowledge and types of practice that are necessary for the development and enhancement and sustaining of performance. At a fundamental level concerns with the body, mind and soul of the corporate athlete are about individual and organisational performance. Care of the self requires certain persons in particular contexts to know that the self as enterprise has a body, a mind, a soul. In these contexts you need to imagine that your employer/organisation and their interest in performance and productivity matches your own concerns for the health and well-being of your body, mind and soul. But what might be some of the costs that accompany this sort of alignment, or the work that needs to be done on the self to realise the promise of such an alignment?

SELLING YOUR BODY, MIND AND SOUL: A FAUSTIAN PACT?

The figure of what Arlie Hochschild calls the *zero-drag employee* allows me to begin to map the tensions, the costs, as well as the benefits, of what might be called the Faustian pact in which we, as persons who want to work in twenty-first century organisations, willingly sell our body, mind and soul. Hochschild (2001, xix) begins her introduction to *The Time Bind* with a brief discussion of this figure. The figure of the *zero drag employee* – regardless of whether it exists at all, or describes anyone in *reality* – gestures towards the ways in which all dimensions of the self are increasingly incorporated into the many ways of imagining the forces that shape individual and organisational performance. Hochschild suggests that in the relatively short period between the first publication of her book (1997) and the writing of a new introduction (2000) a new term had begun circulating in the local/global economy of Silicon Valley, California. This term – *zero drag* – had morphed through a number of phases from a term that originally described the 'frictionless movement of a physical object like a skate or a bicycle'; through a usage that tried to identify workers who, 'regardless of financial incentives, easily gave up one job for another'; to arrive at the point where it signified an employee who is 'unattached' or 'unobligated': 'A dot.com employer might comment approvingly of an employee, "He's zero drag", meaning that he's available to take on extra assignments, respond to emergency calls, or relocate any time'. In the physical and virtual workspaces energised by Silicon Valley (as a place, as a metaphor for the *new* economy) *zero drag* was an ideal. As with all ideals not many measured up. So it became, according to the research that Hochschild cites, a practice to think of employees, and potential employees, in terms of their *drag coefficients*: 'Since the job is a full hour's commute from San Francisco, an apartment in the city was a full unit of drag. A spouse? Drag coefficient of one. Kids? A half point per'.

The issues that interest Hochschild in her discussion of *zero drag* – and they are mine at this point also – are the assumptions that frame the very idea of a zero drag *ideal*, and which also frame the calculations that attach certain values to particular impediments to the attainment of this ideal (spouse, children, connections, roots). As Hochschild (2001, xix) suggests:

> Imagining the perfect, zero-drag worker, we might envision a young, single, childless male wanting to make good in a first or second job. Maybe his sister takes his mother to the doctor, and his mother, when she's well, looks after his grandparents. Or perhaps the term calls to mind a forty-year-old man married to a homemaker who assumes full responsibility for their young children and elderly parents.

These framing assumptions and calculations do, indeed, say much about the claims that many organisations seem to think that they have over the time, energies, commitments and performance of their employees in twenty-first century flexible capitalism: claims that appear to suggest that in order to secure a position in the increasingly globalised labour markets of the twenty-first century, individuals need to be prepared to sell not only their body and mind to potential employees, but also their soul. For many individuals this pact generates some form of future accounting that is often more than what was first bargained for. In Madeleine Bunting's (2004) discussion of 'Missionary Management' in *Willing Slaves* she details research and conversations she had with employees and various managers at Microsoft's (UK) Reading headquarters, at the Wal-Mart owned Asda supermarket chain's York store, and in the North Tyneside call centres of telecommunications company Orange.

In her account of the research she undertook at Microsoft Bunting (2004, 94) describes the physical space at the Reading headquarters as exemplifying a work utopia often imagined by management commentators, consultants and academics. She describes an environment at Reading in which executives, managers and employees (subsequently identified as a select company of *change agents*) have access to a range of benefits, practices and facilities that enabled Microsoft to win the *Sunday Times* 'Best Company to Work For' award in 2003. Summer brings company provided ice-creams and picnic rugs to enjoy in the landscaped gardens; year round there is access to four cafes in the complex in which to do work and hold meetings; the company provides a dry cleaning service, a grocery delivery service, child minding facilities, financial advisors, and a health and well-being centre that is staffed by qualified nurses. Apparently, 'the canteen offers such good breakfasts that employees plan their team meetings at 8.30am to take place there'. And these facilities, services and benefits (which Microsoft UK is not alone in providing to its core workforce) have a pretty clear purpose: 'Microsoft UK is proud of having put a great deal of effort into providing exactly the right conditions in which to cultivate the most commitment'. What Microsoft is after, in providing these facilities to its core workforce of *change agents*, is an alignment between the organisation and individuals in terms of the values, beliefs, dispositions and behaviours that will deliver performance, productivity and profit in the globalised environment of flexible capitalism. Citing a 2002 paper titled 'Engage Employees and Boost Performance' by Helen Murlis and Peggy Schubert, of the management consultants the Hay Group, Bunting (2004, 110) identifies the extensive and powerful reach of these competitive and performance based rationalities as they drive the quest for employee commitment:

> Getting engaged performance is not just about investing financially in employees through pay and benefit increases. It is about striking a new contract in which the organisation invests emotionally in its workforce. In exchange, employees make a similar investment, pouring their 'discretionary effort' into their work and delivering superior performance. The new contract says, 'We'll make your job (and life) more meaningful. You give us your hearts and minds.'

Bunting's description of Microsoft (UK) reveals an organisation in which everything that can be outsourced has been; an organisation that, as a consequence of this outsourcing, employs a mere 1595 change agents – 55 per cent of whom are aged under 35, only 1 per cent are over 55; an organisation in which only one quarter of change agents are female; an organisation in which senior level employees work for the company for an average of seven years, and junior level employees work for Microsoft for an average of three and a half years; and, interestingly, an organisation that has trouble finding the *right* people to employ:

> *'We've had 13,000 applications for jobs in the last nine months, and we hired fourteen. We're having to target individuals now – sniping to pick out the good ones. We look for change agents, the best and the brightest.'*
>
> Steve Harvey, Director of People and Culture, Microsoft UK, cited in Bunting (2004, 95)

It would appear that Microsoft has a problem recruiting and retaining people. Yet this may not be a problem at all – or it may be a problem if flexibility, innovation, performance and commitment are understood from within conceptual frameworks more suited to a less flexible capitalism. Microsoft is a work environment that is constantly being remade and reengineered; processes that appear as *natural* in frameworks that require constant cycles and processes of innovation. These cycles demand unending creative input from change agents who are prepared to exhibit levels of commitment to the organisation that supersede all other possible ties that might elevate an individual's *drag coefficient*.

Bunting quotes extensively from Steve Harvey to illustrate the ways in which this commitment, passion, flexibility and adaptability are developed, encouraged and supported through a variety of education and training programmes, cultural workshops, cultural change processes and practices such as mentoring programmes. Microsoft, like most other flexible organisations, does not assume that a preparedness to sell body, mind and soul is a natural attribute or characteristic of the person, but is rather something that must be encouraged, nurtured, demanded

and expected. The organisation's two day cultural alignment programme (*Personal Excellence Programme*) aims, in part, to develop an awareness of the choices and commitments that are expected of Microsoft's change agents:

> *'We try to teach choices and consequences – if you choose to have a family or play golf, you have to be honest about what kind of job you can do and what responsibilities you can manage. We're educating people to make these choices, and loads of jobs are very demanding and very challenging. Women look at how big these jobs are, and take a choice … We have very driven people who try to balance work-life over a life. They take the long-term picture. The difficulties come when try to balance work-life on a daily or weekly basis.'*
>
> Steve Harvey, Director of People and Culture, Microsoft UK, cited in Bunting (2004, 96)

Bunting (2004, 95–100) reports on interviews and other data (including company documents and policies) from her research time at Microsoft that supports a sense that many *change agents* are, indeed, willing participants in this workplace environment and the practices and processes that seek to generate performance, commitment and passion. This data includes: average annual salaries of 65,000 UK pounds; generous and flexible pensions and stock options programmes; surveys that claim that 93 per cent of change agents are *proud* to work at Microsoft UK; enthusiastic accounts of the benefits of participation in highly structured mentoring programs that promise to find the mentees *soul work* – that work that will get, and keep you motivated and committed to the organisation:

> *'The reward is that we're making a positive difference to how people live their lives and do their work … We're helping people to do things better, faster and more efficiently – if we aren't, we might as well pack up and go home … If your work doesn't make you feel really good, why do it?'*
>
> Chris Bartlett, Business Productivity Advisor, Microsoft UK, cited in Bunting (2004, 99–100)

However, Bunting (2004, 100–101) also reports on interviews with other Microsoft change agents that highlight the Faustian elements of the pact that is seemingly so willingly entered into between these change agents and their employers. Katy Isherwood is identified as a 40-year-old manager of a customer technical support desk, and Bunting's description is of a dedicated, effective, enthusiastic and supportive manager who exhibits and professes significant attachment and loyalty

to the individuals who comprise her team, and to the organisation at large. But Isherwood's commitment, she claims, is not unbounded and her view of work is that it is 'part of my life, not the whole of my life'. This sense of balance (somewhat at odds with her Director of People and Culture) is something that is not always evident in her fellow change agents:

> *'There's a lot of people here who get into trouble. They are addicted to Microsoft. They're in denial, but they live, eat and breathe Microsoft. It's their world.'*
>
> Katy Isherwood, Customer Technical Support Manager, Microsoft UK, cited in Bunting (2004, 100)

In this context the ambiguous and ironic sentiments of Bunting's title (*Willing Slaves*) are made explicit. What exactly is willing? Do we always know the consequences of willingly making these pacts – not necessarily with the devil, but with organisations that are always ready to take what an employee is willing to offer?:

> *'There's no job for life, it's hard out there. You need to have the right skills, and people work very hard. We're a commodity, and they'll get everything out of you. If you offer Microsoft your soul and your life – and people here want to please, they need to feel valued, because Microsoft employs high achievers who want to be the top of the tree – they'll take everything that's offered. I've found people in the loo sobbing, exhausted and overstretched. People are frightened of getting a bad review. You're only as good as your last project. There's tremendous pressure to perform, but that's because of today's business environment, there's nothing Microsoft can do about that'*
>
> Katy Isherwood, Customer Technical Support Manager, Microsoft UK, cited in Bunting (2004, 101)

> *There is no job for life.*
>
> *If you offer Microsoft your soul and your life … they'll take everything that's offered.*
>
> *We try to teach choices and consequences – if you choose to have a family or play golf, you have to be honest about what kind of job you can do and what responsibilities you can manage.*

The self as enterprise is charged with the responsibility of making choices; of availing itself of the necessary information on which to make choices; of imagining the consequences – for the self, for relationships, for responsibilities and obligations, for performance – of making particular choices. It is in Bauman's (2008b) observations about the ambivalence that marks much of the human condition that we glimpse the burdens that the self as enterprise is expected to carry, as well as the benefits that might accompany such burdens. In *The Art of Life* he cites Niels Åkerstrøm's claim that life at work resembles, ever-more closely, life in modern marriages, or life in a *liquid relationship*. In this equivalence we see that a person '"is always in doubt about how much he is loved or not"'. As a consequence we witness a state of near constant emergency: a 'state calling for the mobilization of all resources, rational and emotional alike' (Bauman 2008b, 129). In this sort of relationship:

> there is no written contract of employment (just as there is no verbal agreement of cohabitation between lovers) which is fixed forever, 'for better or worse' and 'till death do us part'. Partners are kept perpetually *in statu nascendi*, uncertain about the future, constantly in need of proving yet more convincingly that they 'have earned' and 'deserve' the boss's or the partner's sympathy or loyalty. 'Being loved' is never 'sufficiently' earned and confirmed, it remains forever conditional – the condition being a constant supply of ever new evidence of one's ability to perform, to succeed, to be again and again 'one up' on current or potential competitors. The job is never finished, just as the stipulations of love and recognition are never met completely and unconditionally. There is no time to rest on one's laurels: laurels are known to wilt and fade in no time, successes tend to be forgotten a moment after being scored, life in a company is an infinite succession of emergencies … This is an exciting and exhausting life: exciting for the adventurous, exhausting for the weak-hearted.
>
> Bauman (2008b, 130)

The sometimes bitter, even painful, irony here is that a certain self-awareness of what might be a Faustian pact, or even the cultivation of the capacities, the dispositions, the behaviours that enable choice making do not remove or lessen this ambivalence. Willingly agreeing that the state, the condition, the potentialities of one's body, mind and soul are of interest to those who employ and manage us – as they are to us – heighten the ambivalence and the uncertainty that the self as enterprise is expected to manage, to live with. Because in entering into these pacts we open all aspects of our lives to the logics of competition, advantage and performance, and to the scrutiny, surveillance and imperatives to know and govern ourselves in the terms of these logics. The things that are given, that must be taken for granted in these logics – that is, are beyond the choices to be imagined and managed by individuals – are that competition *is* intense, advantage *must be*

found, performance *is* demanded. All that is left is the endless work we must do on ourselves to promote our own resiliency in the midst of this *monstrous cosmos*:

> In a corporate environment that is changing at warp speed, performing consistently at high levels is more difficult and necessary than ever. Companies can't afford to address employees' cognitive capacities while ignoring their physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being. On the playing field or in the boardroom, high performance depends as much as on how people renew and recover energy as on how they expend it, on how they manage their lives as much as on how they manage their work. When people feel strong and resilient – physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually – they perform better, with more passion, for longer. They win, their families win, and the corporations that employ them win.
>
> Loehr and Schwartz (2001, 128)

CHAPTER 10

24/7 AND THE PROBLEM OF WORK–LIFE BALANCE

WHEN WORK BECOMES A HAVEN, WHAT DOES WORK–LIFE BALANCE MEAN?

A key theme in twenty-first century workplaces – and in commercial and policy discussions about the regulation and management of the complex and often competing logics and demands that shape activities and processes in these workplaces – is a struggle over time and space that is made known through the concept of *Work-Life Balance* (WLB). WLB involves a contest between competing interests and relationships: a contest that is governed by the mutability of time/space that is a fundamental characteristic of flexible capitalism. Twenty-first century capitalism has the capacity to flexibilise time and space, to time-shift, to transform industrial age notions of time and space (work time and work space), to enable particular groups of workers to work from home, to work on the move, to stay connected, to be on-line, to be available – 24/7. For many workers digital workspaces and work practices have unchained work from a particular time and place/space. Global computer networks, mobile/cell phone networks and data devices that have the capacity to access these networks, all facilitate and energise the transformation of our understandings of time and space as these shape our experience of working, and of not working. When does work end and life (away from work) begin? Does it make sense to even ask such a question in 24/7 flexible capitalism? Or should we ask other questions about time and space in contexts where we already fret about *managing time*, being *time poor*, sharing *quality time* (with a partner, a child, a dependent parent), *finding time*, *spending time* …?

The ambivalence and ambiguity that might attach to these questions, and any answers to them, is important in how I want to explore contemporary associations between time understood as 24/7 and the problem of WLB. This ambivalence is well illustrated, again, in Arlie Hochschild's (2001) influential and best selling *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work*. Against Christopher Lasch's suggestion that the domestic space (home) is a *haven in a heartless world* – a place and space that the male breadwinner might return to after a hard day at work and declare, 'Honey I'm home!' – Hochschild (2001, 44–45) tellingly recounts research interviews in which, as the subtitle of her book suggests,

work becomes home and home becomes work. In this way of both imagining, and juggling family and work life, the figure of a tired, harassed, often emotionally drained parent or partner escapes a domestic space of often 'unresolved quarrels and unwashed laundry for the reliable orderliness, harmony and managed cheer of work'. In this sort of scenario, some 'people find in work a respite from the emotional tangles at home. Others marry their work, investing it with an emotional significance reserved for family, while hesitating to trust loved ones at home'.

Linda Avery – described by Hochschild as a friendly 38-year-old mother of two who works as a shift supervisor at one of the Amerco plants Hochschild conducted research in – embodies many of the tensions, ambiguities, even contradictions that emerge in discussions about the colonisation of time/space by 24/7 flexible capitalism. Linda is in her second marriage. Her current husband works an opposite shift as a technician in the same factory as Linda. She has a 16-year-old daughter from her previous marriage and a 2-year-old from her current relationship:

> '*I walk in the door and the minute I turn the key in the lock my older daughter is there. Granted, she needs somebody to talk to about her day … The baby is still up … and that upsets me … My daughter comes right up to the door and complains about anything her stepfather said or did.*'
>
> Linda Avery, Shift Supervisor, cited in Hochschild (2001, 37)

The home shift, in this situation, is no haven. Indeed, Linda, like many others in her situation, finds a different set of relationships at work:

> '*I usually come to work early just to get away from the house. I get there at 2.30pm, and people are there waiting. We sit. We talk. We joke. I let them know what's going on, who has to be where, what changes I've made for the shift that day … There's laughing, fun, joking. My coworkers aren't putting me down for any reason.*'
>
> Linda Avery, Shift Supervisor, cited in (Hochschild 2001, 37–38)

At work reorganisations, re-engineering and downsizing produce the conditions of precariousness and uncertainty that can result in many of us *working scared*. In non-work relationships divorce, relationship break-ups, remarriage and step families, the rising incidence of single person households, or households comprising singles co-habiting, produce the conditions in which many of us might find in workspaces

a haven from the intensity of personal relations that have become less permanent, more fragile and, as a consequence, more demanding of relationship skills. Here precariousness and uncertainty in relationships means many of us *live*, if not *scared*, then at least *anxious*.

In thinking about these dilemmas I want to explore some questions about how time is understood, experienced and mobilised to regulate aspects of our lives when we talk of time in terms of 24/7. Some of these questions can be broached in a brief, introductory way via Hochschild's discussion of *quality time*.

Hochschild (2001) argues that Frederick Winslow Taylor stands as a metaphor for industrialised time: for time and motion that is governed by regularised, rationalised, calculated efficiencies that are directed and controlled by systems, processes, supervision and surveillance. The metaphor of *quality time* – which is emblematic of so much of what many of us think about in settings in which we consider that our lives are *time poor* – performs a similar function in trying to grasp some of the complexities of what can, in the context of this discussion, be termed post-industrial, post-family time.

Quality time, suggests Hochschild (2001, 50), represents the application of a low grade Taylorist view of time in the domestic realm; here the objects of Taylorist principles are children, partners/spouses, dependents, leisure activities – all of which are subjected to a view of productivity in relationships in which less can be more. In this view quality time 'holds out the hope that scheduling intense periods of togetherness can compensate for an overall loss of time in such a way that a relationship will suffer no loss of quality'. Hochschild has little doubt that a quest for, and investment in, quality time is just another 'way of transforming the cult of efficiency from office to home. Instead of nine hours a day with a child, we declare ourselves capable of getting the "same result" with one intensely focused total quality hour'. In these settings one characteristic of the self as enterprise might well be an often limited capacity to exercise some sovereignty over what I will, later, call different *packets of time/space*.

Hochschild (2001, 212) illustrates some of these tensions through the example of one of her participants – Denise Hampton – and the special work needed to be done in order to do *quality time* with her two young sons by reading *The Narnia Chronicles* as a bedtime story. This work meant that 'she made a special effort not to think about the e-mail piling up for her in cyberspace and the memos she might soon have to compose and e-mail back'. As Hochschild notes, this sort of quality time, attached as it is to ideas and ideals of parenting practice, and to the needs, desires and, possibly, to a sense of duty, of both child and parent, 'actually took special discipline, focus and energy, just like work'. So that even when Denise 'was at home, even when her mind was on domestic matters, she found herself approaching time in a quasi-industrial way'.

The management of *quality time* is a contested space shaped by the management of the self as enterprise. Oftentimes the management of time is, as Foucault would argue, a disciplinary practice. Other times the management of time indicates something about how the self as enterprise is able to marshal, manage and exercise some control over the array of spaces, activities, practices that give time its character. To make *quality time*, to bring it into being, to find space for it, to organise those who will participate in it, to manage its *durée*, requires a particular set of skills, capacities, behaviours and dispositions. The manufacturing of quality time is an ongoing project, and it requires those who are tasked with the responsibility for imagining, finding, making and managing it, to be entrepreneurial, to locate it within a larger enterprise in which the practices of the world of paid work benchmark how it should be done, when it should unfold, what it should achieve. As Hochschild (2001, 211–212) notes, 'these brief respites of "relaxed time" themselves can look more and more like little segments of job time, with parents punching in and out as if on a time clock.'

DISCIPLINE AND THE CONTEST OVER TIME

Industrialisation – the design, development and global spread of large scale factory/office/warehouse spaces and work processes that were shaped and regulated within and by these spaces – brought large numbers of workers out of their homes and into the regulated, public, spaces of rationalised capitalism. Industrial capitalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed, among other things, long run historical struggles between capital, workers and governments over the capacity to regulate and govern time and space, to fill time. Indeed, in Australia at various times of the year in the different states there is a public holiday (usually a Monday to give most workers a long weekend) that commemorates the struggle of trade unions and labour reformers around the Eight Hours Movement of the mid to late nineteenth century: a movement framed by the principle that a good life could be lived if it was based on *eight hours labour, eight hours rest and eight hours recreation*. In Anthony Giddens' (1990, 1991) multi-dimensional model of modernity processes of industrialisation are understood as leading to the transformation of nature, and the emergence of the 'created environment'. Further, these processes are understood in terms of their dynamism in that they result in the 'regularised social organisation of production' in order to co-ordinate (in countless permutations) human activity, machines, technologies and the inputs and outputs of materials, goods, services and creative efforts. Processes of industrialisation serve to constitute the realm of the social (the *public* and the *private)*, through the dynamic reorganisation of processes of production, transportation and communication and social life (Giddens 1990, 55–56).

The usefulness of Giddens' (1990, 3) account of modernity lies in the ways he constructs an understanding of the processes, or 'facilitating conditions', which

energise the emergence and development, on a global scale, of the 'organisational clusters' of modernity. Giddens, here, is not subscribing to, or constructing, a teleological view of inevitable historical progress from some originary set of processes. Rather, his aim is to identify the institutional dimensions to, and the facilitating conditions of, processes which mark off modernity, in certain radical ways, from the 'premodern' ordering of social life. He also argues that these processes have, during the last four decades, become *radicalised* and globalised.

Giddens' (1990, 16–17, original emphasis) strategy for understanding these transformations rests on identifying the 'dynamism of modernity' as being a consequence of the following: '*the separation of time and space*,' and their 'recombination' in various forms so as to 'permit the precise time-space "zoning" of social life'; the '*disembedding*' and '*reembedding*' of social systems and relations; and the '*reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations*' as a result of the ongoing activities, practices and outputs of various forms of expertise that take these social relations as their objects. A detailed discussion of the analytical and interpretive power of a number of these concepts is beyond what I want to discuss here. However, for Giddens (1990, 1991) the *emptying of time*, or the emergence of the idea of an *empty* dimension to time, precedes, and is a necessary precondition for, the *emptying of space*. The development of the mechanical clock and its spread throughout the population was crucial to the development of the notion of a uniform, empty dimension to time. This development enabled processes of standardisation and routinisation, across time and space, through the capacity to precisely *zone* time. Time as something to be filled, or utilised, or commodified became fundamental to the ordering processes of modernity.

For Giddens (1991, 17), the spread and utilisation of clock time 'facilitated, but also presumed, deeply structured changes in the tissue of everyday life'. Such changes could not only be local, they were also globalising. This capacity to precisely and, ultimately, universally zone time facilitated the separation of time from space, and the separation of space from place. What Giddens identifies as the processes of modernity are facilitated by both the separation of time and space, and their reintegration in various configurations. The emergence, even dominance, of relationships which do not rely on physical co-presence (for example, virtual work teams in globally integrated organisations); the regularised structuring of relations between *absent* others; the ordering of localised interactions through the institutional structuring of *empty* time-space zones (bringing teams together from places near and far) are all indicative of the ways in which the possibility of engineering numerous time-space configurations is implicated in the dynamism of modernity. As Giddens (1990, 20) argues these empty dimensions to time and space work to sever the intimate relationships between social activity and place (as a context of co-presence). In doing so, the capacity to endlessly reconfigure relations of time-space opens up the 'possibilities of change by breaking free from the restraints of local habits and practices'. This potential is expressed most

powerfully in the modes of rationalised organisation which structure contemporary organisations, and their capacity to plan, organise and co-ordinate (govern) aspects of the local and the global in a manner which 'routinely affects the lives of many millions of people'. What is meant by this separation of time and space is made starkly evident in the ways in which the digital spaces of the twenty-first century, and the flows of capital in these spaces, 24/7, are at once disconnected from place, but at the same time can profoundly (re)shape places such as villages and towns, factories and offices.

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1995), again, adds accounts of the *little practices* that provide the mechanisms that energise the processes identified by Giddens and others.[1] In a discussion of the ways in which discipline requires the minute control of activities to enable their productive, efficient conduct Foucault (1995, 150) examines a number of ways in which time enables discipline to function. Understood in particular ways time provides a mechanism by which bodies can be made productive, docile, with a certain degree of efficiency. Discipline requires, and makes possible, a rationalised control of time and of activity. For example, he references an early nineteenth century timetable that orders, quite precisely, the activities and practices laid down for the commencement of the day in the Écoles *mutuelles* (mutual improvement schools): *'8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 the monitor's summons, 8.56 entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the children go to their benches, 9.04 first slate, 9.08 end of dictation, 9.12 second slate, etc'*. Foucault (1995, 151) also charts the emergence of these rationalities and mechanisms in the *machinery of marching* that is identifiable in mid eighteenth century accounts for controlling the timing and the movements of the well drilled, marching soldier:

> The length of the short step will be a foot, that of the ordinary step, the double step and the marching step will be two feet … as for the duration, that of the small step and the ordinary step will last one second, during which two double steps would be performed; the duration of the marching step will be a little longer than one second.

In these articulations of bodies, actions, order and time Foucault (1995, 152–153) suggests that a sort of 'anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined'. In these precise plans an 'act is broken down into its elements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed'. In these ways, in the relations between particular understandings of bodies, of ends/purposes, of the

1 See Tucker (1998) for a discussion of the connections, and differences, between the work of Giddens and Foucault.

techniques available, or which might be invented, for achieving these outcomes, then time 'penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power'. In identifying, formulating and putting into play these little practices, the proper use of the body – 'which makes possible a correct use of time' – means that 'nothing must remain idle or useless … A well-disciplined body forms the operational context of the slightest gesture'. Utility and efficiency call forth new articulations between bodies and objects (weapons, machinery, tools, pencil, slates): 'Over the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex.'

Foucault (1995, 153–154) argues that discipline produces the possibility of, even requires for its efficient function, 'a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than uses; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces'. This ordering, rationalisation and emptying of time 'means that one must seek to intensify the use of the slightest moment, as if time, in its very fragmentation, were exhaustible'. In this sense discipline arranges a 'positive economy of time'. The 'more time is broken down, the more its subdivisions multiply, the better one disarticulates it by deploying its internal elements under a gaze that supervises them, the more one can accelerate an operation, or at least regulate it according to an optimum speed'. What we witness in these developments is the 'regulation of the time of an action that was so important in the army and which was to be so throughout the entire technology of human activity'.

The work that Foucault does here provides a means to think about the character of the struggles over the ordering, emptying and filling of time, and the relationships of always unruly, but ideally docile, bodies to processes of production that are rendered knowable in ways that privilege concerns with productivity and efficiency, with *time and motion*. In the first part of the twentieth century these disciplinary mechanisms would find an elaborate and widespread articulation in F W Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management. In his chapter on 'Organizations as Machines' Gareth Morgan (1997) reviews the influence of Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management on the ways in which labour processes and management practices were conceived and put into action in twentieth century work organisations – from manufacturing to retail and service and into office work. Again, a broad discussion and critique of Taylorism is beyond what I want to do here (see Braverman 1974). What is of interest, though, is the way in which Morgan (and others) make clear that these principles (and their intimate relation to the rationalities that Foucault identifies in his discussions of discipline, and the mechanisms that enable discipline to function) continue to give shape to the ways in which work is imagined, structured and managed in many work organisations in twenty-first century capitalism. For Morgan (1997, 24) the continuing influence of Taylorism is substantial and is reflected in what has been called the

McDonaldization of work and the spread of *McJobs*. These ideas try to 'capture how the organisational principles underlying the design of the McDonald's chain of fast food restaurants, with its emphasis on ruthless efficiency, quantification, predictability, control, and de-skilled jobs' still provides a template for imagining and managing work organisations. Morgan (1997, 13–14) reproduces (as Exhibit 2.1) a 'management observation checklist used by a famous fast food restaurant' to illustrate the ways in which such tools enable management to breakdown, itemise, de-skill, and evaluate something as simple, *seemingly*, as serving a customer. The checklist (with each item to be ticked Yes or No) identifies the many elements of the interaction between worker, customer, food production and service: elements that become visible if imagined in particular – scientific, efficient, productive – ways:

- Greeting the customer:
  1. There is a smile.
  2. It is a sincere greeting.
  3. There is eye contact.
- Taking the order:
  1. The counter person is thoroughly familiar with the menu ticket. (No hunting for items).
  2. The customer has to give the order only once.
  3. Small orders (four items or less) are memorized rather than written down.
  4. There is suggestive selling.
- Assembling the order:
  1. The order is assembled in the proper sequence.
  2. Grill slips are handed in first.
  3. Drinks are poured in the proper sequence.
  4. Proper amount of ice.
  5. Cups slanted and finger used to activate.
  6. Drinks are filled to the proper level.
  7. Drinks are capped.
  8. Clean cups.
  9. Holding times are observed on coffee.
  10. Cups are filled to the proper level on coffee.
- Presenting the order:
  1. It is properly packaged.
  2. The bag is double folded.
  3. Plastic trays are used if eating inside.
  4. Change is counted efficiently.
  5. Large bills are laid on the till until the change is given.
- Thanking customer and asking for repeat business:
  1. There is always a thank-you.
  2. The thank-you is sincere.

3. There is eye contact.
4. Return business was asked for.

Contests over time, over rationalisation, over the disciplining of bodies, minds and souls have taken various forms at various times in the wake of industrialisation. Hochschild (2001, 212–213), for example, makes reference to Charlie Chaplin's classic 1936 film *Modern Times* – a comic exploration of the often damaging absurdities that are imagined as flowing from the processes and mechanisms that industrial capitalism develops and deploys in its drive for efficiency and productivity. Her reference highlights the scene in which the inventors of the J. Willicomb Billows Feeding machine try to demonstrate the efficiencies that flow from a machine that 'automatically feeds your men at work'. The benefits of introducing such efficiencies are made apparent in the pitch the sales people make to management: 'Don't stop for lunch. Be ahead of your competition. The Billows Feeding machine will eliminate the lunch hour, increase your production, and decrease your overhead' (All those of us who have *willingly* given up our lunch hour to take lunch at our desks [eaten in less than half the time!] might wonder how it has come to this!). The comedy in *Modern Times* works in the way in which the machine malfunctions and creates havoc for the hapless, helpless Chaplin who must try to keep up with the speeded up force feeding. The rationalised, efficient, automated feeding is situated, also, alongside the efficiencies promised by the (speeded up) production/assembly line and its de-skilling of workers through the sorts of Principles that framed Taylor's view of work processes and the management of these.[2]

The challenges and struggles over what might be lost, as well as gained, over what might be the costs, as well as the benefits of the science (cult?) of efficiency and productivity in capitalist work organisations have also been taken up more recently by the likes of Richard Sennett; by Alain de Botton (2009) in *The Pleasures and Sorrows of Work*; by Matthew Crawford (2009) in *Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work*; and by Lars Svendsen (2008) in *Work* (as part of the *Art of Living* series which seeks to *open up philosophy's riches to a wider public*). While the approaches and contexts of many of these explorations are diverse there is a common thread at work that is well summed up by Crawford (2009, 4–5) who claims that his book 'is less concerned with economics than it is with the *experience* of making things and fixing things. I also want to consider what is at stake when such experiences recede from our common life. How does this affect the prospects for full human flourishing?'

What energises many of these discussions is the ongoing search for meaning and purpose, and for what it means to be human, in work. And the ways in which

2 Video sharing on YouTube makes this scene readily available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZlJ0vtUu4w&feature=related

much of what passes for work in industrial and flexible capitalism quite often fails to provide this meaning and purpose. Especially in terms of the ways in which concerns about time and motion, efficiency, productivity dominate how it is that labour (manual, intellectual, creative) might be managed.

WORK–LIFE BALANCE AND THE FLEXIBILISATION OF TIME

Early in *Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture is Ruling our Lives* Madeleine Bunting (2004, 5) makes reference to an email contribution from a technical consultant for a French multinational firm in the UK Midlands. She identifies this person as Pete – he was one of those contributors Bunting conducted a follow-up interview with after he emailed her through her *Guardian* column. Pete is described as earning £31,000 per annum for a *notional* 37.5 hours per week. I stress 'notional' here because Pete calculates that he regularly works another 12 hours of unpaid overtime per week – a situation that is for him a forced *choice* and not something that he *willingly* undertakes. On top of this he has an hour long commute to and from work each day, so that 'most of his conscious life is taken up by work – including the time that he spends thinking about work in early morning hours because he can't sleep'. He describes a workspace that has been downsized by a third, but which has increased performance/productivity demands and revenue targets: a space that is populated by mainly younger co-workers (he is 45) who apparently thrive in these conditions and work long hours with few relationship commitments outside of the workplace. In many respects his email and conversation with Bunting represent the personal side of work intensification and the struggle over time/space that is of interest here:

> *'Anyone who strives to meet the demands of work overload will take this stress home with them: poor sleep quality, an inability to engage in evening conversation, a "Fuck it" attitude to bills, shopping, housework, parent phoning, friend phoning, eating and sex. I rescue each of these when they reach crisis point and it usually coincides with when I'm least able to act.*'
>
> Pete, Technical Consultant, cited in Bunting (2004, 5)

For Bunting the point about Pete's story, and his feelings about, and orientation to work that appears to be consuming his waking and sleeping life, is that it is *unremarkable*. In the avalanche of electronic responses to her *Working Lives* column this sense of work having the ability to colonise time and space 24 hours a day, 7 days a week was widespread, profound, troubling and anxiety provoking for large numbers of the respondents to her column. In this situation the widespread

prevalence of unpaid overtime indicates that many organisations have been remarkably successful in devising practices and processes, and in developing values and beliefs, that result in individuals and teams of workers donating, free of charge, large amounts of time to the organisation. Even if you do get paid overtime then the expectations are, often, that you will be available when the organisation needs you. An organisation's need to be responsive – *Just In Time* – to the needs of customers and the demands of the supply chain, translates into a demand from more intense work performance from a smaller core workforce. Employees are expected to make themselves available – and to be flexible in terms of other demands from relationships and packets of time/space – to ensure the effectiveness and performance of the organisation. Here Bunting cites the example of Tony, a team leader in a car assembly plant (also in the UK Midlands) who often works 60-hour weeks (including paid overtime). His employment agreement allows for compulsory overtime up to 4.5 hours per day:

> '*In the past ten days I've done twenty-seven hours overtime, with weekend shifts every weekend. I had to sign the waiver on the* [European Union's] *Working Time Regulations. I had no choice – if I didn't they would have given me a rubbish job, one of those nobody wants, and I would still have had to do some overtime anyway. Two men did refuse to sign the waiver on the Working Time Regulations and they got moved. I want a better balance. I don't mind some overtime, but not as much as this. I don't want the money. I suppose I'm being bullied.*'
>
> Tony, Team Leader, cited in Bunting (2004, 8)

Mike Harris, the then CEO of internet bank and financial services provider Egg, details the consequences of initial success, and the need to maintain and grow from this successful launch, on his ability to manage packets of time/space. These demands emerge from the competitive processes and pressures of a digital, globalised, deregulated business environment that pays scant regard to the packets of time/space that human bodies inhabit (and the human relationships that emerge from and shape these packets):

> '*The pace of work is getting worse, there's no doubt about it. It's the rate of change in globalisation – you're subject to competition from people who are far bigger than you and who do things you've never thought of. Wherever you look you see the global competition, and you no longer have the forms of protection because of deregulation.*'
>
> Mike Harris, former Egg CEO, cited in Bunting (2004, 47)

In this environment the rationalities of efficiency, competitiveness, quality and return on shareholder's funds are significant and highly consequential drivers of organisational processes and practices that energise continual demands for improvement, for greater effort and outputs (more from less), for the intensification of work. Bunting (2004, 16) suggests that there is, increasingly, a *timelessness* that is characteristic of flexible, globalised labour markets. Participants and would-be participants in these markets are confronted with contexts and processes in which 'traditional patterns of working time' and of 'private lives' are transformed as a consequence of the *erasure* of the boundaries between them. Flexible, 24/7 capitalism demands responsiveness, connections, performance and activity to be *timeless*. Yet flesh and blood bodies inhabit packets of time/space in which human relationships – with children, parents, dependents, partners/spouses – demand and are structured by a *timeliness*. Here responsiveness, connection, performance and activity have different characteristics and different consequences. It is in these packets of time/space that the current struggles and debates over WLB emerge and get played out.

A substantial commercial, academic and policy interest in the idea of work–life balance has emerged in recent years (for example, DTI 2003, Well-Being-ESRC 2003, Future of Work-ESRC 2003, Warhurst et al. 2008). Much of this interest in WLB is set against the changed nature of work, and work management practices, under a regime of flexible capitalism. As I have indicated throughout the discussion to this point twenty-first century, 24/7, flexible capitalism creates new demands for those who work, and those who want to work, to imagine that their performance at work is determined by their health, fitness, relationships and work–life balance. Increasingly, all aspects of a worker's life have come to be seen as performance related, and consequently of interest to those that employ them, that manage them, that promote them, that fire them.

These changes in the world of work have provoked much debate about the connection between contemporary work practices and the health and well-being of those who work. Robert Taylor (2002, 7–8) points to some of the tensions produced by a focus on WLB in contemporary labour markets. On the one hand in policy and community discussions it is suggested that it is only via active participation – as 'worker citizens' – in paid labour market that men and women can find 'prosperity and personal salvation'. Baldry et al. (2007, 223) also argue that in recent UK government 'economic and social policy, we can discern the constituents of a new work ethic for our time'. This ethic is to be found in the widespread, often repeated, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit suggestion that active participation in society, 'full citizenship and personal fulfilment are only attainable through participation in paid work' (Baldry et al. 2007, 223). On the other hand the world of work is characterised by overwork, precarious participation in various labour markets and stress – so that overwork, in many industrialised nations, is 'seen as a primary cause of ill health, both physical and mental' (Taylor 2002, 7–8).

These changed work and organisational regimes, which are diverse in their outcomes, and which provide a range of benefits for some participants (individuals, organisations, regions, nation states), also have a range of potentially damaging consequences for many others. These negative consequences are at one level economic and material. However, they also impact at the level of relationships, health and well-being and identity. Bunting (2004, xxi–xxiii), for example, borrows from the environmental movement's concept of environment sustainability to highlight what she calls a crisis of human sustainability as a consequence of 'a scarcity of the conditions which nurture resilient, secure individuals, families, friendships and communities'. This is a crisis that is identifiable in increasing rates of stress, depression and mental illness, and a care crisis for children, partners and the elderly.

Warhurst et al. (2008), in an introductory chapter to a collection that presents a critical analysis of the debates about WLB, raise a number of concerns with the character and object of these debates. They suggest a number of conceptual and empirical problems that are fundamental to the territory that is charted in these discussions. Included here are concerns that workplace surveys in many of the OECD countries don't support a view that many workers (across a variety of occupations) are working longer hours. Indeed, they claim that the data appears to suggests a decline in working hours for the majority of workers (in an ILO report, however, Anne Spurgeon (2003) contests this sort of claim). Warhurst et al. indicate that work intensification (working harder, with fewer breaks and fewer resources) may be a larger concern for many employees. They are also wary of the ways in which, conceptually, *work* and *life* are presented as apparently clearly demarcated spheres of human action, when there is ample historical and contemporary research to suggest that the boundaries between work and non-work lives are not clear cut at all for many workers/occupations. They also want to trouble an often implicit assumption in WLB debates that the *work* part of this relationship is a bad space, and the *life* (usually domestic) part is seen as the good space. As I have suggested throughout this book the sorts of distinctions critiqued by Warhurst et al. often fail to account for the ambivalence that is so evident in the experience of *work* and *life* for so many (*when work becomes home* ...).

An initial interest in WLB emerged as a consequence of increasing numbers of women entering various labour markets on a permanent basis. Rosabeth Kanter of Harvard University is credited with being the first to bring WLB issues into focus in her 1977 book *Work and Family in the US* (Fletcher 2002, 7). Not only has the traditional *male model* of the ideal worker been transformed as a result of these developments, but the carer responsibilities of people have also tended to become less gender specific. Men, too, often seek WLB initiatives in their employment to accommodate their responsibilities as carers. However, the WLB agenda has extended beyond the provision of flexible arrangements for carer responsibilities outside the workplace. The issue of work related stress in

the context of competitive, performance related, organisational change has also energised a concern with WLB (Kelly and Colquhoun, 2003, 2005).

In the previous chapter I explored some of the ways in which high performance work systems/environments create demands for high performance persons (*corporate athletes*) who can recognise their responsibility to develop WLB so that their work organisation can perform better. In what follows I want to develop some of these ideas to suggest that contemporary workplace health and well-being discourses and programmes play a significant role in attempts to promote individual and organisational performance. These concerns with workplace health and well-being find a central place in concerns with WLB. The location of concerns with health and well-being in WLB programmes enables the translation, and incorporation (in a double sense) of non-work relationships, settings, behaviours and dispositions into management concerns with promoting and maintaining performance. Indeed, for many employees a distinction between work and non-work becomes intensely problematic – even redundant. Instead, the translation, and incorporation of concerns with health and well-being in WLB discourses enables organisations and management to claim that workers are responsible for managing themselves, their work performance, their bodies, their relationships in ways that dissolve distinctions between work/home/leisure. Performance at work is understood as being influenced by all aspects of a worker's life – and workers are required to think of themselves, and act on themselves, in these terms.

Drawing on research conducted in Labyrinth Corporation – the pseudonym of the organisation that I introduced in Chapter 9 – colleagues and I (Allender et al. 2006a, 2006b) discussed the ways in which concerns with performance, productivity, safety, health and well-being in twenty-first century workplaces are, in part, structured by a number of competing discourses. Workplace health programmes can have multiple aims and shifting understandings of the concept of workplace health and well-being. Employers might argue that their workplace health promotion programmes signal a genuine interest in the health of employees, and that their programmes have the potential to improve worker health, work motivation and job satisfaction. It is also claimed that these initiatives can improve productivity, product quality and shareholder value. Workplace health programmes assume a variety of forms subject to negotiation between a range of stakeholders – including occupational physicians, nurses, disability advisors, health and safety advisers, management, unions, insurers, industrial hygienists and employees. Each of these groups has particular interests in workplace health, and promotes certain forms of knowledge and understanding ahead of others. In this sense workplace health programmes might be considered as more than initiatives aimed at improving employee health and well-being, and recast as political programmes characterised by often competing strategies and relations of power.

In the case of Labyrinth we identified two distinct workplace health discourses: a safety discourse and a lifestyle discourse. Very briefly, we (Allender et al. 2006b, 82–85) suggested that a safety discourse of workplace health and well-being uses detailed checklists to identify health hazards in the interactions between employees and the work environment. In this discourse poor health states are seen as being determined by the physical workspace, and are related to things such as slips and trips, poor lighting, bad ergonomics and unsafe storage of materials. In this sense health is not a personal resource, but an outcome of the interaction between any employee and their workspace. The legislative support for this safety discourse provides a strong foothold in the varied programmes that address workplace health. At Labyrinth a key Occupational Health Officer described the influence of legislation on the company's approach to workplace health:

> '*The way I look at it, and I guess the way most health and safety professionals would look at it is that you have to determine what does the company legally have to do, what are our responsibilities? We do have very clear-cut responsibilities in law about a number of aspects of health …* '

We suggested that in contrast to the quite specific legislative focus of the safety discourse, the lifestyle discourse is often more diffuse, less focused. While the safety discourse is concerned with specific, discrete physical exposures to harmful agents within the workplace, the lifestyle discourse takes an interest in a wide array of aspects of the worker's life under the banner of workplace health. At Labyrinth, for example, the Healthy Lifestyles programme aimed to develop an awareness in individuals, and in organisational practices, that all elements of a person's life-*style* could be related to performance at work. A flavour of the extent of this interest comes from the Healthy Lifestyles programme booklet and the sorts of services, benefits and advice that are offered to employees to assist them in developing a lifestyle that might provide them with more balance in their lives, and contribute to the performance expectations of the organisation:

HEALTHY LIFESTYLES CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS:

Purchasing Service, Elder Care Information, Financial Planning, Families at Work Program, Home Loans, Car Loans, Savings and Credit Facilities, Health Plan Coverage. Discount Broking and Investment Services. Cinema Tickets, Tax and Legal Assistance Help Line, Travel Discount Program, Employee Assistance Program (EAP), Social Activities, Health Promotion Program.

THESE PROGRAMS WILL ENSURE THAT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY –

are given the opportunity to balance your work and personal life, have the ability to save time, are able to make dollar savings, are provided with information in managing your personal and financial affairs.

The lifestyle discourse of workplace health incorporates elements as diverse as purchasing services, elder care, home loans and health promotion. These elements muddy the work and non-work boundary by making more and more areas of the employee's life amenable to identification and calculation in order to see how these areas might shape health and well-being, and performance. The provision of services and advice on things such as savings and credit, home loans, purchasing services and travel discounts locate some of the determinants of workplace health in the employee's life outside work. At the same time, employees are encouraged to make more and more elements of their non-work lives available to the company's interest in the relation between workplace health and performance. As one employee noted: '*If you were going through a personal crisis they [work] will organise a counsellor, or a psychotherapist or even a psychiatrist or whatever you need.*' The lifestyle discourse establishes positive connections between the work you can do on yourself, the lifestyle you can fashion, and your performance at work. Imagining the self in these ways has positive outcomes for some at Labyrinth: '*Certainly being healthy physically makes it easier to be healthier mentally ... I spent two hours this morning sitting at a PC, at 5 o'clock in the morning and there's not many people who can do that two hours straight.*' Lifestyle discourse aims not just to improve employees' health, but also to produce more productive, effective workers. The Healthy Lifestyles administrator at Labyrinth identified a direct link between the Lifestyle Programme and the health of the company: '*I believe that's just really gonna make people fitter and more conscious of their health. Fitter workforce, better, fitter and healthier. Yeah, improvements for the company*' (Allender at al 2006b, 84–85).

Some of the literature on WLB also argues that family-friendly WLB programmes have to be actively sponsored by management (see, for example, Gonyea and

Googins 1996, Grandley 2001, Harker 1996, Raabe 1996, Reade 2002). Much of this discussion points to the ambiguous nature of choice in these programmes – although many employees would like to avail themselves of such policies and spend more time with their families, few are willing to use the policies and risk their careers. Hochschild (2001, 219–220), for example, argues that many employees at Amerco were in a particular dimension of what she calls the *time bind*. She quotes a middle manager, whom she identifies as Jimmy Wayland, who wanted to spend more time with his small son, more time away from the demands of work, less time thinking and dreaming about these demands/practices. However, Jimmy's 'idea of time', for a variety of reasons to do with the way he struggled to negotiate demands on his time (work and/or family related), 'lived-on but only in his head': '*I'm not putting time where my values are.*'

Work time and non-work time are increasingly brought together in the idea of time as 24/7 – a situation in which boundaries between work and non-work take on new characteristics, and work time colonises, more and more, non-work time (Hartley 2004, Scholarios and Marks 2004). In part the reshaping of these boundaries is due to the perceived need to sacrifice non-work commitments for career progression. Lewis (2003), for example, has shown that chartered accountants identify working long hours with positive professional identities. In this way interests outside work, such as family, are marginalised in the move towards being a high performance employee or professional. She also suggests that the ability to work around the clock means work has become the new leisure. Work, here, may even be *better than sex* (Trinca and Fox, 2004).

WORK–LIFE BALANCE AND AN ETHIC OF PERFORMANCE

At Labyrinth the inclusion of programme elements which care for the employee's extended family, such as elder care, carries an implicit reciprocal expectation for the employee. An employee's family situation and relationships become a central concern to the organisation under the banner of WLB. In this programme the organisation appears to signal its preparedness to provide assistance in responding to an employee's family commitments while placing an expectation on the employee to transfer this saved family time back to the company (Allender et al, 2006a, 2006b). WLB discourses are structured by, and promote, what I characterise as an ethic of performance. WLB discourses allow management practices to move concerns about employee health and performance outside the workplace. The forms of self-regulation and self-knowledge required for sustained, increasing levels of individual and corporate performance no longer stop at the end of some notional working day.

In a review of the research generated under the UK's ESRC Future of Work Programme Taylor (2002, 10–11) explores what he calls the 'realities of the

contemporary workplace'. This examination situates the rhetoric of WLB that structures various policy and commercial discussions in labour markets in which jobs 'in general are becoming more stressful and time-consuming and consequently less satisfying'. So, while Healthy Lifestyles can be read as an attempt by Labyrinth to improve the balance between its employees' working and private life, workplace health programmes such as Healthy Lifestyles do not exist in isolation from other organisational concerns with performance, productivity, competition, efficiency. Rather, these programmes represent a widespread organisational concern to develop an ethic of performance that is made known and understood through narratives of intense competition, and the imperatives of individual and organisational performance in a more flexible capitalism. Discourses of competition and performance drive and shape the reality of WLB programmes such as Healthy Lifestyles. Within this contested space a managerial concern with organisational and individual performance enables the physical and mental health states of workers, the determinants of these, workers' carer responsibilities, their relationships, indeed all aspects of their lives to be re-conceptualised and translated into areas of interest and concern to organisations and managers.

In the Healthy Lifestyles programme at Labyrinth, and elsewhere, we can identify a variety of injunctions or incitements or forms of encouragement to act in certain ways. That is, we can identify processes of normalisation and individualisation in WLB discourses which seek to develop in workers an ethic based in certain ideas of performance – and the behaviours, dispositions and forms of self-knowledge required to develop and maintain these levels of performance. Within these frameworks we are free to choose and to act, but to be employable or successful in the world of flexible capitalism we have to choose to act in certain ways – or suffer the consequences.

In highlighting the ambiguous character of much of this apparent willingness to embrace an ethic of performance I am concerned with examining the things that we need to know about ourselves – the particular forms of knowledge about our bodies, our health, our diet, our attitudes, our relationships – and the impact of these on our performance, and our sense of this performance. These technologies of the self suggest particular ways that we should imagine ourselves, and the work we should undertake on ourselves in order to be able to fashion a working self/life that meets these models of high performance. WLB discourses are based in, and produce, certain types of knowledge that promise to provoke forms of self-understanding capable of producing an ethic of performance. Foucault (2000b, 224) suggested that 'Max Weber posed the question: If one wants to behave rationally and regulate one's action according to true principles, what part of one's self should one renounce? What is the ascetic price of reason? To what kind of asceticism should one submit?' In framing this reading of Weber, and the relation his own work had to Weber's work, Foucault suggested that he had 'posed the opposite question: How have certain kinds of interdictions required the price of

certain kinds of knowledge about oneself? What must one know about one-self in order to be willing to renounce anything?'

My purpose in identifying an ethic of performance that is embedded in, and structures, WLB discourses is to explore the tensions that this quest for high performance produces, and the obligations and responsibilities that we carry in governing ourselves in these ways. Included here is a concern with examining the emergence of problems associated with workplace stress, health and well-being and WLB, and the ways in which these problems are framed by the issues of an individual's health and well-being, and their capacity to handle stress or the demands of performance. A science of performance produces the knowledge that promises to make these problems manageable. In the example of Healthy Lifestyles, and in Loehr and Schwartz's (2001) 'The Making of a Corporate Athlete', it is possible to identify a raft of measures, calculations, tests, diagnoses and programmes implicated in identifying and normalising a range of behaviours and dispositions that mark the working person as athletic or high performing – or not. Forms of knowledge about such seemingly mundane things as diet, sleep, exercise, fitness, excrement and/or zits. These and other tools aim to calculate, quantify, measure and provoke performance in quasi-scientific and objective ways.

A number of key ideas from Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* are useful in understanding the ways in which particular forms of scientific knowledge are powerful influences on the emergence of an ethic of enterprise and of performance: ethics that have as their ends enhanced performance, effectiveness and efficiency – of the individual and the organisation. A key element to Lyotard's (1984, 3–4) discussion is the claim that as 'societies enter the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age' then: 'Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in new production: in both cases the goal is exchange'. For Lyotard this admittedly partial hypothesis on the commodification of knowledge is situated in the technological and information revolutions facilitated by computerisation in the last half of the twentieth century. These revolutions have a profound impact on the nature of knowledge – its production, circulation, transmission, storage, reception, transformation, reproduction – and the forms of knowledge that are considered useful, productive, translatable, legitimate. In the language games which construct and legitimate knowledge in a globalised knowledge economy scientific knowledge assumes a privileged and dominant position. Lyotard argues that the principle of performativity is an inherent, internal form of legitimation within scientific discourses. That is, scientific knowledge is legitimated on the basis that it can enhance efficiency, effectiveness and performance because it is objective, quantifiable and translatable in terms of inputs and outputs. Lyotard's thesis – with its central concerns with the principle of performativity, the commodification of knowledge, the development of a computer facilitated globalised knowledge economy – has, as many writers have argued, been *stunningly accurate* in

describing and analysing the ways in which scientific knowledge has reshaped workplaces and workplace identities (Roberts, 1998. See also Kerfoot, 2002; Peters, M. 1999; Usher and Solomon, 1998).

Using Lyotard's concept of performativity to analyse changing understandings of the *professional* – with associated interests in various understandings of knowledge, expertise, authority, autonomy, and the management of these – Dent and Whitehead (2002, 8) suggest that, increasingly, for 'professional status to be legitimized' it must have some basis or validation in 'scientific knowledge'. That is, professionals (and the professions) are compelled, in postmodern language games, 'to be measured against so-called "objective" criteria in scientific mode'. In these settings the professional's 'account is no longer sufficient of itself and must be measured and inspected against external criteria or targets of performance, all of which purport to be "scientific" and thus accurate and dispassionate, not open to question or doubt as models of "truth"'. Dent and Whitehead (2002b, 8–9) argue that Lyotard's notion of performativity powerfully captures contemporary 'obsessions' with performance, effectiveness and efficiency, and 'the concern to "objectively" subject this efficiency to empiricist means and measures to test its worth'. They acknowledge that a concern with efficiency and the like is not novel – as any discussion of Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management would indicate. What is new are the ways in which non-scientific ways of framing understandings of what it means to be a professional are 'marginalised' and 'delegitimised' within the dominant 'scientific knowledge order' (see also Kerfoot, 2002).

From another perspective Jary (2002, 38–39) is centrally concerned with the ways in which an 'audit explosion' – itself a phenomenon by which performativity is expressed and enacted – can be understood both as a means of 'disciplining' professionals, but also of producing particular forms of professional personhood. Citing Michael Power's (1994, 1997) analysis of an audit society in which the techniques and mechanisms of audit represent the dominance of a 'distinct mentality of administrative control, a pervasive logic which has a life over and above specific practices' Jary (2002, 38–39) argues that processes of audit are not simply objective, 'benign' measures of character, or capacity or performance. Rather, the myriad ways in which working people are made subject to, monitored and surveyed in contemporary workplaces – for their own good and the good of the organisation – positively act on the person to produce new understandings of what it is to be a person who embodies, who embraces an ethic of enterprise, an ethic of performance (see also Parker, 2002).

At some level, in some circumstances, WLB discourses enable more and more aspects of workers' lives to be incorporated and translated into managerial concerns with individual and organisational performance. What we often witness in WLB programmes is an attempt to link the performance of organisations in an environment of flexible capitalism to the health, fitness and performance

capacities of individual employees. Concerns with an individual's capacity to meet the performance demands of intensified work regimes have seen managerial discourses shift focus to things that employees do in their lives away from work. Indeed, under these intensified work regimes the distinction between *at work* and *away from work* is increasingly difficult to maintain. This focus on performance, on performance identified and calculated in quasi-scientific ways, on an individual's capacities to perform, and to recover so as to perform again, creates new responsibilities and obligations for individuals to seek and develop balance in their lives. Thinking of WLB discourses in this manner enables a focus on the seemingly mundane and endless processes of identification and measurement which energise a calculus of performance; and to focus on the ways in which this calculus, under the banner of WLB, takes all aspects of the body, mind and soul of workers as its objects. A process of objectification that sets out to encourage workers to recognise themselves and act upon themselves, willingly, in ways prescribed by an ethic of performance.

A MATTER OF TIME …

Nikolas Rose (1999a, 31) argues that to govern is to 'cut experience in certain ways, to distribute attractions and repulsions, passions and fears across it, to bring new facets and forces, new intensities and relations into being'. To govern, therefore, is 'partly a matter of time'. Industrialisation and the rationalisation of clock time created a need for 'novel ways of cutting up time in order to govern productive subjects'. As these types of person we 'must learn to count our lives by hours, minutes, seconds, the time of work and the time of leisure, the week and the weekend, opening hours and closing time'. The 'bell, the timetable, the whistle at the end of the shift', all of these seek to discipline unruly bodies, to 'manage time externally'. Nigel Thrift (2005, 3–4) argues that capitalist firms 'may be able to mobilize power and enrol allies', may seek to manage and regulate, 'but they are as uncertain about the future as we all are because the future unfolds as a virtuality … not a known quantity, or at least a distinct possibility'. This virtuality does not mean that institutions, organisations and managers do not aim to *colonise the future* (Giddens 1990). The character of capitalist organisation is to a large extent shaped by the necessity to tame the wildness of these virtualities, to predict, to foresee, to plan, to create, as Thrift suggests, 'temporary actualisations out of new questions'.

Time is empty. In twenty-first century flexible capitalism time can be filled, used in a variety of ways. In these times the use of time says much about the practise of freedom by the self as enterprise. But this signals a different view of time, a different understanding of time to the rationalised, disciplined, efficient view of Taylorist time. Under these conditions we are compelled to be our own time and motion experts (in a Taylorist sense); or managers of time/space portfolios (in a

globalised, shareholder capitalism sense). These portfolios – comprising differing *packets* of time/space which are managed for us; in which we might be under more or less surveillance and discipline; in which we have more or less flexibility to manage ourselves, our relationships, our work, our leisure – become a measure, an indicator of our abilities to make and exercise choices in the 24/7 world of flexible capitalism. For example, it is only in a 24/7, always on, always connected, flexible environment – where sleep is the human equivalent of electrical appliances in stand-by mode – that we can be considered *time poor* or *time rich*. Indeed, the idea of *time sovereignty* (Bunting 2004) – which is suggestive of a certain capacity to exercise some control over packets of time/space – may be a better indicator of the degree to which individuals are able to flexibly manage and regulate significant relationships in their lives.

Imagining the self as enterprise creates a moral obligation to govern oneself, in spaces that have expanded to 24/7, in ways that make the most of time, to be able to exercise some sovereignty over different packets of time/space, in order for time to be useful, to be productive given the particular character of these episodes of time – *quality time*, *down time*, *recovery time*. So, in the more flexible spaces of twenty-first century capitalism in which the self ought imagine itself as an enterprise then the 'beeping wrist watch, the courses in time-management and the like inscribe the particular temporalities into the comportment of free citizens as a matter of their self-control' (Rose 1999a, 31). And also in such things as school days, after school activities, childcare and all those other activities and relations and processes that structure packets of time/space and which we have to continually account for in the conduct of our daily, weekly, monthly, yearly lives (as these are more aggregated packets of time/space).

Efficiency, speed, the freeing up of time, these are all ideas about time that are always relative. They exist in relation to, alongside, in competition with, or are left over from, other configurations of time/space, activity and practice. However, in the *monstrous cosmos* of twenty-first century flexible capitalism there is little chance of escape from the rationalisation, the compartmentalisation of time and its relation to these other dimensions of time: 'As time becomes something to "save" at home as much as or even more than at work, domestic life becomes quite literally a second shift.' In these circumstances a 'cult of efficiency, one centered on the workplace, is allowed to set up shop and make itself comfortable at home. Efficiency has become a means to an end – more home time – and a way of life, an end in itself' (Hochschild 2001, 212).

CONCLUSION
LE LAISSER-FAIRE, C'EST FINI[1]

As the following commentary from a variety of sources and perspectives indicates, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–09 has had a range of consequences – some of which, in some settings, may unfold for generations to come. The GFC will also likely to continue to confound those who try to make some sense of the causes, the consequences and the *character* of responsibility for these circumstances.

> When I flew to Dublin in early November, the Irish government was busy helping the Irish people come to terms with their loss. It had been two years since a handful of Irish politicians and bankers decided to guarantee all the debts of the country's biggest banks, but the people were only now getting their minds around what that meant for them. The numbers were breathtaking. A single bank, Anglo Irish, which, two years before, the Irish government had claimed was merely suffering from a 'liquidity problem,' faced losses of up to 34 billion euros … As the sum total of loans made by Anglo Irish, most of it to Irish property developers, was only 72 billion euros, the bank had lost nearly half of every dollar it invested.
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> Even in an era when capitalists went out of their way to destroy capitalism, the Irish bankers set some kind of record for destruction. Theo Phanos, a London hedge-fund manager with interests in Ireland, says that 'Anglo Irish was probably the world's worst bank. Even worse than the Icelandic banks.'
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> Ireland's financial disaster shared some things with Iceland's. It was created by the sort of men who ignore their wives' suggestions that maybe they should stop and ask for directions, for instance. But while Icelandic males used foreign money to conquer foreign places—trophy companies in Britain, chunks of Scandinavia—the Irish male used foreign money to conquer Ireland. Left alone in a dark room with a pile of money, the Irish decided what they really wanted to do with it was to buy Ireland. From one another. An Irish economist named Morgan Kelly, whose estimates of Irish bank losses have been the most prescient, made a back-of-the-envelope calculation that puts the losses of all Irish banks at roughly 106 billion euros … At the rate money currently flows into the Irish treasury, Irish bank losses alone would absorb every penny of Irish taxes for at least the next three years.

1 French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the consequences of the GFC (cited in Altman 2009, 2–14).

In recognition of the spectacular losses, the entire Irish economy has almost dutifully collapsed. When you fly into Dublin you are traveling, for the first time in 15 years, against the traffic. The Irish are once again leaving Ireland, along with hordes of migrant workers. In late 2006, the unemployment rate stood at a bit more than 4 percent; now it's 14 percent and climbing toward rates not experienced since the mid-1980s. Just a few years ago, Ireland was able to borrow money more cheaply than Germany; now, if it can borrow at all, it will be charged interest rates nearly 6 percent higher than Germany, another echo of a distant past. The Irish budget deficit—which three years ago was a surplus—is now 32 percent of its G.D.P., the highest by far in the history of the Eurozone. One credit-analysis firm has judged Ireland the third-most-likely country to default. Not quite as risky for the global investor as Venezuela, but riskier than Iraq. Distinctly Third World, in any case.

Michael Lewis (2011) '*When Irish Eyes Are Crying*'

Alexandra managed to get back to work in Paris only three months after being made redundant in 2009. Impressive considering that the unemployment rate was over 10% at the time, one of the highest in the last two decades. And even more impressive given that Alexandra is 58, only two years younger than the age at which most French women retire from working.

But Alexandra's 'exception française' may become the norm in the years ahead. The French government announced plans in 2009 to raise the minimum retirement age from 60 to 62 and the full pensionable age from 65 to 67. Despite widespread protests and strikes, which reflected public anxiety about the crisis more generally, the reforms were passed in November 2010. However, making people stay at work longer for a full state pension is only one part of the problem. The other is making sure they are able to keep working.

OECD analysis suggests that at the time of publication, unemployment had peaked in developed economies at 10%. But with the economic recovery still weak, private sector job creation remains feeble in most countries. And government spending cuts mean that the public sector cannot make up the gap because it is shedding jobs, too.

OECD (2011) *Boosting Jobs and Skills*

As we head into 2011, economies around the world are still emerging from the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. But, unlike then, this crisis was largely contained as a result of swift action by central banks, governments and parliaments.

These actions were extraordinary and have left challenges in their wake. The biggest of these challenges comes from a deterioration in public finances of unprecedented scale and geographical reach … At the end of 2010, government debt in the euro area is 18 percentage points above its 2007 levels according to the European Commission's autumn forecast data. In the US and Japan it has increased by more than 30 percentage points according to the OECD. There is little doubt that all countries among the advanced economies are now in urgent need of implementing a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy.

Fortunately, there is an increasingly large consensus to maintain government fiscal integrity by offering credible exit strategies and embracing profound financial sector reform. There is by now also an increasing understanding in many parts of the global economy that there is no time to lose in implementing consolidation and restoring sound public finances.

Those who argue against a determined move toward fiscal consolidation are, in my view, underestimating that under extraordinary economic circumstances, established empirical relationships may no longer function in the same way as before. Today we are navigating in largely uncharted territory.

Jean-Claude Trichet (2011) *The Fiscal Imperative*

The global economy is in the midst of a deep downturn, affecting the real and financial sectors, that is taking its toll both in advanced and in emerging and developing countries. All major advanced economies are in recession, while activity in emerging and developing economies is slowing abruptly.

There is a risk that the impact on LICs [Low Income Countries] could be more serious—26 countries appear particularly vulnerable to the unfolding crisis. These include countries heavily dependent on commodity exports, such as oil exporters, as well as fragile states with little room for maneuver. Baseline projections for 2009 foresee a total balance of payments shock of US$165 billion. They also suggest that LICs may need at least US$25 billion to offset the impact of the shock on their international reserves; given the heavy downside risks to the forecast, the needs could be much larger—approaching US$140 billion in a 'bad case' scenario.

IMF (2009) *The Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Low-Income Countries*

> On Wall Street, the Great Recession didn't last long. Having sustained losses of $42.6 billion in 2008, the securities industry generated $55 billion in profits in 2009, smashing the previous record, and it paid out $20.3 billion in bonuses. In the spring of 2010, the Wall Street gusher continued to spew money. Between January and March, Citigroup's investment banking division made more than $2.5 billion in profits. Goldman Sachs's traders enjoyed their best quarter ever, generating an astonishing $7.4 billion in net revenues.
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> Barely a year and a half after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Wall Street was once again doing well for itself – obscenely well, it seemed to many people. 'For most Americans, these huge bonuses are a bitter pill and hard to comprehend,' noted Thomas DiNapoli, the comptroller of New York State, whose office tracks Wall Street profits. 'Taxpayers bailed them out, and now they're back making money while many New York families are struggling to make ends meet.'
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> John Cassidy (2010) '*The Economy: Why They Failed*'

Robert Reich, former US Secretary of Labour during Bill Clinton's presidency (1993–1997), published *Supercapitalism* in the US in 2007 (2008 in the UK) before the GFC of 2008–09 rolled, tsunami like, through the globalised financial sector and into other sectors of the global economy with intimate, possibly little recognised, relationships to the worlds of derivatives, Collateralised Debt Obligations, Credit Default Swaps, billion dollar profits and multi-million dollar bonuses. Reich (2008, 4–5) argues that in the industrialised democracies, to varying degrees, the last few decades have been characterised by an ongoing struggle over regulation and the competing interests of *enterprise* – corporate and individual – and a *common good* defined and articulated in relation to shifting understandings of the roles that governments should play in regulating enterprise: 'capitalism has become responsive to what we want as individual purchasers of goods, but democracy has grown less responsive to what we want together as citizens.' This observation is at the heart of Reich's commentary, and is summed up in his book's subtitle: *The Battle for Democracy in an Age of Big Business*. For Reich (2008, 3–5) the key indicators of what he calls *supercapitalism* can be found in such things as surging share price indices (in '1975, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hovered close to 600 … By late 2006, it hit 12,000'); relatively low rates of inflation since the 1980s; longer average life spans for Americans that are accompanied by a surge in the variety of goods, services and choices available at prices that when adjusted have declined since the 1950s. For Reich, and for many others, these sorts of indicators, taken alongside the demise of state communism and the emergence of a more globalised capitalism are 'by almost anyone's definition', a 'triumph'.

Much of Reich's analysis sits comfortably alongside the work of someone like Richard Sennett. A key difference lies in Reich's tendency, as a person with

significant, high level policy experience and expertise, to frame a series of policy and political responses to the ills that he identifies and diagnoses. As political and policy responses there is probably much to argue with, especially as Reich frames these responses as consisting of an *inevitable* trade-off between the individualised interests of consumers and investors, and the collective interests of citizens who are deemed to be, all, equally aware of the environmental, social and economic costs associated with the myriad (unfathomable?) transactions that structure the complex social, economic and political processes of the globalised, industrialised democracies (see Reich 2008, 126–130). At the same time many might argue, in the aftermath of the GFC, that much of Reich's analysis and observations are out-of-date. In the midst of the unfolding consequences of the GFC many commentators suggested that the triumph of *Supercapitalism* may have been short lived, and, indeed, the American model of neo-liberal free market capitalism was thought to be, at the least, 'under a cloud' (Altman 2009, 2–14). Roger Altman, himself a former US Deputy Treasury Secretary in the first Clinton Administration, cites French President Nicolas Sarkozy saying '*Le laisser-faire, c'est fini*', and China's Vice Premier Wang Qishan observing that '*The teachers now have some problems*', as the consequences of the GFC became more apparent.

However, the news of this demise may have been, so to speak, premature. It can be argued that initial governmental responses to the GFC were marked by some convergence of thought, in spaces/gatherings such as the G8 and G20, around the need for national governments to provide stimulus spending and to guarantee or to invest directly in banking and financial institutions that were deemed to be *too big to fail*. However, in a number of spaces and ways this apparent consensus has proved to be less than robust. The emergence of the phenomenon of the Tea Party movement in the US is one significant illustration of the possibly temporary nature of the demise of neo-liberal mentalities of rule. The movement is an affiliation of a range of organisations and individuals that takes some overall coherence from documents such as the Mission Statement of the Tea Party Patriots (2011). The Patriots are an umbrella organisation for the movement, for the circulation of its ideas, and for the recruitment of members and signatories to an array of petitions. The Mission Statement outlines what the Patriots identify as its Core Values:

Fiscal Responsibility: Fiscal Responsibility by government honors and respects the freedom of the individual to spend the money that is the fruit of their own labor. A constitutionally limited government, designed to protect the blessings of liberty, must be fiscally responsible or it must subject its citizenry to high levels of taxation that unjustly restrict the liberty our Constitution was designed to protect. Such runaway deficit spending as we now see in Washington D.C. compels us to take action as the increasing national debt is a grave threat to our national sovereignty and the personal and economic liberty of future generations.

Constitutionally Limited Government: We, the members of The Tea Party Patriots, are inspired by our founding documents and regard the Constitution of the United States to be the supreme law of the land. We believe that it is possible to know the original intent of the government our founders set forth, and stand in support of that intent. Like the founders, we support states' rights for those powers not expressly stated in the Constitution. As the government is of the people, by the people and for the people, in all other matters we support the personal liberty of the individual, within the rule of law.

Free Markets: A free market is the economic consequence of personal liberty. The founders believed that personal and economic freedom were indivisible, as do we. Our current government's interference distorts the free market and inhibits the pursuit of individual and economic liberty. Therefore, we support a return to the free market principles on which this nation was founded and oppose government intervention into the operations of private business.

Any critique of this movement must be provisional at this time, and is largely beyond what I want to discuss here. But the Tea Party Patriots are explicit about the ways in which they imagine such things as enterprise, individual autonomy and responsibility, and the (limited) roles of the state in various spaces of activity. The success of Tea Party endorsed candidates and of the Republican Party in the 2010 US mid-term elections represents a significant and powerful attempt to reconfigure ideas about the role of the State, market mechanisms, individual self-interest and an ethic of enterprise. Some analysts of the phenomenon highlight the complex relation between these ideas: the interests of capital; the influence of a revolutionary mythology that celebrates a narrative of the founding *fathers* and US exceptionalism; the place of an evangelical Christian fundamentalism in certain parts of the US; an anti-Obama racial politics; the ongoing War on Terror and hostility to Islam; and the influence of conservative commentary in relation to these and other issues on the world wide web, talk radio, pay TV and Fox News (Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck in particular) (see, for example, Bromwich 2010, Dworkin et al. 2010, Krugman and Wells 2011, Madrick 2010, Tomasky 2011). The US presidential and congressional elections of 2012 are being played out (at the time of writing) in the context of an impassioned contest over these interests.

Parliamentary elections in the UK in 2010 also triggered a substantial reframing by the Conservative Party/Liberal Democrats coalition of the role of the State in

relation to the so-called *Big Society*, and of the ways in which the State would imagine its roles in the provision of services, payments, programmes and forms of market regulation.

In February 2011, in an article in the Conservative leaning *Telegraph*, British Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) made explicit that while the priority of his Government was to clear up 'the mess Labour made of our economy, my mission in politics is to repair the breakdown in our society: the family breakdown and community breakdown that has done so much damage to people's lives – not to mention the costs that our deep social problems load on to the state'. For Cameron and his coalition government the 'idea at the heart' of this project, the Big Society, is 'about rebuilding responsibility and giving people more control over their lives'. Central to these concerns are particular, quite familiar, in the history of neo-liberal political rationalities, understandings of enterprise, individual autonomy, responsibility and choice. The idea of the Big Society has as a core tenet the dismantling of what Cameron identifies as Big Government: 'We will soon publish a White Paper setting out our approach to public service reform. It will put in place principles that will signal the decisive end of the old-fashioned, top-down, take-what-you're-given model of public services.' The aim here is to 'dismantle Big Government and build the Big Society in its place'.

In this way of imagining and identifying what it is that ails the UK economy and society in the wake of the GFC, and the *profligacy* of the former New Labour government, it is clear to Cameron that: 'This change is long overdue. We all know the damage caused by centrally controlled public services'. *Public*, in this context, signals something that is inherently lacking when compared to the rigours, the discipline, the competitiveness of markets: 'That's why we need a complete change, and that's what our White Paper will bring. The grip of state control will be released and power will be placed in people's hands.' In the Big Society, which signals, at the level of discourse, a major departure from Thatcherite declarations that *There is no such thing as society*, there 'will be more freedom, more choice and more local control' (Cameron 2011).

The White Paper, according to Cameron (2011), frames an approach to the ways in which currently public services are re-imagined in terms of a supposedly more efficient competitive market. Two elements will be central to the ways in which these ideas are to be made concrete. The first element will see a version of compulsory competitive tendering in a new market for the provision of nearly all areas/aspects of these services: 'We will create a new presumption – backed up by new rights for public service users and a new system of independent adjudication – that public services should be open to a range of providers competing to offer a better service.' This principle, of competitive, market based *solutions* to the problems of government, is framed by, and will enable, certain ideas of individual choice and autonomy: 'This is vital to give meaning to another key principle:

choice. Wherever possible we will increase it, whether it's patients having the freedom to choose which hospital they get treated in or parents having a genuine choice over their child's school.' In the Big Society the State's role is redefined in terms of market regulation: 'Of course, the state will still have a crucial role to play: ensuring fair funding, ensuring fair competition, and ensuring that everyone – regardless of wealth – gets fair access.'

The *Telegraph* (2011) editorial that accompanied the PM's framing of the processes, rationalities and technologies that would enable the Big Society to emerge and flourish was enthusiastic and supportive of the changes Cameron identified and the mechanisms he outlined for driving these changes: 'The forthcoming Open Public Services White Paper may sound as dry as dust, but its impact is designed to be seismic – nothing less than to draw to a close 65 years of top-down, Whitehall-knows-best government. Big Government is to be dismantled and the Big Society built in its place.' The *Telegraph* applauded the PM's focus on legislating for the provision of public services to be open to compulsory competitive tendering, and the government's renewed emphasis on individuals exercising choice as consumers of these services: 'This is ground-breaking stuff, but given that a parliament cannot bind its successors, can Mr Cameron be sure that these changes will stick and that a future Labour government will not return to its statist ways? That will depend on the extent to which Mr Cameron's reimagined state is delivered in reality.' For the *Telegraph*: 'If the provision of public services by outside providers becomes the default setting, and people increasingly take responsibility for decisions that affect them, this new order will become entrenched and, as a consequence, irreversible. Who said there are no big ideas being debated in politics any more?'

Over at the left leaning *The Guardian* the news of the Conservative/Liberal Democrats' vision for the Big Society was greeted with less rapture. Polly Toynbee (2011) has been a significant and vocal critic of the government spending cuts and austerity programme that have marked the initial period of the coalition government in the wake of the GFC. For Toynbee much of the discourse articulating the reasons for these substantial cuts to government spending has *dissembled*: the GFC provides, in her view, a convenient crisis in which to articulate a Tory vision of individual enterprise, autonomy and responsibility: 'This is it, the last veil ripped away. In the *Daily Telegraph* today, David Cameron penned his preview of the long-delayed white paper on public services. The paper's editorial saw the light: "For the first time he explains the full scope of his ambition to roll back the boundaries of an overweening state".' For Toynbee this is 'indeed the eureka moment for the country. Nothing like this was ever breathed before the election'. With his framing of the UK's sovereign debt as being at *crisis* levels, of an *economic mess* left by the Labour government, and of the *damage caused by centrally controlled public services*, Toynbee argues that: 'Cameron is setting his runaway ideology, speeding down the tracks on collision course with public sentiment. This only confirms that tell-tale moment of glee when the Tory benches

shouted "More! More!" as Osborne ended his budget listing the deepest public cuts since the war.'

Since this moment there have been significant changes in the UK in the scale and provision of formerly public services under the twin umbrellas of the Big Society and austerity: in the National Health Service; in primary, secondary and higher education; in public/social housing; policing; local government services; and pensions and benefits. Again, at the time of writing the UK is in the grip of a double-dip recession with the promise that austerity programmes will continue for decades in order to reduce government debt levels as a percentage of GDP (Office for Budget Responsibility, OBR, 2012). These changes and forecasts have provoked much debate and have been positioned as being implicated in the riots that occurred in many UK cities during August 2011.

The so-called *sovereign debt crises* in the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) economies in the Eurozone that has unfolded during 2011–12 also represents a largely successful framing of responses to the downstream effects of the GFC as being principally about State debt levels. In this discourse those that depend most on State provided services, payments and programmes will be the ones to carry the greatest burden as severe austerity measures are implemented to protect sovereign debt ratings, or to bail out banks and financial institutions. In an appearance before the UK's House of Commons Treasury Committee in early 2011 the Governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King made a number of comments that support this claim. Phillip Inman (2011) suggests that King 'risked reopening the bitter argument over blame for the financial crisis by saying that government spending cuts are the fault of the City and expressing surprise there has not been more public anger'. Inman quotes King as claiming that those made unemployed and bankrupt, or who have had their government benefits cut as a consequence of the GFC and sovereign debt driven austerity programmes 'had every reason to be resentful and voice their protest'. In King's submission to the Committee he suggested that the billions spent bailing out the banks and the need for public spending cuts were the fault of the financial services sector: '*The price of this financial crisis is being borne by people who absolutely did not cause it.*'

Much of this book is an argument for thinking differently about the knowledge practices that are available to do social science, and for the development of a social scientific imagination which might recognise in such knowledge practices a means to think differently about *ethically slanted maxims* for the conduct of the self as enterprise, work, and the *monstrous cosmos* of twenty-first century capitalism. A capitalism which, as the GFC indicates, is resilient, tends to mobilise ideas, policies and practices that look after the interests of capital (in this case financial capital), and is able, in these times, to articulate powerful ideas of individual enterprise, autonomy, choice and responsibility.

In *The Shock Doctrine* Naomi Klein (2007, 6) quotes Milton Friedman as making explicit what she sees as 'contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum': 'only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.' For Friedman: 'That I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.'

In his meditation on Michel Foucault's *untimely thinking* Paul Rabinow (2009, 31–32) cites a 1981 conversation between Foucault and Didier Eribon in which Foucault makes a case for what should be the objects of intellectual work. The intellectual, since they work in the 'register of thought', should 'see just how far thought can be freed so as to make certain transformations seem urgent enough so that others will attempt to bring their own into effect, and difficult enough so that if they are brought about they will be deeply inscribed in the real'.

Friedman and Foucault make very similar arguments for the power of ideas, for the possibilities of thinking in certain ways. For Friedman, though, this thinking about thinking has a strong sense of *timeliness* about it, even an opportunism. Times of crisis call for timely solutions. Foucault, on the other hand, speaks of thinking as being *untimely*, *inopportune*. Going further, in a 1983 conversation with Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus (published as *On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress*) Foucault (2000d, 256) claimed that 'what I want to do is not the history of solutions … I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of *problématiques*'.

It would seem, at first glance, that Friedman's account of thinking, of tactics, of solutions is opportune. And in terms of the ideas lying around waiting to be picked up in the context of the GFC then neo-liberal accounts of enterprise, free markets, individual autonomy, choice and responsibility, and the limited roles of government appear attractive, if not inevitable. At such times, Foucault might argue, is the moment for untimely thinking. When things appear as attractive, almost inevitable, when there seems to be little alternative to governments cutting spending to reduce debt, or to the competitive, efficient logics of markets, or to exhortations to work harder, longer and for less pay and more insecurity, then this is the time for a genealogy of problems.

Twenty-first century flexible capitalism is a *monstrous cosmos*. But it is a cosmos in which there is an array of diverse fields of possibility. The Spanish *Indignados*, the Greek *Indignant Citizens Movement* (Κίνημα Αγανακτισμένων Πολιτών), the Occupy movement (*We are the 99 per cent),* the men and women of the Arab Spring, Green movements, anti-globalisation protesters, cinema, art, literature, music, performance, (even) social science, all these and more can often test and trouble the limits and possibilities of these fields. There may even be more things

in heaven and on earth than capitalism. As Nigel Thrift (2005, 3) makes clear capitalism can be *fun*: 'People get stuff from it – and not just more commodities.' Capitalism 'has a kind of crazy vitality. It doesn't just line its pockets. It also appeals to gut feelings. It gets involved in all kinds of extravagant symbioses'. It is productive, it 'adds into the world as well as subtracts'. But, at the same, as Thrift suggests, twenty-first century capitalism can be oppressive, exploitative and 'hard graft' for many.

In *Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts* Zygmunt Bauman (2004, 5–6) argues that at the start of the twenty-first century large numbers of people around the globe – hundreds of millions, in fact – are surplus to requirements, are, indeed, redundant. This redundancy is a consequence of the global spread and triumph of modernisation processes: 'The production of "human waste" … (the "excessive" and "redundant", that is the population of those who either could not or were not wished to be recognised or allowed to stay), is an inevitable outcome of modernization.' As processes of modernisation have become truly globalised, as the 'totality of human production and consumption has become money and market mediated, and the processes of the commodification, commercialization and monetarization of human livelihoods have penetrated every nook and cranny of the globe', then the 'crisis of the human waste disposal industry' has become more acute.

Redundancy, the sense that we might be of limited or no use – particularly in social, cultural and commercial environments in which usefulness not only brings material rewards, but also gives purpose and meaning to a life – can have profound consequences for a sense of self. As Bauman (2004, 12) suggests: 'To be "redundant" means to be supernumerary, unneeded, of no use – whatever the needs and uses are that set the standard of usefulness and indispensability. The others do not need you; they can do as well, and better, without you.' To be redundant also suggests that there is no 'self evident reason for your being around and no obvious justification for your claim to have the right to stay around'. To be made redundant 'means to have been disposed of because of being disposable – just like the empty and non-refundable plastic bottle or once-used syringe, an unattractive commodity with no buyers …'. For Bauman (2004, 12) redundancy shares its 'semantic space with "rejects", "wastrels", "garbage", "refuse" – with "waste"'. To be redundant or surplus to requirements holds out different possibilities or prospects to being unemployed: 'The destination of the unemployed, of the "reserve army of labour", was to be called back into active service. The destination of waste is the waste yard, the rubbish heap' (see also Kelly and Harrison 2009, 2–3).

In these spaces, in the thinking and the ideas that have been put to work, and to play, in the writing of this book, I keep getting drawn back to Foucault's (2000d, 256) contention that in doing a genealogy of problems 'not everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad'. As he goes

onto to suggest: 'If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.'

A hyper- and pessimistic activism is suggestive of ongoing, myriad contests about what such things as choice, autonomy, responsibility and enterprise might mean. In workplaces, organisations, labour markets, jurisdictions (local, state/regional, national and international). Contests small and large. Individual and collective. In the realms of thought, of practice, of process, of policy and politics.

In the realm of thought, the realm in which this book is located, a re-enchanted social scientific imagination has an important role to play in identifying and exploring the ambivalence, the ambiguity, the irony of the human experience: of work as toil and drudgery and as better than sex; of a concern for work–life balance and the body mind and soul of those that work; and of the Faustian dimensions of these and other concerns. Not only in terms of *evidence based* research (the twenty-first century correlate of the *abstract empiricism* critiqued by C W Mills?), but in lifting our eyes a bit, every so often, to engage in what some disparage as *blue-sky* thinking. To imagine spaces for the meticulous, empirical, genealogical work of a Foucault. And for the provocative, speculative, imagination of a Bauman.

An aside: What would social science look like if it was done, some of the time, by someone like the physicist and media presenter Brian Cox, and it included language such as the following? 'On camera he is articulate and lyrical … The sun, he will say, is "*a colossal fiery sphere of tortured matter*". And while the Northern Lights are the visual manifestation of the Earth's magnetic fields protecting us from the solar wind, those green shafts of light nevertheless "*look like spirits drifting up from the mountain into heaven*"' (Farndale 2011). Or is this language, this style of thinking beyond the limits and possibilities of social science? If physics can speak of *elegance* and *beauty* and *ugliness* can social science?

For now, then, there appears to be little choice but to continue to imagine ourselves and work on ourselves as if we are an enterprise. We have little choice but to go on making choices. And to continue to carry the responsibilities for securing our own precarious form of salvation in the risky, globalised labour markets of twenty-first century flexible capitalism – where most of us aspire to the privileges that attach to a vocation, but where too many of us have to make do with toil and drudgery.

But in doing so, at the same time, we might also try to colonise the times, spaces and places in which we, as individuals and as members of groups, trouble what it is that we have become or are expected to be. To paraphrase Foucault (2007b, c) (and Rabinow 2009), we must not *diminish the possibilities of inopportune, untimely thinking*. We should imagine that with this form of thinking we give ourselves the right to *question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth*. In this questioning we will find the *art of voluntary insubordination, that*

of reflected intractability. An art that can continue to give *new impetus as far and wide as possible, to the undefined, uncertain, ambiguous and open-ended work of freedom*.

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INDEX

(Tables indexed in bold numbers)

ABC radio 3
Aborigines 110
abstract generic concepts 75
Action Plan for Managing Staff Health and Wellbeing and Effective Schools 122, 124
ACTU 10, 117–18, 120
AFL 149–50
AFR BOSS (Australian Financial Review management magazine) 10
After Method 29
The Age 3
agents 33, 83, 124, 128–9, 134, 177
  federal 153
  free 105
  marketing 108
agriculture 57
Åkerstrøm, Niels 161
allegories 24–7
Allen, Peter 122–3
Allender, Steven 139, 176–9
Altamaier, E.M. 117
Altman, Roger 185, 189
ambiguities 8, 12, 14–15, 26–7, 30, 37, 41, 43, 48, 55, 99, 119, 163–4, 196
  material 94
  of new work regimes 13
  resolving and managing 14
ambivalence, uncertainty and ambiguity› 43
Amerco Co. 164, 179
American Chicago School of Economics, *see* Chicago School of Economics
American corporations 83
American Institute of Stress 118
American pension funds 62
American restaurant industry 113
analytical concepts 23
anxieties 2, 8, 66, 68, 99, 117, 120; *see also* uncertainties
  emergence of widespread 7
  public 186
  suffered by employees 10
Arab Spring 194
archaeology 45
archaeology of the human sciences 17
The Art of Life 161
asceticism 32, 126, 180
aspirations 2, 4, 53, 85, 93
  lifestyle 60
  positive 154
  prior generations 53
AT&T Co. 66
austerity programmes 192–3
Austin, Nancy 78
Australia 56–8, 60, 84, 98–100
  political landscape 4
  sports entertainment business 149
  trade unions 106, 166
  Virgin Blue 99–100
  working families 2
The Australian 52
Australian Council of Trades Unions, *see* ACTU
Australian employees 10, 117
Australian Financial Review 10
Australian Football League, *see* AFL
Australian Labor Party 1–2, 4
Australian studies 10, 117
autonomy, individual 89, 190–1, 194
Avery, Linda 164

Babbo's grill station 114
Baehr, Peter 73
Baldry, C. 54–5, 61, 174
Ballard, J. 84

banks 54, 98, 100, 185, 187, 193
Baron, R.A. 117
Barry, A. 38, 84
Bartlett, Chris 159
Batali, Mario 113–14
Bauman, Zygmunt 7–9, 15, 21–2, 27–30, 50, 55, 66–7, 94–5, 107–10, 136, 149, 161, 195–6
  arguments of 66
  commitment to literature 27
  sociological imagination 27–8
  thinking of 29
  work 9, 27–9
Baxter, Richard 76, 78
Beck, Glenn 7, 11, 22, 30, 53, 55, 61, 65–6, 83, 99, 149, 190
Beck, Ulrich 7–8, 21, 50, 53, 65
Beck-Gernsheim, E. 53
Bell, Daniel 58, 82
benefits 88, 94, 96, 108, 131, 134, 141, 154, 156–9, 161, 171, 175, 177, 193
  government 193
  salary 59
  unemployment 88
Bentham, Jeremy 77
Better than Sex: How a Whole Generation Got Hooked on Work 10
'Big Society' 191–3
bio-power 141, 143–4
Bismarckian State socialism 90
Boltanski, L. 54
bonds, sub-prime mortgage 133
Borges, Jorge Luis 17
Borneo, Rudy 152
Bourdain, Anthony 113
Bourdieu, P. 18
Brack, Garry 118
Branson, Richard 99–100
Bratich, J.Z. 38
The Brave New World of Work 7
Braverman, H. 82, 169
Brazilianisation of labour markets 15, 25, 49–69
Brett, J. 2–3
Bretton Woods agreement 61
British Institute of Management 118
Broussine, M. 63
Buford, Bill 113–14
Bunting, Madeleine 10, 12, 157–60, 172–5, 184
Burchell, G. 38, 90, 92–3, 123
Burke, R.J. 117
Burrogh, B. 133
Butler, Judith 15, 34, 36, 47
Byosiere, P. 117

Cambridge Companion to Foucault 43
Cameron, David 191–2
campaigns 2–3, 10, 117–18, 120
Canada 7, 56–8, 60
capacities 9, 45–6, 49, 66–8, 94, 103–4, 108–10, 118, 124–6, 136, 147–8, 154–5, 163, 166–8, 181–4
  cognitive 151, 154, 162
  emotional 153
  human 128
  individual's 149, 183
  personal 124
  physical 151
  productive 142
  psychic 125
  self-governing 89
Capetillo, J. 38
capital 61–2, 67, 108, 132, 166, 168, 190, 193
  financial 193
  globalised 62
  mobile 61
  predatory 62
capitalism 5, 14, 18–20, 53–4, 59, 62–3, 69, 71, 73–8, 82, 188, 193, 195
  cultural 19, 51, 132
  disorganised 51
  flexible 5, 9, 11–12, 14, 47, 51, 61–5, 67–9, 71, 78–9, 83–4, 93–4, 157, 163–4, 174
  globalised 20, 82, 188
  industrial 12, 166, 171
  new 7, 12, 54
  rationalised 14, 71, 82, 142, 166
  spirit of 15, 30, 71, 73–8
  twentieth century 5, 15, 17, 20–2, 30, 51, 61–4, 68, 71, 73, 75, 77–9, 81–3, 98–100, 149–50
  twenty-first century 71–94
  understanding of 54
care of the self 13, 33, 41–5, 73, 87, 100, 122, 137, 139, 141, 155, 179
carer responsibilities 2, 99, 175, 180
Carroll, Lewis 23
CAS 119, 127–30, 134–6
  characteristics 130
  metaphor 132–3, 136
  perspectives 129, 135
Cassidy, John 188

Castells, Manuel 21, 54
casualisation 7, 60
change agents 157–60
changing corporate world 134
chaos, edge of 16, 25, 130, 133, 135–6
Chaplin, Charlie 171
charts 29–30, 86, 108, 150, 168
checklists 124–5, 139, 170
chefs 113, 145–7
Chettle, Henry 97
Chiapello, E. 54
Chicago School of Economics 89–90
children 38, 50, 89, 100, 120, 137, 155–6, 165, 168, 174–5
China 49, 59
Chinese encyclopaedia 17
choices 5, 8–9, 14–15, 41, 53, 60–1, 84, 92–6, 99–101, 106–10, 116, 118–19, 159, 161, 191–4
  acts of 93, 106, 108, 110, 161, 196
  consumer 108
  healthy lifestyle 123, 135
  individual 101, 106, 108, 110, 191
  strategic 92
  unforced 95
  voluntary 35
A Christian Directory 76
Christian fundamentalism 190
Cilliers, P. 132
circuits 64, 82–3, 132
citizens 49, 87, 89, 105, 188–9
  qualifications of 47
  worker 174
  and would-be citizens 89
citizenship 84, 87, 174
  active 84
  individual 87
Civilian Employment: Males and Females as a Percentage of Labour Force **56**
Clinton, Bill 188
clock time 148, 167, 183; *see also* time
'Clothing Resistant Movement Consultants' 52
co-workers 98, 104, 118
Cold War 49
Cole, C. 38
College de France 31, 42, 89
Colquhoun, Derek 10, 45, 118, 120, 176
commitments and responsibilities 3, 11, 29, 65, 73, 96, 100, 146, 157–9
commodities 16, 19, 81, 108, 155, 160, 195
  markets 3
  mass 19
  virtual 78
companies 49, 62, 98, 132, 134, 137, 157–8, 161–2, 177–9
competence, individual 118–19
competition 7, 99, 109, 133, 161, 171, 173, 180, 184
  fair 192
  global 173
  intense 180
  professional 38
complex adaptive systems, *see* CAS
complexities 24, 27, 95, 119, 127, 130–6, 150, 165
  metaphors 131–3
complexity sciences 119, 127, 130, 132–3
complexity theory 127, 129, 131, 134
concepts 4, 12, 25, 28, 33–4, 37, 39, 66, 71, 75, 77, 132–4, 163, 167, 176
  abstract generic 75
  analytical 23
  economy of 127, 132, 134
  environmental movement's 175
  framing of 137
  of governmentality 34, 37–9, 44–5, 69, 87, 93, 141
'conduct of conduct' 38–9, 89
connections 27, 96, 103, 127, 136, 155–6, 168, 174
  intimate 142
  positive 178
  seamless 98
  strong 8
constitutionally limited government 190
consumption 8, 12, 14, 28, 76, 81–2, 96, 107–10, 148, 195
  aestheticised object of 107, 109
  culture 28, 109
  work 96
contexts 1–5, 12, 16–17, 20–1, 27, 59, 64–6, 84, 89–90, 99–101, 106–7, 126–8, 130–1, 149, 190–1
  Anglo-European 84
  historical 90
  national 84, 88
  operational 169
  particular 13, 18, 41, 152, 155
  professional 126
contributors 8, 10, 31, 84, 172
  regular 113
  significant 40
cooks 113–14, 116, 133, 145–7

core workforce 7, 55–6, 59, 66, 157–8, 173, 178
'corporate athlete' 137–8, 140–1, 150–1, 153–5, 176, 181
  Faustian pact 156–62
  making of 149–55
corporate practices 132
corporate world, changing of 134
The Corrosion of Character 7, 64
costs 1, 94, 103, 106, 130–1, 136, 138, 140, 155–6, 171, 191
  cumulative 118
  economic 10, 117, 189
  emotional 94, 96, 135
  human 130
  injury 104
  personal 140
Cox, Brian 196
crafting 25, 27
Crawford, Matthew 171
credit default swaps 188
credit facilities 74, 178
Crook, Colin 133
CSFs 121
cultural circuits 82–3, 132–3
The Culture of the New Capitalism 7
Curriculum Standards Frameworks, *see* CSFs
Cutting, Gary 43

Daily Telegraph 191–2
damages 12, 191–2
Dante 114, 116
de Botton, Alain 171
Dean, Mitchell 22, 38, 45, 84, 107, 125
debates 7–8, 21, 23, 34–5, 51, 54–5, 102, 174–5, 193
Dekker, Thomas 96–7
Deleuze, G. 25
demands 2, 4, 10, 12, 15, 26, 30, 46, 53, 61, 63–4, 117–18, 146–8, 172–3, 179
  competing 149
  complex 62
  energise continual 174
  increased performance 172
  post-bureaucracy 63
Dent, M. 126, 182
Department of Education, *see* DOE
Department of School Education, *see* DSE
Department of Trade and Industry, *see* DTI
deregulation 173
derivatives 133, 188
designs 20, 67, 69, 72, 91, 166, 170
desks 98–9, 103, 171
development 36, 40–1, 54, 63–4, 67–8, 75, 82, 84, 87, 89, 108, 126, 141, 155, 166–7
  of discipline 39, 142
  global 63
  new mode of 54, 64
  professional 121, 126
  public housing 88
  skills 146
  software 54
diet 104, 140, 152, 180–1
dilemmas 9, 26, 45, 51, 65, 99, 103, 119, 165
  human 27
  prolonged policy 3
dimensions 10–11, 55, 107, 124, 151, 156, 184
  adaptive 129
  cultural 11, 22, 73
  emotional 82
  institutional 167
  provocative 27, 73
  subjective 47
Dimmock, C. 135
Dinham, S. 120–1, 135
'disaster capitalism' 50–1
disciplinary society 39, 142
discipline 18, 24, 27, 38–9, 64, 87, 92, 131, 141–5, 147–50, 166, 168–9, 183–4, 191
  eccentric 131
  special 165
Discipline and Punish 141–2
discourses 21, 24, 32, 68, 118, 122–3, 127, 177, 191–3
  of choice 45, 63
  competing 176
  of competition 180
  distinct workplace health 177
  economic 84
  managerialist 21
  neo-liberal 99, 101
  post-structuralist 24
  scientific 181
  therapeutic 123
'disembedding' and 'reembedding of social systems 167
dispositions 2, 9, 33, 38–9, 41, 45, 56, 71, 73, 86, 92, 107, 118–19, 124, 180–1

ethical 14
of individuals 39–40, 91
methodological 20
professional 119
DIY 7, 11, 14, 53, 71, 93, 99
entrepreneurial 14, 71
projects 53, 93, 99
'self' 11
Do-It-Yourself, *see* DIY
docile bodies 142–4
DOE 123–5, 128, 135
Doogan, K. 55
Dow Jones Industrial Average 188
drag coefficients 156, 158
Dreyfus, Hubert 31, 194
drudgery 10, 16, 25, 95–6, 100–102, 106, 109–10, 196
DSE 121
DTI 174
du Gay, Paul 9, 21–3, 106
Dublin 185–6
Dworkin, R. 190

EAP 178
economic activities 62–3, 85, 102
Economic and Social Research Council, *see* ESRC
economics 11, 89–90, 92, 131, 171
economies 7, 28, 38, 54–5, 59, 65, 84, 89–90, 99, 106–7, 132, 134, 142–3, 186–7, 191
advanced 55, 187
centrally-directed 91
developing 106, 187
emergent moral 69
global 50, 59, 156, 187–8
multiple local 103
new 54, 63–4, 82, 156
over-developed 5, 14, 25, 65
permanent 144
post-industrial 21
semi-industrialised 65
Economist 83
economy of concepts 127, 132, 134
Edgar, D. 56
'edge of chaos' 113–36
editors 73–4, 102
educational systems 50, 121
Ehrenreich, Barbara 101–7
Elliott, Anthony 8, 94
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 83
emotional capacity 151, 153
emotions 11, 123, 151, 153, 155
empirical work 12, 54–5
Employee Assistance Program, *see* EAP
employees 10, 12, 38, 88, 99–100, 117–18, 131, 139–40, 150, 156–8, 160, 162, 173, 175–80, 183
Australian 10, 117
individual 183
potential 156–7
'zero drag' 156
employers 1–3, 9, 16, 99–100, 159, 176
'dot.com' 156
Employers First (Company) 118
employment, part-time 59–60
'emptying of space' 167
The End of Work 7
Engels 54
enlightenment 15, 19, 33–7, 45
ethos 44
question 34
Scottish 86, 92
thinkers 34
enterprise 5–7, 13–17, 28, 40–1, 47–8, 68–9, 81–4, 87–95, 106–7, 109–10, 155, 161, 165–6, 181–4, 190–1
capitalist 88
culture 106
ethic of 6, 13–14, 22, 64, 81, 89, 106, 181–2, 190
individual 192–3
regulating 188
self-governing 73
social 145, 149
environmental movement's concepts 175
epochalism 21–2
ESRC 54
essays 33–6, 46
ethic of enterprise 6, 13–14, 22, 64, 81, 89, 106, 181–2, 190
ethic of performance 179–83
ethical self-problematisation 125
ethics 4, 6, 11, 13, 33, 37, 41–2, 44, 47, 53, 71, 93, 95, 137–8, 180–1
new work 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 47, 137, 174
ontological condition of 13, 41
teamwork 65
The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom 13
Europe 7, 86
European Commission 187
European Union 173
Eurozone 186, 193
evangelical Christian fundamentalism 190

Evans, Linda 120
executives 150, 157
extra territorial organisations 57

factory workers 85
families 1–2, 6, 8, 21, 38, 47, 50, 56, 92, 122–3, 128–9, 155, 159–60, 175, 178–9
  domesticated 87
  extended 179
  juggling with work commitments 164
  low-income 102
  single 68, 146
  step 164
family planning 150
Farndale, N. 196
The Fatal Conceit of Socialism 90–1
Faustian dimensions 196
Faustian elements 159
Faustian pact 156–62
Females as a Percentage of Part-Time Labour Force **60**
Feminism and the Final Foucault 37
Ferguson, N. 133
fetishisation 21, 62, 64
  of flexibility 64
  of identity 21
fiscal consolidation 187
fiscal responsibility 190
fitness 9, 138–40, 174, 181–2
Fletcher, W. 175
flexibilisation of capitalism 62; *see also* flexible capitalism
flexibilisation of time 172–9
flexibility 7, 61–7, 109–10, 132, 158
  begetting disorder 65
  increased 121
  lessening of 184
  metaphor of 51, 63
flexible capitalism 5, 9, 11–12, 14, 47, 51, 61–5, 67–9, 71, 78–9, 83–4, 93–4, 157, 163–4, 174
  'a monstrous cosmos' 194
  structures 68
  time 183
  world of 11, 180, 184
Florida, Richard 59
food 41, 103, 113, 140, 145–8, 152
  production 170
  subsidised by the company 98
  weekly budget for 103
forms of personhood 5, 21, 28, 30, 37, 47, 71, 84, 107, 127, 133–4
Foucault, Michel 5, 11, 14–15, 17, 21, 31, 33, 35, 37, 41, 43, 45, 47, 73, 137
  'ambivalence, uncertainty and ambiguity' 43
  analyses liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities 39
  archaeology of the human sciences 17
  concept of governmentality 34, 37–9, 141
  distinguishes between three forms of power 39
  essays 34
  explores new rationalities of detention, punishment and surveillance 77
  and freedom 37–9
  middle period of his life 43
  'practices of freedom' 42
  'processes of liberation' 42
  suggests 'taking care of oneself requires knowing … oneself' 42
  'untimely thinking' 194
Foucault and the Art of Ethics 42
Fox, Catherine 10–12, 96–100, 107, 179
framing of concepts 137
France 31, 35, 42, 89
Franco, L.M. 63
Franklin, Benjamin 73–5, 77–8
free markets 2, 190, 194
freedom 5, 9, 13–14, 33–4, 37–42, 44–6, 63, 65, 73, 87–9, 92–3, 99, 106, 108–10, 190–2
  economic 190
  new 65, 67
  practices of 42
French intellectuals 32
French Revolution 35
Freud, Sigmund 96–7, 101
Friedman, Milton 50, 90, 194
Furlong, Andy 59–60, 66–7

Gardner, Howard 81
GEC 130
genealogical analyses 22, 36, 41
genealogical approach 21
genealogical debates 21, 30, 45
genealogical work 196
General Electric Corporation, *see* GEC
Generation X 10, 78, 96
generic concepts 75
German Ordoliberalen 89
German post-war neo-liberalism 90
Germany 186

GFC 3, 20, 133, 185, 187–9, 191–4
Giddens, Anthony 21–2, 30, 53, 66, 83, 128, 136, 166–8, 183
global cities 67
global competition 173
global financial crisis, *see* GFC
God 77
Goldman Sachs 188
Goodwin, Brian 133–4
Googins, B. 179
Gordon, Colin 85, 89, 91–2
Gordon, Scott 85
government 1–4, 9, 33, 38–41, 43, 46, 49, 54, 84–92, 122–3, 142, 149, 187–8, 190–2, 194
  arts of 38–9, 87, 145
  benefits 193
  coalition 191–2
  conservative 1–2
  debt levels 187, 193
  income support 121
  intervention 90, 190
  mentality of 41, 90
  neo-liberal 41, 73, 84, 89, 91, 94, 142
  rationality of 84, 86–7
  society of 39, 142
  spending of 135, 186, 192–3
governmentalisation 45–8
governmentality 34, 37–9, 44–5, 69, 87, 93, 141
  emerging 87–8
  literature on 84
  reflexive 22
  work 30
Grandley, A. 179
Grattan, M. 3–4
Greece 42, 56–8, 60, 193
Green movements 194
grill stations 114–16
Guardian 10, 172, 192

Hampton, Denise 165
Harper's (magazine) 14n1, 102
Harris, Mike 173
Harrison, Bennett 14, 17, 41, 62, 113, 145, 149, 152, 195
Harvester Judgement 1907 1
Harvey, Steve 158–9
health and well-being programmes 117–19, 123–5, 135–40, 149, 153, 155, 174–8, 180–1
heat 16, 113–16, 118–19, 136
Heat: An Amateur's Adventures as Kitchen Slave, Line Cook, Pasta-Maker and Apprentice to a Butcher in Tuscany 114
Heilbroner, Robert 90
Hickey, Christopher 38, 126, 141, 149–50
Higgins, Justice Henry Bourne 1
high performance, quest for 131, 151, 162, 176, 180–1
Hindess, Barry 38, 84
The History of Sexuality 41
Hochschild, Arlie 56, 156, 163–6, 171, 179, 184
'Holistic Lap Aides' 52–3
Holt, Henry 117
Houghton, William 97
Howard, John 1–2
Howard's Brutopia: The Battle of Ideas in Australian Politics 1
human relationships 173–4
'hyper-and pessimistic activism' 196

Iceland 185
Ideal Performance State, *see* IPS
images 22, 67, 98, 108
IMF 187
In Praise of Idleness 95
In Search of Excellence 78
income 102–4, 108
India 49, 59
individual autonomy 89, 190–1, 194
individual biographical projects 93
individual competence 118–19
The Individualized Society 7, 66
industrial relations policies 2
industrialisation 166, 171, 183
industrialised democracies 51, 99, 106, 188–9
industry 57, 59, 74, 100, 114, 150
  human waste disposal 195
  oil 68
  restaurant 113, 145
  securities 188
  supply 54
Inman, Phillip 193
innovation 20, 58, 62–3, 133, 158
An Inquiry Into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations 85
international credit ratings agencies 135
investors 49, 62, 189
  empowered 62
  institutional 62
IPS 151–2

Ireland 56–8, 60, 185–6, 193
Irish banks 185
Irish budget deficit 186
Irish economy 186
Irish government 185
Irish property developers 185
Irish treasury 185
irony 8, 12–15, 20, 25–7, 30, 37, 41, 48, 69, 74, 80, 99, 119, 161, 196
Isherwood, Katy 159–60

Jamie's Kitchen Australia (TV series) 145–6
Jane, Emma 53
Japan 56–8, 60, 187
jobs 11, 13, 27, 52–3, 55, 58–9, 66, 95–6, 98, 100, 102–3, 108–10, 116–18, 156, 158–61
  back-breaking 103
  de-skilled 170
  minimum wage 102–3
  particular 67, 109
John Fairfax (media company) 98
John's Health (workplace health consultancy) 137, 139–41
Jones, Marion 153
judgement 15, 34, 36, 48

Kant, Immanuel 34–5
Kanter, Rosabeth 175
key learning areas, *see* KLAs
King, Mervyn 193
KITA (Kick-In-The-Ass) strategies 131
Kitchen Confidential 113
kitchens 16, 113–16, 119, 136, 147
KLAs 121
Klein, Naomi 50
Knopf, Alfred, A. 72
Knowing Capitalism 18–19
knowledge 13, 18, 24, 26, 35, 37–8, 42, 47, 58–9, 78, 82–3, 85–6, 89, 145–6, 180–2
  commodification of 181
  definitive 37
  detailed 85
  economy 51, 54, 59, 61, 82, 98, 119, 181
  expert 89
  legitimate 181
  new forms of 139, 144
  particular forms of 15, 145, 180
  positive 144
  production 26, 119, 144
  theoretical 58
  workers 59
knowledge practices 18, 23–5, 55, 193
  institutionalised 18
  rule-bound 24
Krugman, P. 190

Labor Party, *see* Australian Labor Party
Labour Force Participation Rates (Percentage of 15 to 64-year-olds in Labour Force) **56**
labour markets 2, 5, 7–8, 14–15, 25, 28, 55, 57, 61, 65–6, 68, 87, 99, 107, 139
  contemporary 174
  female 66
  first world 65
  flexible 95, 106
  globalised 47, 51, 68, 157, 174, 196
  peripheral 59
  precarious 5, 73, 93–4
  regulated 53
  various 7, 174–5
Labyrinth Corporation (pseudonym) 137–9, 141, 176–80
Lasch, Christopher 163
Lash, Scott 21–2, 30, 59, 67, 83
Law, John 15, 17–18, 23–6, 29, 150
Leadbetter, Charles 21
leadership 79, 81, 125
Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership 81
learning 7, 120, 122, 148
lebensführung (ethically slanted maxim for the conduct of life) 75
lectures 11, 41, 89, 150
Lehman Brothers 188
Lemert, C. 94, 135
Les nouvelles littéraires 43
Lewin, R. 130
Lewis, Michael 133, 179, 186
liberal democracies 11, 14–16, 28, 51, 54, 86–7, 89–90
liberalism 85–6, 92
Lichtenstein, Benyamin 130
LICs 187
life-long learning 7
lifestyle discourse 177–8
'liquid life' theory 8–9, 27
liquid modernity 21, 50, 68
literary exercises 18, 74
Loehr, Jim 137, 150
London 67, 145
London School of Economics, *see* LSE

losses 165, 185–6
Irish bank 185
sustained 188
low income countries, *see* LICs
low-income families 102
low wage workers 105–6
LSE 127, 130
Lyotard, Jean-François 59, 82–3, 181–2

madness 35–6, 43
management 13, 20, 22, 38, 62, 73, 82–3, 120–2, 124, 130–3, 139–40, 144–5, 166, 170–1, 176
commentators 157
consultants 82, 157
discourses 133
financial 121
gurus 82
hierarchy 134
human resource 117, 120
practices 105, 124, 132, 138, 145, 169, 179
rationalities 125
structure 134
surveillance 98
theorists 151
maps and charts 29–30
markets 62, 82, 86, 88, 90–2, 102, 174, 191, 194–5; *see also* labour markets
deregulated telecommunications 133
domestic air 100
economic 91
financial 128
global capital 135
housing 103, 107
new 90, 191
rental 103
Marxists 36, 45
Mauss, Marcel 21
McDonald's 170
McKinsey & Company 98
McKnight, David 1
McLuhan, Marshall 72
Medicaid 103
Mencken, H.L. 83
mental capacity 151, 154
Menzies, R. 1
Meredyth, D. 84
metaphors 2, 5, 22, 25–6, 51, 69, 119, 127–8, 131–2, 155–6, 165
Meyer, Christopher 133
Microsoft UK 157–60
Miller, P. 38, 76, 86, 117, 122
Mills, C.W. 15, 17, 55, 196
Mills, Wright 27, 68, 117
mind 12, 81, 138–41
Mind and Body Profile 138–9
minimum wage jobs 102–3
mining 57–8, 63
Modern Times 171
Mol, Annemarie 18, 23
money 67, 74, 83, 108, 113, 173, 185, 190, 195
borrowing of 186
and finance 63
Moodys 135
morale 120, 123, 125
Morgan, Gareth 22, 119, 130, 169–70
motivation 92, 120, 151, 154
multi-skilling 7
Murdoch, Rupert 52
Murlis, Helen 157

The Narnia Chronicles 165
National Health Service 193
National Socialism 90
Nazism 90
Nehamas, Alexander 42
neo-liberal free market capitalism 189
neo-liberalism 84–5, 92
new work ethics 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 47, 137, 174
New Work Ethics?: The Corporate Athlete's Back End Index and Organisational Performance 137
New Yorker 83, 113
New Zealand 56–8, 60
News Corporation 52
newspapers and journals 106
The Age 3
The Australian 52
Australian Financial Review 10
Daily Telegraph 191–2
Economist 83
Guardian 10, 172, 192
Harper's 14n1, 102
New Yorker 83, 113
Sydney Morning Herald 118
Newtonian scientific rationalities 127
Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-Wage USA 101–3
Nietzsche, Friedrich 31–2
Nolan, Peter 54

obligations 73, 88, 126, 135–6, 140, 161, 181, 183; *see also* responsibilities

governmental 34
moral 184
social 89
OBR 193
occupational health and fitness, *see* OH&F
Occupational Health and Fitness Assessment 138
occupational health and safety, *see* OH&S
occupations 100, 117–18, 175
lowest skilled 60
re-numerated livelihood-serving 109
workers 175
OECD 56–8, 60, 186–7
analysis of 186
countries 175
economies 53, 55, 57, 59, 63
figures 59
O'Farrell, Clare 144
Office for Budget Responsibility, *see* OBR
OH&F 140
OH&S 10, 117
O'Leary, Timothy 42, 44
Oliver, Jamie 145–8
On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress 194
The Order of Things, Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish 43, 168
Ordoliberalen 89–90, 92
organisational performances 139–41, 149, 155–6, 176, 180, 182
organisations 12, 22, 53–4, 61–2, 100, 119, 127–8, 130–1, 133–4, 136, 138–41, 157–60, 173, 175–7, 179–83
capitalist 20, 183
flexible 158
integrated 167
rationalised 168
structure of contemporary 168
twenty-first century 132, 156
umbrella 189
work 21, 51, 169, 171, 176
Osborne, T 85–6, 193
overtime 104, 172–3

panopticism 141, 144
Panopticon 77
Paras, Eric 42–4
Parkin, David 123, 135
part-time employment 59–60
Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment **60**
partners 9, 129, 161, 163, 165, 174–5
partnerships 132
passion 24, 38, 78, 83, 145–8, 152, 158–9, 162, 183
Percentage of Civilian Employment: Agriculture **57**
Percentage of Civilian Employment: Industry **57**
Percentage of Civilian Employment: Services **58**
performance 2, 7, 9–12, 96, 99, 103, 116, 138, 140–1, 148–53, 155, 157–9, 161–2, 173–4, 176–83
enhanced 181
ethic of 179–83
executive 137
high 131, 151, 162, 176, 180–1
individual 141, 150, 180
mental 151
pyramid 151
stressful 152
performativity, concept of 20, 83, 182
peripheral workforces 7, 59
personhood, forms of 5, 21, 28, 30, 37, 47, 71, 84, 107, 127, 133–4
Peters, Tom 21, 38, 49, 71–2, 78–81, 83–4, 93, 182
Phanos, Theo 185
philosophy 43, 74, 131, 145, 171
Pizzey, Michael 146–7
The Pleasures and Sorrows of Work 171
Plesk, P. 128–9
policies 50, 67, 90–2, 125, 127, 159, 163, 174, 179, 189, 193–4, 196
anti-liberal 90
individual life 108
of the Labor Party 2
social 174
policies welfare 90
political science 3
politics 3–4, 11, 22, 33, 38, 43, 46, 59, 86, 191–2, 196
racial 190
The Politics of Truth 34
populations 39–40, 85, 108, 138, 142, 167, 195
active 65
large 91, 119
particular 59
target 86
world's 28

power 5, 34, 37, 39–41, 43, 46, 66, 82, 86–7, 122, 137, 143–4, 147–8, 169, 190–1
  analytical 89
  computing 131
  disciplinary forms of 39, 149
  discursive 19
  effects of 46, 196
  exercise of 40, 86, 142
  mechanics of 143
  mobilizing of 183
  pastoral 39
Power, Michael 182
power relations 14, 39–41, 44, 47, 147, 176
'practices of freedom' 42
principles 2, 41–2, 44, 46, 92, 165–6, 169, 171, 180, 191
  free market 190
  functional 50
  generalised 91
  organisational 170
Principles of Scientific Management 169, 182
private emotions 24
problematisations 45, 85, 89, 121, 125
  advanced liberal 84–5
  ethical 125–6
  feminist 24
  framing post World War II 89
  new 142
  particular 44
  provisional 141
  restless 46
problems 13, 19, 28–9, 31, 39–40, 42, 51, 84–5, 106–7, 118–19, 125, 127–8, 158, 163, 181
  analytical 28
  empirical 175
  ethical 42
  genealogy of 194–5
  liquidity 185
  political 121
  social 101, 120, 191
'processes of liberation' 42
producers 93, 96, 107, 132
production 12, 14, 19, 28, 44, 55–6, 65, 78, 81–2, 88–9, 132, 144–5, 166, 169, 171
  food 170
  human 195
  imaginary 77
  lost 118
  new 181
  primary 57
productivity 2, 85, 99, 136, 138, 140–1, 157, 165, 169, 171–2, 176, 180
  economic 59
  matches cncerns 155
  solutions 131
professional competition 38
profiles 113, 138–9
profits 2, 69, 83, 133, 157, 188
  corporate 2, 59, 69, 74, 83, 133–4, 157, 188
  maximisation of 134
  raising of 74
projects 14, 19, 24, 36, 66, 68, 73, 78, 81, 83, 102, 125, 148, 166, 191
  biographical 7
  disciplinary 87
  governmental 29
  philosophical 86
  reflexive 92
  single coherent 43
The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism 5, 62, 71, 73–7
provocations 5–6, 17, 24, 27, 29, 40–1, 138
'psy disciplines' 132
public servants 3–4
public services 3–4, 191–3
publications
  100 Ways to Help You Succeed/Make Money 71–2, 78–81
  AFR BOSS 10
  After Method 29
  The Art of Life 161
  Better than Sex: How a Whole Generation Got Hooked on Work 10
  Brave New World of Work 7
  Cambridge Companion to Foucault 43
  A Christian Directory 76
  The Corrosion of Character 7, 64
  The Culture of the New Capitalism 7
  Discipline and Punish 141–2
  The End of Work 7
  The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom 13
  The Fatal Conceit of Socialism 90–1
  Feminism and the Final Foucault 37
  Foucault and the Art of Ethics 42
  Heat: An Amateur's Adventures as Kitchen Slave, Line Cook, Pasta-Maker and Apprentice to a Butcher in Tuscany 114

The History of Sexuality 41
Howard's Brutopia: The Battle of Ideas in Australian Politics 1
In Praise of Idleness 95
In Search of Excellence 78
The Individualized Society 7, 66
An Inquiry Into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations 85
Kitchen Confidential 113
Knowing Capitalism 18–19
Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership 81
Les nouvelles littéraires 43
Mind and Body Profile 138–9
The Narnia Chronicles 165
New Work Ethics?: The Corporate Athlete's Back End Index and Organisational Performance 137
Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-Wage USA 101–3
On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress 194
The Order of Things, Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish 43, 168
Panopticon 77
The Pleasures and Sorrows of Work 171
The Politics of Truth 34
Principles of Scientific Management 169, 182
The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism 5
Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work 171
The Social Thought of Zygmunt Bauman 28–9
Supercapitalism: The Battle for Democracy in an Age of Big Business 49, 188
Theory, Culture & Society 31
Uncertainty and Surprise: Questions on Working with the Unexpected and Unknowable (conference) 119, 128, 134–6
Unzeitgemäss Betrachtungen (*Untimely Meditations*) 31
Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts 195
Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture is Ruling our Lives 10, 157, 160, 172
Work, Consumerism and the New Poor 7
Working in Jamie's Kitchen: Salvation, Passion and Young Workers 145–8
Puritanism 77

Qishan, Wang 189
quality time 16, 165–6, 184
quants 133
Quixote, Don 27–8

Raabe, P. 179
Rabinow, Paul 31–4, 194, 196
racial vilification and harassment 150
Rajchman, John 34
Raymond Williams Lecture, Cambridge University 36
recovery rituals 153
redundancy 195
'regularised social organisation of production' 166
Reich, Robert 49, 188–9
relationship skills 165
responsibilities 3, 5, 8, 14, 37, 50, 88–9, 94, 118–19, 124–5, 136, 159–61, 175–7, 190–4, 196
  ethical 122–3
  individual 25
  professional 120
  rebuilding 191
  social 89
  teacher 122
responsibilities and commitments 3, 11, 29, 65, 73, 96, 100, 146, 157–9
restaurants 57, 113–14, 145
rewards 11–12, 71, 73, 96, 159
  intangible 100
  material 113, 195
Rifkin, Jeremy 7, 66, 130
'risk society' 50–1, 53, 66, 68
risks 1–2, 9, 12–15, 51, 68, 73, 88–9, 92, 94, 106, 119, 122–3, 126, 133, 140–1
  appropriate 124
  heavy downside 187
rituals 151, 153–5
  effective 153
  five-step 154
  majestic 144
  new sleep 153
Roberts, Kevin 72, 182

Rose, Nikolas 21–2, 40, 84, 87, 94, 183
Rudd, Kevin 1–5
rules 18, 20, 23, 42–3, 46, 66, 84, 88, 91, 109, 129, 143
  internalised 129
  methodological 20
  neo-liberal mentalities of 94, 189
  workplace 105
Russell, Bertrand 95

Saffo, Paul 78
salary benefits 59
'salvation' 33, 71, 93, 145
Sarkozy, Nicolas 185, 189
school managers 123–6
  requirements of 123, 125
  self-governing 123
schools 6, 34, 47, 52, 88, 107, 119–25, 128–9, 134–5, 137, 144
  goals of 122, 125, 135
  mutual improvement 168
  self-managing 123
  theological 68
Schubert, Peggy 157
Schwartz, Tony 137, 150
science 17–18, 24, 46, 50, 85, 128, 132, 171, 181
  early modern European 85
  human 17
  mathematical 119
  political 3
Science, Technology and Society, *see* STS
scientific knowledge 181–2
scientific management 59, 169, 182
Scotland 54
Scott, C. 120–1, 135
Scottish enlightenment 86, 92
self 11, 31, 33, 44, 68, 96, 122, 148, 184
  emotional 123, 135, 154
  entrepreneurial 83, 96
  improvement 108
  liberation of 12–13
  management 121
  organisation 127–8
  reflexive 44
  working 12, 180
self-actualisation 96–7, 100
self-awareness 14, 148, 161
self-doubts 99, 105
self-esteem 109, 123
self-formation 45, 123–4
self-knowledge 39, 124, 148, 151, 179–80
self-management 81, 121
self-motivation 81
self-organisation 130
self-transformation 33, 81, 145
selfhood 14, 16, 44, 51, 68, 93, 124
Sennett, Richard 7, 11–12, 22, 30, 51, 61–6, 171, 188–9
sex 10–11, 16, 25, 36, 53, 95–7, 99–101, 103, 105–7, 109–11, 116, 172, 179, 196
sexual harassment 150
sexuality 33, 36, 41–2, 50, 84, 121
Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work 171
Silicon Valley 156
skills 9, 94, 96, 117–18, 148, 150, 154, 166, 186
  developing 146, 148
  new 12, 120
  professional middle class 103
  relationship 165
slaves 9, 41, 116
Smith, Adam 85
social insurance 1, 88–9
social life 88, 166–7
social relations 45, 54, 167
social science 9, 15, 17–18, 24–6, 29, 38, 55, 141, 193–4, 196
social scientific imagination 15, 17, 25, 27, 29, 64, 193
The Social Thought of Zygmunt Bauman 28–9
social work 57, 88
society 27, 58, 65, 91–2, 106–8, 133, 174, 181, 191
  administration of 86
  civil 84, 86, 89, 142
  of consumers 108
  nation-state 67
  post-industrial 51, 58, 82
  of producers 96, 107
sociological-anthropological approach 21–2, 44–5, 106
sociological imagination 8, 27–8, 68, 117
sociological literatures 136
sociological mission 28
sociological tradition 27
sociological understanding 21, 51
sociology 22, 24, 27–8, 40, 66, 68, 73, 117
  critical 40
  cultural 8
  mainstream 27

Socrates 53
soul 16, 25, 38, 82, 137, 139–41, 143–5, 147, 149–61, 171, 183, 196; *see also* mind
  dimensions of 137
  as an illusion 137
  impact of 141
  and rationalised capitalism 82
sovereignty 39, 86–7, 142, 144–5, 147, 165, 184
  exercise of 147–8
  national 190
  society of 39, 142
Spain 193
spirit of capitalism 15, 30, 71, 73–8
Spurgeon, Anne 175
staff 113, 124–5, 147
  clinics 129
  health 122–4, 135
  ministerial 3
  teaching 121
  turnover 118
Standard and Poors 135
step-families 164
stress 10–11, 16, 25, 34, 75, 78, 113–19, 120–1, 123, 125–7, 129–31, 133, 135–6, 138–9, 174–5
  campaign 10
  individualising 119
  managing of 25, 135
  professional 122
  teachers 119, 123–7
'stressed self' 122, 124, 126
STS 24
sub-prime mortgage bonds 133
subjects 10, 13, 31, 34, 37–40, 42–4, 46–7, 50, 67, 73, 86–7, 89, 92–3, 98, 124
  citizen 87–9
  cosmopolitan 67
  ethical 123–4
  governing 125
  moral 47
  productive 183
  reflective 39, 44
supercapitalism 51, 189
Supercapitalism: The Battle for Democracy in an Age of Big Business 49, 188
surrendering of civil rights 105
surveillance 65, 77, 90, 100, 144, 149, 161, 165, 184
Sydney Morning Herald 118

target populations 86
tasks 5, 11, 19, 35, 44, 65, 79, 81, 86, 93, 97, 100, 102–3, 105, 150–1
  menial 148
  transformed 58
Taylor, Frederick Winslow 165
Taylor, Robert 37, 129, 174
Tea Party Patriots 189–90
teacher selfhood 125
teachers 119–26, 135, 147, 189
  individual 122
  managing of 125
  nature of 119–20
  stressed 119, 123–7
teaching 100, 119–20, 122, 125
teams 39–40, 99, 123, 148–50, 160, 167, 173
  'boundaryless' 131
  self-governing school management 123
  virtual work 167
technologies 30, 49–51, 59, 63, 67, 86–9, 99, 130, 133, 151–2, 166, 169, 180, 192
  computer 133
  governmental 86
  information 64, 82
  mass production 59
  new 96
  social insurance 88
tensions 10, 14, 26, 96, 129–31, 133, 156, 164–5, 174, 181
  physical 154
  provoked 88
Tester, Keith 27–9
Thatcher, Margaret 91
themes 10, 46, 51, 77, 79–80, 96, 123, 135
  common 68, 76
  key 79, 163
theological schools 68
Theory, Culture & Society 31
thinking 5–6, 8–9, 14–18, 23, 28–36, 38, 40, 44–8, 51, 62, 73, 82–5, 99, 154, 193–6
  blue-sky 196
  inopportune 33
  less time 179
  mode of 31
  new 130

Thomas, Keith 76, 95–7, 101
'Thonged Pole Authorities' 52
Thoreau, Henry David 83
Thrift, Nigel 18–20, 51, 56, 63–4, 68, 82–3, 127, 131–4, 183, 195
time 1–4, 11, 16–17, 19–20, 74, 98–9, 118–20, 147, 152–4, 163, 165–9, 171–4, 178–9, 183–4, 186–7
  flexibilising of 163
  industrialised 165
  managing 163
  pressures 55
  working 174
time-management 154, 166, 184
time-sovereignty 184
toil and drudgery 16, 25, 64, 95–7, 99–103, 105–7, 109–11, 196
Tom, Emma 52–3
Toynbee, Polly 103, 106, 192
trainees 145–6, 148
training 33, 86, 143–4, 146, 148–50, 153
  consumer 109
  structured 145
  traditional performance-enhancement 154
  vocational 145
training colleges 147
Trichet, Jean-Claude 187
Trinca, Helen 10–12, 96–100, 107, 179
twentieth century capitalism 5, 15, 17, 20–2, 30, 51, 61–4, 68, 71, 73, 75, 77–9, 81–3, 98–100, 149–50
twenty-first century capitalism 71–94
twenty-first century organisations 132, 156
twenty-first century workplaces 163, 176

UK 7, 10, 54, 56–8, 60, 84, 120, 145, 157–9, 188, 190, 193
  cities 193
  economy 191
  government 174
  Midlands 172–3
uncertainties 7–9, 20, 66, 68, 99, 102
Uncertainty and Surprise: Questions on Working with the Unexpected and Unknowable (conference) 119, 128, 134–6
unemployment benefits 88
United Kingdom, *see* UK
United States, *see* US
'untimely thinking' 194
Unzeitgemäss Betrachtungen (*Untimely Meditations*) 31
up-skilling 7
Urry, John 21–2, 30, 59, 67, 83
US 7, 103, 113, 131, 152, 175, 187–90
  Deputy Treasury Secretary 189
  and the living wage 103
  minimum wage work in the 102
  state based welfare reforms 102
  sub-prime mortgage bonds 133

Victorian Department of Education Action Plan 122, 124
Victorian State Government 116, 135
Virgin Blue 99–100
vocations 95–6, 106–11, 196
von Hayek, Frederich 90–1

wages 2, 102–3, 105
  living 1, 103
  low 59, 100
  minimum 1, 102–5
  subsistence 103
Wal-Mart 103, 105, 157
Warhurst C. 174–5
Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts 195
Waterman, Bob 78
Watson, Ruth 146
Wayland, Jimmy 179
Weber, Max 5, 9, 14, 21, 27, 54–5, 62, 68, 71, 73–8, 93, 149, 180
Weissman, Robert 130–1
Welch, Jack 130
welfare 88–9, 102–3, 120
  government 88–90
  policies 90
  recipients 102
  social 87
  state 1, 88, 91
Wells, Gordon 12, 73–4, 190
Whitehead, S. 126, 182
Wilde, Oscar 101
Willicomb Billows Feeding Machine 171
Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture is Ruling our Lives 10, 157, 160, 172
WLB 2, 10, 60, 159, 163–6, 167, 169, 171–81, 183, 196
  agenda 175
  banner of 179, 183
  discourses 176, 179–83

'disembedding' and 'reembedding of social systems 167
'emptying of space' 167
ethic of performance 179–83
flexibilisation of time 172–9
initiatives 175
programmes 176, 178, 180, 182
'regularised social organisation of production' 166
Work, Consumerism and the New Poor 7
Work Choices (policy of the Howard government) 2
work-life balance, *see* WLB
work motivation 176
work organisations 21, 51, 169, 171, 176
work regimes 7, 22, 96–7, 102
intensified 183
new 10, 13, 66
workers 6, 10–11, 14, 38, 53, 59, 68–9, 98, 118–19, 163, 166, 170–1, 175–6, 180, 182–3
factory 85
migrant 186
workforce 7, 55–6, 59, 66, 157–8, 173, 178
working families 2–4
Working in Jamie's Kitchen: Salvation, Passion and Young Workers 145–8
Working Time Regulations (European Union) 173
workplace health programmes 117, 136–8, 176–8, 180
workplace rules 105
workplace stress 117–19, 128, 130, 135, 181
workplaces 10, 16, 98–9, 116–18, 150, 163, 172, 175, 177, 179, 184, 196
contemporary 180, 182
low-wage 105
medium-wage 105
reshaped 182
twenty-first century 163, 176
workspaces 164, 172, 177
digital 163
physical 177
virtual 156
World War II 66

'zero-drag' employees 156

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